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The thesis’ main contribution pertains to demonstrating the importance of factoring in the 
agency of Islamists when studying militant Islamist activism. The surrounding structural and 
cultural conditions offer opportunities and pose constraints that in turn are interpreted by 
Islamist activists. Islamists, however, are not equally involved in processes of strategic framing 
and decision making. The inside of militant Islamist activism is more dynamic than it is often 
depicted as it hosts constant competitions over power, wealth, prestige, and influence. The 
research shows that intra-movement vying for power is central to determining the group’s 
actions and strategic preferences in response to turning points in the political milieu. 
The thesis questions the validity and utility of scholarly attempts to “exceptionalise” Salafi-
Jihadism on the bases of being extant and rigid. The research does so by showing that Salafi-
Jihadism is an extension of the modern phenomenon of Islamism. The qualitative analysis of 
the discourse of al-Nusra’s ideologues demonstrates that Salafi-Jihadists share with other 
Islamists the centrality of politics in their discourse, the long-term objectives of activism, and 
the vision of how an ideal society should be. Notwithstanding such ideological conformity, 
there is ample room for strategic prioritisations, manoeuvrings, and adaptations in Salafi-
Jihadist activism. The historical and discursive experiences of Salafi-Jihadists reveal a 
dialectical interplay between ideology and pragmatism. The necessity to bridge the gap 
between discourse and real-life considerations has given rise to new and modified branches 
in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). These aspects of religion are theorised and elaborated by an 
increasingly empowered class of jihadist strategists.  
Specific choices made by the strategists have shaped the trajectory of al-Nusra and 
determined its oscillation between “moderation” and “radicalism” between 2012 and 2018. 
Armed with relevant geopolitical knowledge, the strategists marginalised other competing 
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The rise of al-Nusra Front during the course of the Syrian civil war cannot be explained in 
military terms alone. Al-Nusra’s epistemic elite1 has been engrossed in complementary 
battles of words and thoughts that have proven indispensable for the very survival of their 
organisation. Al-Nusra’s propaganda messages and mobilisation campaigns have depended 
on ideological and strategic guidelines sketched by specific epistemic leaders such as Eyad al-
Qunaibi, Tariq Abdelhaleem, Hani el-Sibaʿi, and Abdul Rahim Attoun. Using a familiar Islamist 
discourse, these figures have woven the discursive fabric that held members of al-Nusra Front 
together. At times, especially between 2012 and 2015, the written and recorded messages of 
these figures mobilised members of al-Nusra ideologically, strengthened their morale, and 
provided them with reasons to keep fighting and remain committed to their organisation 
despite suffering military losses at the hands of the Syrian regime and al-Nusra’s rival brother, 
namely the Islamic State group (IS). Strategically, such ideational works have defined the 
“enemy” to members of al-Nusra and determined their stance from the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and powerful militant Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham Movement and Jaysh al-
Islam. As such, the role played by Islamist ideologues and strategists is vital to legitimating, 
directing, and sustaining the activism of al-Nusra Front.  
However, the Islamists’ processes of ideational framing do not take place in a vacuum. Several 
transformative events along the line of the conflict in Syria have imposed immense pressures 
on processes of ideational framing in militant Islamist activism. The structural constraints 
caused chiefly by the rapid rise of ISIS in 2013 and 2014 and the Russian military intervention 
in September 2015 reversed al-Nusra’s earlier territorial expansion. Furthermore, the 
initiation of political negotiations between the al-Assad regime and several opposition groups 
in January 2017 has further isolated al-Nusra pushing it back and propelling it to tighten its 
grip over the Idlib province. These changes, among others, forced al-Nusra Front to undergo 
processes of restructuring and rebranding in 2016 and 2017 and acquiesce to Turkey’s 
decision to establish military ‘observation posts’ in areas controlled by al-Nusra.  
 
1 Key Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists form together an epistemic leadership whose rulings are seen 
by their followers as sources of reference (Ar. marjiʿiyya). As such, the role of the group’s epistemic leaders 
(Ar. marajiʿ) is decisive for highly ideological organisations such as al-Nusra Front. 
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Gradually, the widening gap between the discourse and the actions of al-Nusra Front has 
drained its reputational capital locally and propelled certain members of its epistemic 
leadership, such as the Egyptian-Canadian scholar Tariq Abdelaleem, Jordanian Sami al-
ʿUraydi, and the once widely followed Salafi-Jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to 
distance themselves from the organisation and to publicly criticise its performance and 
strategic choices. It is thus imperative to research the discourse of al-Nusra Front and the 
manner through which epistemic leaders use discourse strategically in addition to the factors 
that play into the success or failure of their efforts and the limits of their strategic 
manoeuvrability.  
The thesis’ main contribution pertains to demonstrating the importance of factoring 
in the agency of Islamists when studying militant Islamist activism. The surrounding structural 
conditions and cultural climate offer opportunities and pose constraints that, in turn, are 
interpreted by Islamist activists. Islamists, however, are not standing on an equal footing 
when it comes to power and influence nor are they equally involved in processes of strategic 
framing and decision making. The inside of militant Islamist activism is more dynamic than it 
is often depicted as it hosts a constant competition over power, wealth, prestige, and 
influence. Intra-movement vying for power in the case of al-Nusra Front has been central to 
determining the group’s actions and strategic preferences in response to certain turning 
points and changes in the political milieu during the civil war in Syria. This makes it immensely 
significant to observe the main competing currents and alliances within al-Nusra Front in 
addition to comprehending their incentives and divergences. 
Accounting for the agency of Islamists is a scholarly effort that intends to bring more balance 
and thickness to the Culturalist and Structuralist approaches to militant Islamist activism. The 
Culturalist approach to Islamism suggests the omnipresence of Islamic culture which is 
reminiscent of older and culturally-essentialising Orientalist perspectives that presented fixed 
characterisation of Muslim societies based on the claim that these societies manifest cultural 
and political continuities throughout history. It is worth noting that the famous historian 
Bernard Lewis is a leading figure in a scholarly trend that adopts a religio-centric approach to 
study Muslim cultures and societies. The crux of Lewis’ argument revolves around the 
conviction that what holds “the Muslim society” together is an unchanging culture and an 
historical experience that is by and large informed by a monolithic Islamic identity. Hence, it 
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is through focusing on Islam that these perspectives attempt to explain the phenomenon of 
Islamism and it is violent manifestations. 
In this research, criticising the Culturalist approach does not stem from the idea that cultural 
thoughts and religious convictions are irrelevant to the emergence and evolvement of 
modern Islamist activism. Rather, the problem arises only when their impact is overstated 
based on an a priori position. Additionally, one needs to entertain the idea that such pre-
existing cultural elements must pass through lengthy processes of signification and framing 
before becoming relevant to modern-day social and political affairs. 
On the other hand, some scholars provide sheer structuralist analysis of the emergence of 
Islamism. Most structural-historical analyses lead to perceiving the recent rise of radical 
Islamism as an unavoidable reaction to Western hegemony, domestic despotism in various 
parts of the Muslim world, and other historical conditions. There is a lot of truth in such 
historical analyses, but at the same time they tend to disregard the agency of the Islamists 
themselves and portray them as mere reactors. Clearly, there is a lot of dogma and ideological 
commitment among Islamist activists, but there is also a lot of rationality and strategic 
planning. In this regard, Jordanian scholar and expert in militant Islamism Hassan Abu Haniyeh 
promises to offer explanations that are different from simplistic Orientalist interpretations 
that reduce the causes of the jihadist phenomenon to long-standing cultural factors 
emanating from Islam itself (Abu Haniyeh, p. 8). Therefore, Abu Haniyeh employs a political 
and economic framework that lends special significance to the impact of factors such as 
poverty, illiteracy, and oppression on the spread of violence and religious extremism. In this 
research, I hold that, in addition to these objective factors, there are subjective factors related 
to jihadist groups and networks themselves, as these groups are made up of individuals with 
their own visions, preferences, and reasons that may be linked to their upbringings, espoused 
belief systems, their own interests and their relationships with each other and the society 
around them. Considering that, Salafi-Jihadist organisations are perceived in this research as 
more than just passive actors, whether in terms of their response to the historical 
circumstances surrounding them, including religious interpretations, cultural and ideological 
patterns, and prevailing ways of thinking, or even with regard to their desire and ability to 
contribute consciously and purposefully to the making of reality surrounding them.  
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As such, neither of the two structural and cultural perspectives provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the rise of the Islamic State group, al-Nusra Front, Hurras al-Din, and others. 
Additionally, neglecting the agency of Islamists leads to the affirmation of the propaganda of 
jihadist groups, as these groups tend to hold others responsible for violence and destruction 
and show themselves as helpless with no choice but to defend the interests of the ummah. 
Jihadist movements have long invested in grievance and victimhood to frame their practices 
and violent methods as legitimate reactions to aggressions made by others while using these 
claims as a pretext to disregard many ethical and legal considerations. 
 
Moreover, the thesis questions the validity and utility of scholarly attempts to 
“exceptionalise” the ideology of Salafi-Jihadism on the bases of being extant and uniquely 
rigid. The research does so by showing that Salafi-Jihadism is an extension of the modern 
phenomenon of Islamism. Analysing the discourses of three of al-Nusra’s ideologues 
demonstrates that Salafi-Jihadist organisations share with other Islamists the centrality of 
politics in their discourse, the long-term objectives of activism, and the vision of how an ideal 
society should be. Given that the language of Islamism has recently become widespread in 
various parts of the Middle East for various reasons, the usage of the discourse of Islamism is 
strategically lucrative as it resonates with many people making mobilisation easier and 
rendering ideological fidelity itself a strategy.  
Notwithstanding such ideological conformity, there is ample room for strategic prioritisations, 
manoeuvrings, and adaptations in Salafi-Jihadist activism. Although Salafi-Jihadism offers a 
strategic framework that is distinguishable by its ostensible intransigence and constant 
emphasis on violence that usually takes the form of performing jihad against unbelievers and 
apostates, the historical and discursive experiences of Salafi-Jihadists reveal a dialectical 
interplay between ideology and pragmatism. In this respect, jihadist strategists play a decisive 
intermediary role that determines the momentary outcomes of the ideology-reality relations. 
The necessity to bridge the gap between the discourse of Salafi-Jihadism and real-life 
considerations has given rise to new and modified branches in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). 
These aspects of religion that deal with reality are theorised and elaborated by an increasingly 
empowered class of jihadist strategists.  
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Within al-Nusra Front, specific choices made by a group of strategists have shaped the 
trajectory of their organisation and its oscillation between “moderation” and “radicalism” 
between 2012 and 2018. Armed with a relevant geo-political knowledge, a group of strategic 
leaders successfully marginalised other competing currents based on accusing them of being 
either ghulat (extremist and intransigent) or too lenient and compromising. As such, claims 
to authenticity and moderation have been used strategically in the intra-Nusra power 
competition as well.  
In this research I contextualise the strategies, tactics, and mobilising discourses developed 
and utilised by militant Islamists. On one hand, contextualising the Salafi-Jihadist 
organisations, culturally and historically, is intended to reveal whether their violent method 
is an essential ‘marker of identity’ or a tactic chosen by rational agents given the available 
opportunities and constraints. The political opportunities perspective, for example, helps to 
explain how the structure of polity and the practices of ruling elites in each state may affect 
the Islamists’ method of activism and the success of their mobilisation efforts. On the other 
hand, perceiving militant Islamist activism as a form of collective action that happens within 
certain temporal conditions and cultural settings challenges the Culturalist approach that 
provides an ahistorical account of Islamism and the approach of Terrorism Studies that views 
militant Islamism as inherently and uncompromisingly violent (Burke, 2008). At the same 
time, using the perspectives of SMT to study militant Islamist activism may counter the fact 
that “most of the theories forged in the context of advanced industrial democracies stay 
there” (Meyer, 2002, p. 17), as it may provide “a new testing ground” and offer insights for 
broader and more critical debates on collective actions, social movements, and contentious 
politics.  
Besides, revisiting the roles of ideology and agency in shaping the discourse and actions of al-
Nusra Front and other Salafi-Jihadist organisations is intended to challenge the assumptions 
of a unidirectional relationship between ideology and ontology in Islamist activism which 
underlies two antithetical propositions: the first one entails that Islamic ideology generates 
uniform actions and attitudes which is embedded in theories such as Kepel’s “radicalisation 
of Islam”; the second proposition entails that Islamist activists unrestrictedly instrumentalise 
ideology to legitimate their actions and self-interests as Roy’s theory of “Islamisation of 
radicalism” indicates (Roy, 2017). On one hand, perceiving Islamist radicalisation and violence 
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as products of specific beliefs and readings glosses over the human agency in Islamist activism 
almost entirely. On the other hand, attempts to make sense of religiously framed violence 
based on amplifying the agency of individual members fails to realise the purposive and 
strategic aspects of organised Islamist activism whether taking the form of connected 
networks and cells, organisations with recognised hierarchies, or other organisational 
manifestations. There are cases of true believers, marginalised youths, affluent persons, and 
opportunists all being drawn to join militant Islamist movements making it implausible to 
pinpoint a simple explanation for radicalisation. What is most likely at paly is the existence of 
ideological and strategic processes of framing that are goal-oriented and carried out not 
randomly or by all or any member of an Islamist group, but by dedicated and experienced 
figures who are the frame-articulators. The planned and purposive ideational activities of 
frame-articulators provide a coherent and pertinent marjiʿiyya (source of reference) making 
it possible for the affluent, poor, educated, ignorant, and alienated individuals to belong to 
one Islamist group defending it and working towards achieving its goals.  
This research belongs to a growing trend within political science that is critical of the 
dominance of positivistic approaches in the field. Specifically, it challenges assumptions of 
possible predictability of political behaviours based on theories of rationality or simple causal 
relations. Having said that, this research aspires to bring to light the importance and 
complexity of processes of signification and sense-making in contentious politics. The basic 
hypothesis in the research is that processes of ideational framing do not happen in a random 
fashion; they are usually strategic and channelled towards achieving specific goals and serving 
the interests of certain actors. In short, the agency of actors, their cultural backgrounds, and 
their ideological commitments as well, all play decisive roles in shaping the methods and 
outcomes of collective actions. Following this, the research attempts to provide empirically 
supported answers regarding the impact of political opportunity structures on the making of 
discourse in militant Islamist organisations. Within this scholarly context, this research 
focuses on processes of strategic framing in al-Nusra Front; a militant Islamist organisation 
that presents an important case study.  
In this research, I use an interdisciplinary approach, that borrows extensively from sociology 
and political science, to study a highly political phenomenon, namely militant Islamist 
activism. The manifest impact of al-Nusra Front, IS group, and other violent, religious, and 
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identity-based movements on regional and international politics challenges the explanatory 
power of IR theories, particularly Realism and Neorealism. Therefore, more research is 
required to recognise the growing impact of non-state actors and transnational movements, 
the way they function and their impact locally and internationally. In this regard, the literature 
of Social Movement Theory (SMT) has witnessed the emergence of complementary 
perspectives that consider the impacts of culture, ideology, resources, and political 
opportunities on the trajectories of collective actions. Therefore, in this research I use SMT as 
a general theoretical framework focusing mainly on the impact of political opportunity 
structures on processes of strategic framing.  
This research has several scholarly implications in the field of Middle East politics. Studying 
the motives of Islamist ideologues and strategists reveals that, under a state of political 
closure and developmental failure, the religious authority may provide an alternative conduit 
to power in society and politics. This potential access to power is sought through the use of 
religious authority to construct a discourse that resonates with the present socio-political 
problems and with centuries-old Islamic traditions while claiming to provide an authentic 
representation of Islamic identity, an alternative form of polity, and an effective strategy 
grounded on a careful reading of the international relations, balances of power and identity 
politics. These purposeful processes of framing and signification tacitly respond to the 
challenges to traditional religious authorities caused by the introduction of modern 
educational institutions and political traditions that gave rise to secular elites as the main 
holders of power and authority in social and political affairs in most parts of the Middle East. 
In response to this reality, the discourse of Salafi-Jihadist organisations presents a critique of 
the existing order and asserts the necessity for a revolutionary change to restore the missing 
authoritative socio-political role of the class of religious scholars. 
Moreover, researching the work of ideologues and strategists in al-Nusra Front has several 
policy implications. Addressing the cruciality of ideational framing in militant Islamism means 
it is more effective to concentrate counter-terrorism efforts on dismantling networks of 
epistemic leadership in militant Islamist organisations. The stability and durability of such 
networks will keep the danger of reviving militant Islamist activism present and will render 
any military achievements only temporary. Therefore, military and intelligence operations 
that target terrorist designated groups must be accompanied by efforts to disrupt the work 
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of extremist ideologues and prevent them from using their “epistemic and normative 
authority” to mobilise young Muslims and persuade them to engage in militant Islamist 
activism. Such obstructive efforts may take the form of filing lawsuits, restricted use of social 
media platforms and giving voice to Islamic scholars who are capable of challenging extremist 
theological narratives and interpretations. This stems from a solid conviction that confronting 
a multi-faceted phenomenon such as militant Islamist activism necessarily requires a 
multidimensional approach and concerted efforts. 
Research Questions 
The notion that Islamism is a product of certain historical conditions has recently become 
widespread among scholars of political Islam. This Post-Orientalist attitude implies that there 
is nothing intrinsic to Islam that makes it necessarily violent or politically engaging (Bayat, 
2007, p. 4). In order to become a political ideology that provides rulings and principles 
relevant to the present problems, Islamic traditions, values, and symbols pass through various 
interpretative, mobilizational and organisational processes. These processes are dynamic and 
agentic in nature. It is the purposive efforts and motivational factors behind politicising and 
strategizing Islam that is being overlooked in the study of Islamism and Islamist activism.  
This research builds on the Post-Orientalist traditions to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis that addresses the agency of Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ (influential figures whose 
thoughts and rulings are used as references) and their role in linking ideology and action.  
To that end, in this research I attempt to provide empirically supported answers to the 
following questions:  
What are the defining features and themes of the mobilising discourse of the ideologues of 
al-Nusra Front? 
What roles do the Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists play? And how do they articulate 
their ideational and strategic frames? 
How adaptable is the discourse of al-Nusra Front? And do processes of ideological and 
strategic framing change in response to structural changes in the surrounding environment? 
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Research design   
In this research I employ a constructivist approach to study processes of framing and 
meaning-making in a militant and highly ideological organisation, namely al-Nusra Front. This 
approach entails that militant Islamism is not an outcome of sheer structural changes, nor is 
it a manifestation of age-old cultural currents. Instead, it posits that militant Islamist activism 
is heavily affected by processes of ideological and strategic framings carried out by agents 
constantly faced with various structural constraints and opportunities. 
Therefore, the end-goal of this research is to investigate two things: firstly, the strategic use 
of ideology, and secondly, the adaptability of processes of strategic framing in militant 
Islamist activism. Thus, I will focus on studying al-Nusra’s ideological and strategic framings in 
addition to the adaptability of these framings. To that end, the research is divided into seven 
chapters in addition to an introduction and a general conclusion. The main findings will be 
elaborated and discussed in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters.   
The first empirical chapter (Chapter Four) includes analyses of the structural features of the 
Salafi-Jihadist discourse used by al-Nusra’s ideologues to mobilise Muslims and justify the 
need for and the importance of al-Nusra’s activism. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 
Five) is dedicated to delving beyond the ideological surface of al-Nusra’s discourse. This 
involves bringing to the fore key strands and themes found in the discourse of al-Nusra and 
studying them systematically. The qualitative approach in this chapter is meant to reveal the 
manner through which the ideological discourse of Islamism and the various branches of 
Islamic jurisprudence are used strategically to advance the activism of al-Nusra in Syria and 
establish its unique brand under the context in Syria and within a highly competitive “jihad 
market”. The third empirical chapter (Chapter Six) will study the issue of marjiʿiyya aiming to 
illuminate the divisions and competitions over authority inside al-Nusra Front. The focus will 
be on the roles played by strategists and ideologues and the nature of their interrelations. 
The last empirical chapter (Chapter Seven) will examine al-Nusra Front’s strategic use of 
discourse through studying the group’s variable employment of the “moderation” discourse 
in its relations with the Islamic State group, factions of the armed opposition, and internally 
during the conflict in Syria.  
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Methodologically, I combine discourse analysis and frame analysis to produce a contextual 
study of al-Nusra’s strategic and ideological frames. The starting point in studying collective 
action frames revolves around tracing “framings that are widely shared and based on the 
collective history, symbols, and cultural images” (Johnston & Alimi, 2013, p. 456). As such, I 
will study the structure of each of the analysed texts, which involves highlighting the themes 
and concepts that the author has chosen to foreground or background in addition to what the 
text presupposes in terms of attitudes and viewpoints (Paltridge, 2012, p. 194). The 
explanatory power of this initial method remains limited but identifying what the text is about 
and the presentation and prioritisation of topics are indispensable to any subsequent critical 
analyses.  
A critical analysis of texts starts with deciding the type of discourse that the text belongs to 
and researching the extent to which the text represents its genre (Paltridge, 2012, p. 194). 
Hence, using the established techniques of discourse analysis, I will reveal the skeletal 
ideological structure of the Salafi-Jihadist discourse—i.e., its ideological matrix. At this stage, 
I will use the software NVivo to study the structure and linguistic features of the texts. I will 
analyse and compare the ideological aspects of texts based on the following three criteria:  
The diagnostic question of what is wrong?, the prognostic question of what should be 
done?, and the nature of the motivational call for action.  
Each of these three major themes encompasses several identifying strands2. For example, in 
order to reveal the embedded diagnostic frames in the texts I will use NVivo to look for the 
following discursive strands:  
(1) Criticising the nation-state.  
(2) Grievance and victimhood.  
(3) Blaming the “other”.  
In turn, each of these strands is measured based on the frequency/weight of its linked 
codes3.  
 
2 A discourse strand is an assemblage of thematically linked codes or subthemes. 
3 In qualitative research, a code is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, 





Figure 1 An example of the structure of one discursive strand 
 
The methods of coding and code-clustering in this research are original and based on my 
knowledge of the literature on Islamism. In light of my extensive review of the various 
definitions of and approaches to Islamism, I have created clusters of codes that are linked 
thematically and signify common ideas. These linked codes are then traced in the analysed 
texts using the software NVivo.  
The initial stage of heuristic modelling will then be followed by an interpretative assessment 
of ‘ideological fidelity’ through examining whether the structures and features of the current 
discourse of al-Nusra Front, represented by the selected sample, conform to the classical 
discourse of Islamism. This is operationalised through juxtaposing the ideological features of 
the analysed texts with each other and comparing them with those exhibited mainly in Qutb’s 
seminal work Maʿalim fi al-Tarik (Milestones) (1964) which is taken as a point of reference.  
After revealing the ideological aspects of the discourse of al-Nusra Front, I will critically 
analyse the selected set of Salafi-Jihadist works focusing on presenting situational analyses of 
processes of purposeful and strategic framing. Therefore, I will research the construction and 
alignment of the following themes: maslaha (public interest) and pragmatism, jihad and the 
management of violence, and the Arab Spring and the discursive transition from elitism to 
populism.  
Ideology 
what is wrong? 
. 
Blaming the "other" 





In addition to that, I present a contextual analysis of the discourse of al-Nusra Front. This 
involves comparing the discourses of al-Nusra before and after key events. The main objective 
here is to conduct an “empirically based analysis of framing processes through comparisons 
of frame structures before and after these events” (Johnston & Alimi, 2013, p. 461). In the 
course of the conflict in Syria, there have been several incidents that represented 
“transformative events” for al-Nusra Front, discursively and organisationally. These events 
include: 
- April 2013: ISIS expands in Syria and al-Nusra responds by pledging allegiance to al-
Qaeda. 
- July 2016: Al-Nusra disbands from al-Qaeda under domestic and international 
pressures.  
- December 2016: The Syrian regime regains Aleppo and al-Nusra retreats and 
concentrates its military presence in Idlib. 
- January 2017: The commencement of negotiations between the opposition and the 
Syrian regime and consequently al-Nusra leads a military Islamist coalition under the 
name Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. 
These are transformative events that represent “turning points in structural change, 
concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity” (McAdam & Sewell, 2001, p. 102), 
and thus can be indicators or markers of any changes in the discourse and probably the 
ideology of al-Nusra Front. This diachronic approach is useful to determine what is stable and 
what is changeable in the discourse of the Salafi-Jihadist organisation. Taking the discourse of 
“moderation” as an example, I will examine al-Nusra Front’s variable usage of discourse and 
the reasons behind the group’s oscillation between “moderation” and “radicalism” 
throughout the conflict in Syria.  
This research is a challenging attempt to read the mind of a social movement. Luckily, the 
thoughts and strategies of this mind are available in the form of written and visual materials. 
The selected sample in this research includes primary materials written by influential Salafi-
Jihadist ideologues and strategists such as Abu Musʿab al-Suri, Tariq Abdelhaleem, Eyad al-
Qunaibi, Abdul Rahim Attoun, Abdallah b. Muhammad, and Mazhar al-Wais. The writings of 
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these figures have constructed al-Nusra’s ideology and outlook and established its brand in 
the world of militant Islamist activism. Besides, I will reflect on al-Nusra’s statements in 
response to major organisational and military developments during the civil war in Syria in 
addition to extracts from the speeches of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of al-
Nusra Front, and from al-Nusra-affiliated publications such as Al Risalah Magazine and Ebaa 
Weekly Newsletter. The vast majority of these primary sources are in Arabic, which is my 
native language, therefore I will be able to understand and analyse the original texts. 
Key concepts  
The terms “strategy” and “strategic framing” appear repeatedly in the research. Simply 
defined, “strategy” is used to refer to the ways militant Islamist groups, and other collective 
actors, turn what they have into what they need to achieve what they want (Ganz, 2009). On 
the other hand, strategic framing is understood as a purposeful and deliberate ideational 
endeavour that aspires to advance a shared cause and achieve certain goals considering 
specific historical conditions. It reflects the vision of a movement, or a group within a 
movement, and often takes the form of written notes and plans sketched by strategists. 
Additionally, the concept of “agency” is used in the research to refer to the capacity of actors 
“to appropriate, reproduce, and, potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories 
and conditions of action in accordance with their personal and collective ideals, interests, and 
commitments” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1443). In addition to these technical terms, 
the following Islamic terms are frequently used in the research. 
Marjiʿ (plural: marajiʿ) literally means “reference” and the related word marjiʿiyya means 
“epistemic and normative frame of reference”. In the world of Islamist activism, marjiʿiyya is 
a significant concept that is used to describe the ideological inclination and doctrinal 
background of a group or an individual. In the context of Salafi-Jihadist activism, the issue of 
marjiʿiyya has recently become essential to members of groups such as al-Nusra Front. 
Members of jihadist groups do not plan and act upon their own reasoning and self-interests; 
rather, they usually follow certain marajiʿ, especially in relation to strategic choices. Jihadist 
marajiʿ are authorised to practice ijtihad (legal reasoning). As will be clarified later, regulating 
the practice of ijtihad is part and parcel of debates about issues of authority and distribution 
of power in organised jihadist activism. With these characteristics, jihadist marajiʿ are the 
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“content creators” in the world of jihadist activism who provide their followers with rulings 
and instructions along with religious and strategic justifications that shape their perceptions.  
Salafism, which is a school of thought and a religious movement within Sunni Islam, rests upon 
several principles such as eliminating bidʿa (innovation), fighting shirk (ascribing partners to 
God), and maintaining tawheed (belief in the oneness of God). The jihadists among the Salafis 
(henceforth Salafi-Jihadists) espouse the common Salafist principles but they seek to 
implement their religiously framed vision of society and politics through practising jihad. For 
Salafi-Jihadists, moving from a state of jahilyya (when shariʿa law is not applied) to a state of 
hakimiyya (where sovereignty belongs solely to God) is possible only through performing 
jihad.  
Besides, hijrah, which is an old Islamic concept that means migrating from places of 
mainstream kufr when bringing about change is not feasible, has been appropriated by Salafi-
Jihadists who, since the Afghan jihad, have been launching propaganda campaigns calling on 
young Muslims to migrate to places of jihad to perform a religious duty and express solidarity 
with the rest of the ummah (community of believers). For Salafi-Jihadists, practising hijrah is 
a strong expression of one’s commitment to the Islamic principle of al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty 
and disavowal) which means loyalty to the ummah of Islam and disavowal of kuffar 
(unbelievers). 
Thesis Overview 
The first chapter presents a conceptual framework that focuses on two concepts: Islamism 
and Salafi-Jihadism. After reviewing the literature on Islamism in the first section, I critically 
revisit the different definitions of Salafi-Jihadism in the second section. In the third section I 
trace the evolvement of Salafi-Jihadism through deconstructing its ideological structure and 
providing an overview of its organisational manifestations in the past few decades, 
particularly in the Arab world. 
In the second chapter I contextualise the rise of al-Nusra Front historically by unravelling the 
direct factors and the deep-seated reasons that led to the spread of Salafi-Jihadism in Syria 
soon after the outbreak of the popular uprising in March 2011. The first section deals with 
the state of religious authority in Syria and its shifts in modern times. It also examines the role 
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of the oppressive practices of the al-Assad regime in fuelling religious extremism and pushing 
more people into joining militant Islamist organisations. The second section is dedicated to 
researching the effect of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent rising 
sectarian tensions in the region. In the third section, I study the impact of the Arab Spring 
uprisings on the spread of Salafi-Jihadism. The last section includes details concerning the 
circumstances of the birth of al-Nusra Front in addition to the group’s organisational structure 
and management of symbolic and material resources.  
In the third chapter I outline the theoretical framework of the research. I commence by 
highlighting the importance and relevance of Social Movement Theory to the study of militant 
Islamism. I then review the three main perspectives of SMT—resource mobilisation, political 
opportunities, and framing processes. Within the literature of SMT, I focus on framing 
processes and dedicate a section to the agency of frame-articulators. In the following section 
I deal with levels of framing in militant Islamist activism and explain the connection among 
the ideology of Islamism, the strategy of Salafi-Jihadism, and the short-lived organisational 
frames. In the last section I explain why Discourse Analysis techniques may operationalise the 
theory of framing processes and can be an appropriate method to the study of ideological 
and strategic framing in militant Islamist activism.  
In the fourth chapter I present the findings regarding the nature and main features of the 
ideological discourse of al-Nusra Front. This chapter contains five sections, the first of which 
deals with diagnostic framing in the discourse of the ideologues of al-Nusra. In the second 
section I present the findings regarding the prognostic framing in al-Nusra’s discourse. The 
third section includes the findings about the motivational framing in al-Nusra’s discourse. The 
fourth section discusses the issue of “ideological fidelity” focusing on revealing the extent to 
which the discourse of al-Nusra conforms to the general ideological discourse of Islamism as 
present chiefly in the works of Sayyid Qutb. In this section I discuss possible reasons of 
ideological conformity and the strategic use of a resonant discourse. In the last section I 
discuss the importance of ideological framing in jihadist activism and underscore the 
centrality of ideology among the contributing factors to radicalisation.  
In the fifth chapter I explain how the increasing significance of strategic framing has led to 
changing the nature of religious discourse which has taken the form of new and modified 
branches of Islamic jurisprudence. The first section discusses the re-emergence and increasing 
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employment of fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality jurisprudence), fiqh al-jihad (jihad jurisprudence), and 
fiqh al-awlawiyyat (priorities jurisprudence). In the second section I reveal how the increasing 
importance of strategic framing and political reasoning in jihadist activism provided al-Nusra 
Front with desperately needed religious justifications of the group’s pragmatism and 
recurrent strategic shifts. 
In the sixth chapter I discuss intra-Jihadism vying for authority and control and observe the 
rise of strategists following al-Nusra’s formative period. In the first section I unpack the 
concept of marjiʿiyya which refers to Salafi-Jihadist referential authority. The second section 
highlights the criticisms of the traditional Salafist approach to authority and politics made 
recently by Salafi-Jihadist referential figures. In the third section I observe a jihadist division 
of labour and explain the different roles played by strategists and ideologues in Salafi-Jihadist 
activism while reflecting on the experience of al-Nusra Front. The last section includes a 
discussion of the reasons for the recent rise of strategic referential authority in jihadist 
activism.  
In the seventh chapter I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs) reflecting on the 
case of al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between “moderation” and “radicalism” 
between 2012 and 2017. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section 
examines al-Nusra’s responses to the rise of ISIS in a highly competitive “jihad market”. The 
second section focuses on the relations between al-Nusra and factions of the Free Syrian 
Army and analyses the changes to these relations over the period between 2012 and 2017. In 
the third section I explore the different currents within al-Nusra Front and their competition 
over power and legitimacy and analyse the impact of that competition on the overall 
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In this chapter I review the literature on the concepts of Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism, both of 
which are closely relevant to the study of the discourses and actions of al-Nusra Front in Syria 
between 2011 and 2018. Despite the fact that the two concepts have increasingly become 
extremely popular in the fields of Islamic studies, International Relations, and Middle East 
politics, it is too often that one finds them being used to mean different and sometimes 
opposite things. In the following sections, I commence by reviewing the different approaches 
to Islamism, focusing mainly on the ‘culturalist’ and the ‘structuralist’ approaches in addition 
to Social Movement Theory (SMT). Consequently, I explain why SMT provides a more inclusive 
understanding of the various aspects of Islamism. SMT thus provides the tools for an in-depth 
analysis of Islamist organisations such as the Nusra Front, which goes beyond seeing militant 
Salafi-Jihadism as a cultural augmentation or a mechanistic response to the challenges of 
modernity. I conclude this section by pointing out to the analytic utility of defining Islamism 
as a modern ideology that revolves around the inseparability of Islam and politics. In the 
second section, I review the definitions of Salafi-Jihadism and discuss the problems of 
overcategorization and doctrinal affiliation in defining Salafi-Jihadism which stem from 
ignoring changes in strategies and the agency of Islamists. I then discuss why we need a more 
sophisticated understanding of the superstructure of Salafi-Jihadist organisations. Hence, I 
suggest a tripartite conceptual paradigm that includes Islamism, Salafi-Jihadism, and short-
lived operational frames. These interrelated levels represent the work of epistemic leadership 
that consists of ideologues, strategists, and organisational leaders.  
The third section is dedicated to tracing the discursive and organisational evolvements of 
Salafi-Jihadism. This is an important section that contextualises the rise of al-Nusra Front and 
other competing jihadist groups. In the first part I deal with the Islamic concepts that form 
the main ideological pillars of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism such as hakimiyya, jahiliyya, 
hijrah, and al-wala’ wal bara’. In the second part of this section, I focus on the historical 
development of Salafi-Jihadist activism through tracing the strategies pursued by its main 
organisational representatives including al-Qaeda Central (AQC), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
that was a precursor of ISIS. This theoretical contextualisation is needed for a better 
understanding of the birth of al-Nusra Front and its discursive and behavioural choices during 
the conflict in Syria. In the final part I present a review of Hasan Abu Haniyeh’s account of the 
30 
 
evolvement of “Arab Jihadism” and criticise his apparent neglect of the agency of the Islamists 
themselves rendering them mere reactors. I argue that certainly there is a lot of dogma and 
ideological commitment among Islamist activists, but there is also a lot of rationality and 
strategic planning. I conclude by emphasizing that the constant and unstable dialectic 
relationship between ideology and reality makes it extremely difficult to predict the course of 
jihadist movements.  
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Islamism: revisiting the concept  
The manifest variety of tactics and strategic preferences adopted by militant Islamist 
organisations in Syria, including al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and ISIS, conceals an 
overarching ideological background that is usually referred to as ‘Islamism’.  
Deciding whether Islamism signifies a political ideology, a social movement, a cultural 
framework, a religious doctrine, or a combination of all of these, is highly dependent on the 
adopted perspective. In this section I will review the ‘culturalist explanations’ of Islamism 
which postulate the existence of historical continuities and cultural uniformities in Muslim 
societies. I will also review the structuralist approaches which perceive Islamism as a modern 
phenomenon caused by historical changes in the fields of society, economy, and politics. After 
that, I explain why Social Movement Theory may provide more accurate and comprehensive 
insights into Islamist activism. 
One of the phenomenon’s observable manifestations is the heavy discursive presence of 
Islam in the public sphere in modern times. Notwithstanding, the newness and ubiquity of 
such public presence of Islam form a bone of contention among scholars. Islam’s becoming a 
‘source of publicness’ is explained by Armando Salvatore as “the reconstruction of Islam as a 
vehicle of social change, a principle of social order and an instrument for the assumption of 
both active and passive roles among ever wider social groups” (Salvatore, 1996: 292). 
Salvatore’s acknowledgement of the increasingly ubiquitous presence of Islam in modern 
times goes in line with the thesis of Islamic revival (sometimes called resurgence or awakening 
of Islam) which was particularly popular in the 1980s and 1990s (Haddad, Esposito, & Voll, 
1991; Lapidus, 1997; Esposito, 1983; Kramer, 1996). In spite of the popularity of such 
observations, it is imperative to note that not all scholars of political Islam accept that the rise 
of Islamist discourse and activism is a new phenomenon affected by novel conditions specific 
to the twentieth century. Also, not all approaches to Islamism set clear boundaries between 
what is cultural and what is socio-political. Some scholars postulate the existence of a stable 
Islamic discourse and patterns of behaviour that are traceable to a monolithic Islamic culture. 
Eickelman and Piscatori (1996), for example, maintain that ““Islam” constitutes the language 
of politics in the Muslim world. Although multiple interpretations can exist, Islam is a 
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relatively stable type of expression and thus constitutes a discursive but culturally specific 
genre of politics” (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12).  
Besides, the cultural aspect of Islamism is stressed by Cesari in her recent book What is 
Political Islam? (2018). Reflecting on her research in Egypt and Turkey, Cesari argues that 
Islamism is not “merely an ideology. More accurately, political Islam is the cultural bedrock 
on which both nationalist and Islamist ideologies are grounded” (Cesari, 2018, p. 7). In this 
way she emphasises the cultural essence of Islamism in an attempt to cast more seriousness 
on the phenomenon and to show its far-reaching and long-lasting effect. This approach 
conflates political Islam with Islamic culture and implies the existence of a static form of 
religious culture that permeates and affects all sorts of political activism in Muslim-majority 
countries. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Cesari’s approach leads to a conclusion that 
“global political Islam, especially in its radical forms, is the global dissemination and alteration 
of the national political cultures that see the ummah as a transnational imagined community” 
(Cesari, 2018, p. 9). According to this perspective, both governments and oppositions in 
Muslim countries are reliant on a political discourse that stems from Islam.  
Conflating the socio-political ideology of Islamism with Islamic culture ignores a fundamental 
difference between ideology and culture. While both concepts refer to systems of 
signification, Raymond Williams (1989) explains how, unlike an ideology, culture is “ordinary” 
in the sense that “there is not a special class, or group of men [sic], who are involved in the 
creation of meanings and values, either in a general sense or in specific art and belief” 
(Williams, 1989, p. 84, cited in Storey, 2010, p.5). Recognising this point of divergence is 
necessary for an accurate understanding of the making of political Islamic ideologies and 
discourses that are products of the writings and sayings of a finite number of widely known 
ideologues, propagandists, and strategists.  
It should be noted that the emphasis on the omnipresence of Islamic culture is reminiscent of 
older and culturally-essentialising perspectives that presented fixed characterisation of 
Muslim societies based on the claim that these societies manifest cultural and political 
continuities throughout history. It is through focusing on Islam that these perspectives 
attempt to explain Islamism (Ismail, 2011, p. 18). The famous historian Bernard Lewis is a 
leading figure in a scholarly trend that adopts a religio-centric approach to study Muslim 
cultures and societies. Lewis maintains that: “In the Western world, the basic unit of human 
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organisation is the nation . . . This is then subdivided in various ways, one of which is by 
religion. Muslims, however, tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups but a 
religion subdivided into nations” (Lewis, 2003, p. xix). This stereotyping entails that what 
holds the Muslim society together is an unchanging culture and a historical experience that is 
by and large informed by a monolithic Islamic identity.  
A thorough critique of this perspective comes from Sami Zubaida who scrutinises Ernest 
Gellner’s approach which focuses on the persistence of certain intellectual trends and socio-
political practices since the early stages of Islam (Zubaida, 1995). Arguing in line with the 
Weberian perspective regarding the centrality of ‘superstructural’ elements in determining a 
society’s potentials (Coser, 1977, pp. 227-228), Gellner suggests that the Muslim society is 
characterised by weak state institutions and a strong culture emanating from Islam (Gellner, 
2006; 1992, pp. 2-22). Zubaida demonstrates how such contemporary, totalising approaches 
replicate the classic Orientalist way of perceiving Islam and the Orient, although they often 
reach different conclusions. Specifically, Orientalist scholars described Muslim societies as 
consisting of mighty state apparatuses ruling weak and unorganised societies, which is the 
opposite to modern assumptions about the predominance of Islamic culture and traditions 
over all other aspects of life in Muslim societies (Zubaida, 1995, p. 153). Salwa Ismail also 
criticises ‘meta-narrative’ approaches on the grounds that they are not empirically supported 
and lead to a static perception of Muslim societies (Ismail, 2006, pp. 4-6). Ironically, scholars 
who use a master-narrative framework to study Islamist activism share with the Islamists the 
very notion of an exaggerated role of Islam in determining and explicating the natures and 
trajectories of Muslim societies.4 
This is not to say that cultural thoughts and religious convictions are irrelevant to the 
emergence and evolvement of modern Islamist activism. Rather, the problem arises only 
when their impact is overstated based on an a priori position. In this regard, Ayubi states that 
“the Islamist doctrine was not a ready-made body of knowledge that was simply neglected in 
the past and was now being re-adopted.” Ayubi explains that “the Islamists had to ‘dig’ for 
the sources and to struggle over re-interpreting and reconstructing them” (Ayubi, 1991, p. 
93). For instance, Qutb’s thoughts and religious interpretations, most of which he borrowed 
 
4 This point is well explained by John L. Esposito in his: The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (1999), and in John 
A. Turner’s Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad (2014). 
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from his contemporary Maududi, and from medieval theologians like Ahmad b. Taymiyya (d. 
1328) and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), have indeed become cornerstones of 
the Salafi-Jihadist ideology embraced by current radical Islamist formations. Nevertheless, 
such thoughts had to pass through lengthy processes of purposive framing before becoming 
relevant to modern-day politics and social affairs. 
 
In its broad meaning, Islamism refers to “the attempts of Muslim individuals, groups and 
movements to reconstruct the political, social and cultural basis of their society along Islamic 
lines” (Esposito & Shahin, 2013, p. 1). From a socio-political point of view, these attempts are 
deemed contextual. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the Western political and 
military domination over vast parts of the Muslim world and the subsequent abolishing of the 
Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 are believed to have created a new reality and triggered an 
unprecedented wave of political theorising based on Islamic traditions and terminologies. A 
large number of scholars consider these circumstances, among others, to have been 
responsible for shaping the face of modern Islamist activism.  
In this regard, some scholars provide sheer structuralist analysis of the emergence of 
Islamism. Francois Burgat, for example, perceives the rise of Islamism as a response to three 
historical conditions (Burgat, 2011). First, the rise of Islam as a mobilising force to resist the 
colonial presence in the Muslim world; second, the authoritarian propensity of the post-
independence nationalist regimes, especially in the Arab world; and third, the emergence of 
a new world order following the collapse of the Soviet Union, whereby the United States has 
solely the utmost control over the international arena (Burgat, 2011, p. 30). Burgat suggests 
that although these three conditions were crucial to the expansion of modern Islamist 
activism, it was the third temporality that paved a way for radicalisation (ibid.). Based on his 
historical approach, Burgat states that “the al-Qaeda insurgency, that monstrous progeny of 
the world’s most perverse injustices, can be considered one of its [Islamist radicalisation] 
most hyperbolical expressions” (Burgat, 2011, p. 36). As such, the recent rise of radical 
Islamism is explained as an unavoidable reaction to Western hegemony and domestic 
despotism. This approach overlooks the subjective dynamics of Islamist activism and fails to 
explain why religion, in particular, has become the ideological drive for revolutionary actions, 
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and why in other parts of the world, where similar structural conditions prevail, revolutionary 
movements have adopted different mobilising discourses and tactics.  
Islamism represents more than a mere mechanistic response to the social and political 
circumstances of the modern era; it is rather a processual and purposive one. This is 
supported by the fact that the growing presence of Islamist discourse in the public sphere has 
not been accompanied by a homogeneous social and political movement. Historically, 
although a number of influential Islamic scholars, like Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Sayyid Abul-Aʿla 
Maududi (d. 1979), and Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), led an intellectual movement during the 
first half of the twentieth century calling for rearranging the realms of politics and society 
along the lines of Islamic law (Ayubi, 1991, p. 93), Islamist movements prioritised their 
objectives differently and resorted to various methods of activism. As Thomas Hegghammer 
observed: “different Islamist actors specialize in qualitatively different political activities. 
Some oppose local regimes with nonviolent means; others try to topple regimes with terrorist 
tactics; and still others wage armed resistance to occupation by non-Muslim powers” 
(Hegghammer, 2010, p. 53).  
Studying the discursive and organisational divergences within the Islamist camp requires a 
sophisticated approach to Islamism that can deal with the issues of how and why principles, 
symbols and terms which belong to the hegemonic Islamic discourse are collated and 
presented differently and used in order to promote or justify certain individual and 
organisational behaviours.  
Avoiding the pitfalls of culturalist and structuralist approaches, Social Movement Theory 
(SMT) offers a rich framework that considers framing and mobilisation processes in light of 
their surrounding social, political, and economic opportunities and constraints. This way of 
perceiving collective actions is particularly useful for rethinking Islamism because of its ability 
to contextualise the evolvement of Islamist activism without ignoring the phenomenon’s 
subjective dynamics and the Islamists’ agency and reflexivity.  
SMT theorists present more inclusive explanations of Islamism as they usually maintain that 
Islamist activism represents a “participatory revolution transforming Muslim culture and 
politics as a whole” (Hefner, 2005, p. 8). This participatory tendency followed structural 
changes in the fields of education, economy, and politics. Hefner contends that “urbanization, 
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migration, and growing socioeconomic differentiation”, combined with the inability of state 
institutions to meet the needs of “the new urban masses”, allowed Islamist groups to be 
perceived as “alternative providers of public services in the fields of health, education, and 
public security” (Hefner, 2005, p. 9). These structural changes, however, were coupled with 
conscious endeavours by influential Islamist ideologues to mobilise Muslims by way of 
presenting Islam as all-encompassing and intrinsically political. 
In this regard, SMT scholars point to various internal dynamics that contributed to the 
ascendance of Islamist activism. For example, the spread of literacy is believed to have 
facilitated the rise of ‘new Muslim intellectuals’; most of whom are graduates of state 
educational systems and share a willingness to link their Islamic knowledge to present-day 
problems including modernisation, democratisation, and human rights (Eickelman & 
Piscatori, 1996; Hefner, 2005; Kepel, 2006). Consequently, these changes weakened the 
monopoly of traditional ulama and “generated a great popular appetite for a more 
participatory practice of public life and religion” (Hefner, 2005, p. 9). Aware of their 
surrounding political contexts and cultural challenges, the new Muslim intellectuals framed 
participation in this movement as a strategic, moral, and religious obligation (Bayat, 2007, p. 
7). Historically, the organisational manifestations of this religiously laden participation have 
been remarkably diverse, ranging from movements abiding by the recognised political norms 
in their states to militant groups resorting to violence and engaging in open confrontations 
with both local authorities and international powers.  
 
The plethora of definitions of Islamism reflects the complexity of the phenomenon; and the 
multiplicity of its facets makes it nearly impossible to formulate a concise definition that 
captures all aspects of Islamism. However, it may be analytically useful to view Islamism as an 
ideology the core of which revolves around the inseparability of Islam and politics5. This 
definition goes in line with the political science’s understanding of ideology6 which sees it as 
 
5 Nazih Ayubi (1991) discusses this point and states that the notion that Islam is din wa dawla (lit., religion and 
state) “is fairly recent, dating broadly to the end of the Ottoman Empire and more specifically to the teachings 
of Maududi and some Muslim Brothers” (p. 93). 
6 This is largely based on the political philosopher Martin Seliger’s definition of ideology as a “set of ideas by 
which men [sic] posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political 
action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order”, as 
quoted in (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 6-7). Besides, it is worth noting that the literature of SMT rejects static 
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“the belief system of any social movement" (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 5). It also addresses 
the ideological and ontological aspects of Islamist activism and leaves room for reflecting on 
the relationship between them as well as understanding their distinct dynamics. Additionally, 
perceiving Islamism in this way provides a middle ground between the expansive definitions 
that use the label “Islamist” to describe any form of Islamic activism, even if it was limited to 
promoting piety and social conservatism (e.g. Pierret, 2013, p. 331), and narrow definitions 
such as the one provided by Yassin al-Haj Saleh (2016) which uses Islamism to refer to the 
Muslim Brotherhood only. 
Perceived as a modern political ideology, Islamism is shared among multiple individuals and 
organisations, and serves to provide “political responses to today's societal challenges by 
imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts 
borrowed from the Islamic tradition”, to use the words of Denoeux (2011, p. 60). Denoeux’s 
remarks capture the centrality of politics in the Islamist discourses which is also expressed by 
the fact that ‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ are usually used synonymously. Besides, asserting 
the recency and political nature of Islamism is key to distinguishing ‘Islamist’ from ‘Islamic’. 
The label ‘Islamic’ usually refers to the religious and cultural elements that emanate from 
Islam. ‘Islamist’, on the other hand, is derived from ‘Islamism’ and used to denote the social 
and political aspects of the phenomenon as well as those who subscribe to it. 
In conclusion, it is significant to study the composition of the system of ideas common among 
Islamists, but it must be noted that the ideals are always interpreted and approached 
differently in the world of socio-political activism. Islamists perform within the general 
ideological framework of Islamism, but their strategic frames are outcomes of purposeful 
processes of ideational framing and operational adaptation that are directed towards 
identifiable and timebound objectives. Thus, the strategic use of discourse and the broader 
issue of human agency are markedly relevant to the study of Islamist activism, even in its most 
violent and seemingly intransigent manifestations. Given these considerations, the following 
discussion will reflect on the recent consolidation of Salafi-Jihadism as the spearhead of 
radical Islamism.   
 
connotations of ideology, but still it is widely accepted that the common denominator of all Islamists is the 
political use of Islam. 
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Problematising the concept of Salafi-Jihadism 
In the literature on Islamist activism, al-Nusra Front is usually depicted as a Salafi-Jihadist 
organisation because of the group’s insistence on practising jihad as the only path towards a 
full return to the ‘golden age’ of Islam—the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four 
caliphs (Ayoob, 2008, p. 3). However, the recent historical experience in the Middle East 
showed that, notwithstanding their shared ideological background, Salafi-Jihadist groups may 
behave drastically differently in response to similar structural realities. The clearest example 
here is the separation and later confrontation between al-Qaeda’s al-Nusra Front and the 
Islamic State group IS. Considering such behavioural variations in the world of militant Islamist 
activism, it is important to first revisit the literature on Salafi-Jihadism before moving on to 
unravelling al-Nusra’s discourse and studying the group’s discursive adaptations and strategic 
framings under the context of the Syrian civil war. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the time when organised militant Islamist activism first 
emerged. While the Salafi ideal of returning to the ‘golden age’ of the al-Salaf al-Salih 
(righteous ancestors) has been part of the discourse of “Islamic revival” for some time, with 
Wahhabism but also Islamic reformists equally trying to reclaim religious authenticity, it is 
clear, however, that Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s is the place where jihadism matured as a 
distinct doctrine built mainly on Sayyid Qutb’s political Islamic thoughts. Zollner explains how 
by the end of the 1960s a group from the Muslim Brotherhood had developed radical views 
and become known as the ‘Qutbists’ (Zollner, 2007, pp. 418-420; 2009). This group was at 
odds with the Brotherhood’s leadership which renounced violence and abstained from openly 
opposing Nasser’s regime (Zollner, 2007). As a result, the Qutbists7 eventually broke away 
from the Brotherhood, “adopted the idea of an irreconcilable division between Islam and 
jahiliyya [a time of ignorance], Muslim and kafir (nonbeliever), and fully embraced the 
concept of revolutionary Islamist activism as the true expression of religious duty” (ibid., p. 
420). But how is this relevant to later developments of Salafi-Jihadism?  
 
7 It is worth mentioning here that Trager (2016) observes the re-emergence, and even the dominance, of a 
Qutbist faction within the Muslim Brotherhood in the decade preceding the uprising of 2011 in Egypt. These 
Qutbists “focused on maintaining ideological purity and reinforcing the organization’s rigid hierarchy” (Trager, 
2016, pp. 127-8). 
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By and large, Qutbism is an ideology of jihad. Qutbists theorised jihad theologically as a 
‘neglected religious duty’8 and framed their doctrine as follows: moving from a state of 
jahilyya (when shariʿa law is not applied) to a state of hakimiyya (where sovereignty belongs 
solely to God) is possible only through practising jihad. Later historical events, particularly the 
experience of the Afghan jihad during the 1980s, facilitated the amalgamation of the Qutbist 
doctrine of jihadism with the conservative Saudi Salafism (known as Wahhabism) resulting in 
the currently widespread Salafi-Jihadism (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 225; Lav, 2012, 127). Numerous 
Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists emerged from within the ranks of the mujahideen in 
Afghanistan, key among them were Abdullah Azzam, Osama b. Laden, and Abu Musʿab al-
Suri. The written and recorded messages of these marajiʿ have defined the doctrine of Salafi-
Jihadism and furnished the ideological underpinnings for organisations such as al-Qaeda and 
its offshoots, including al-Nusra Front.  
The works of the epistemic leadership of al-Nusra Front draw extensively on the principles of 
the Salafi movement describing their doctrine as strictly following the example of al-salaf al-
saleh (Wagemakers, 2016a; Meijer, Glossary, 2009). Despite claiming authoritative 
interpretation and notwithstanding that this reading of religious precepts is heavily drawn 
from the Hanbali school of religious thought and the Salafi movement, a central communality 
among the Salafi-jihadist reference works is, paradoxically, the idea of promoting an 
unmediated and literalist reading of the Qur’an and dismissing the need for any intermediary 
interpretative activities. 
With regard to Salafism, there are several crucial principles upon which Salafism is based, 
such as tawheed (belief in the oneness of God), fighting shirk (ascribing partners to God) and 
eliminating bidʿa (innovation). Thus, Salafism encourages its adherents to proactively fight all 
sorts of ‘impurity’ in religious beliefs and rituals, while regarding the Quran, the Sunnah 
(Prophetic sayings and deeds) and the authenticated practices of the Prophet’s companions 
as the only sources of reference (Lauzière, 2016, p. 8). Besides, scholars of Salafism usually 
identify distinct Salafi inclinations: Quietist Salafism which focuses on piety and Islamic 
education, political Salafism which advocates non-revolutionary engagements in politics, and 
 
8 Such theological and strategic framing of jihad is articulated in al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Neglected Duty) 
which is a highly influential pamphlet penned by Islamist activist and strategist Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj 
who was a member of Tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt and played a nodal role in the assassination of president Anwar 
al-Sadat in 1981.  
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Jihadi Salafism which adopts a takfiri approach (accusing others of apostasy) and calls for 
using jihad as a means for bringing about social and political change (Wiktorowicz, 2005; 
Wagemaker 2016a; Meijer, 2009)). Within the world of Salafism, Salafi-Jihadism is presented 
as more intransigent and anti-Western than other Salafi groups (Hegghammer, 2009, p. 253). 
These differentiations and classifications have been expounded at length by scholars like 
Wagemakers (2016a; 2016b), Wiktorowicz (2004; 2005), Meijer (2009), and Hegghammer 
(2009), to name but a few.  
Despite that Salafism focuses mainly on the preservation of piety and religious purity, most 
of its principles have been interpreted and appropriated politically9; and the activities of 
Salafi-Jihadist groups during the last three decades reflect a complex interplay between 
politics and theology in ways that render theology alone an insufficient explanatory 
perspective. In this regard, there are two conceptual problems with the way Salafi-Jihadism 
is usually defined and approached:  
The problem of over-categorisation  
The first problem is about finding a definition of Salafi-Jihadism that is precise and inclusive 
at the same time. Scholars of Islamic activism have produced a sizeable body of literature 
attempting to devise an exhaustive definition and a detailed typology of Salafi-Jihadism which 
in reality is a constantly changing phenomenon. While Salafi-Jihadism is changing in terms of 
its objectives and methods of activism, scholarly efforts have tried to adapt their definitions 
resulting in a current state of over-categorisation.  
The mainstream definition of Salafi-Jihadism conceptualises it as resting on three political 
inclinations: 
First, Jihadi-Salafi groups are perceived as more extremist and intransigent than other 
groups. Second, they are said to draw on Salafi or Wahhabi religious tradition and discourse 
as opposed to the more pragmatic ikhwani ideology and discourse of Sayyid Qutb and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Finally they are seen as more internationalist and anti-Western than 
other groups (Hegghammer, 2009, p. 253).  
 
9 Wagemakers (2009) investigates the manner through which the Salafi-Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi transforms the principle of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) from a call for religious 
commitment into a revolutionary ideology that revolves around waging jihad to face contemporary tawaghit 
(the unbelieving tyrants). 
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Hegghammer questions the utility of this characterisation on the grounds that Salafi-Jihadists 
vary in their degrees of extremism, and because in today’s Islamist activism “the Salafi-
ikhwani dichotomy” is not clear; in addition to the fact that some Salafi-Jihadist scholars “have 
never actually focused their struggle on the West” (Hegghammer, 2009, pp. 254-255). Most 
importantly, Hegghammer observes the existence of “stable and consistent patterns of 
behaviour” among Salafi-Jihadists that result from serious differences in strategies and 
priorities (p. 256). Consequently, to overcome the conceptual ambiguity, he suggests 
alternative preference-based schemes: state-oriented, nation-oriented, ummah-oriented, 
morality-oriented, and sectarian (pp. 257-64).  
Through the very same approach, however, one can argue that issues such as establishing a 
state, the immediate or gradual application of shariʿa, and relationships with other Islamist 
groups could possibly be points of divergence within the Salafi-Jihadi camp. Moreover, the 
recent rise and decline of ISIS and the continuously changing aspects of the strategy of al-
Nusra Front refute both the inclusiveness and the stability of Hegghammer’s suggested 
typology. On one hand, ISIS has simultaneously launched an all-out war against local 
governments, and regional and international powers. On the other hand, within the context 
of the Syrian civil war, al-Nusra Front seems to have been giving preference to fighting the 
Syrian army and its allied militias which are perceived as ‘the near enemy’, bearing in mind 
that the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups had previously focused on targeting ‘the far enemy’. In 
light of this apparent instability of strategic orientations and preferences, it may be more 
beneficial to focus on unravelling the mechanisms and processes through which decisions are 
made and preferences are set under a given situation.   
Using the language of SMT, it can be said that Salafi-Jihadism is a movement-specific frame 
whose backdrop is the overarching and more stable ideology of Islamism (see Figure 2 below). 
While Salafi-Jihadists share with the rest of those dubbed Islamists the long-term vision of a 
social life arranged in lines with the rules of shariʿa, they are different in terms of their 
strategic preferences. The Salafi-Jihadi processes of strategic framing dictate the means of 
activism and the political and theological standpoints in ways that preserve the group’s 
integrity. Thus, framing the use of violence and determining the extent of takfir 
(excommunication), among other doctrinal and strategic matters, happens at this meso level.  
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Notwithstanding, ample room is left for micro-level processes of prioritisation and 
articulation which are contingent on the existing situation and generative of interpretative 
frames and relatively short-lived tactics. These frames and tactics are articulated in “a precise, 
place-oriented way and [are] often the most logical and pragmatic part of jihadist ideology” 
(Springer, 2009, p. 7).  
 
 
This framework helps to understand why and how the same Salafi-Jihadist group may use 
various tactics and pursue different preferences during certain episodes of contention. It also 
shows that the difficulty of defining Salafi-Jihadism stems from the fact that it is meant to 
provide a repertoire of strategic concepts, symbols, and principles that can be used and 
arranged in ways that resonate with the available situation. Despite the distinct strategic 
character of Salafi-Jihadism, which basically revolves around the use of violent jihad, Salafi-
Jihadists are Islamists and remain discursively committed to the long-term vision of how the 
ideal society should be. 
 
Figure 2 A paradigm of militant Islamist framing 
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The problem of “doctrinal affiliation” 
The second problem is that scholars of militant Islamist activism demonstrate a tendency to 
isolate the evolvement of Salafi-Jihadism from the phenomenon of modern Islamism10 and 
the wider political context in the Middle East and the Muslim world. Instead, a heavy 
emphasis is often placed on the doctrinal leaning of Salafi-Jihadism as this is expected to 
reveal the bigger picture of Salafism within which Salafi-Jihadism is a newly spotted detail. 
For various scholars of militant Islamism, Salafi-Jihadists form a current within the Salafi 
movement. This current is distinguishable from the rest of Salafis by its representation of jihad 
as the only legitimate and effective method (Meijer, 2009) and by being highly committed to 
a specific line of theological teachings known as the Salafi jihadi school (Lav, 2012, p. 2).  
It must be noted, however, that the Salafi-Jihadist movement is far from homogeneous, and 
that its adherents express different and sometimes conflicting views about matters such as 
targeting civilians, attacking the Shiʿa, the extent of takfir, and prioritising the confrontations 
with the far and the near enemies. Although their points of divergence appear to be mostly 
on tactics and other practical issues, as Wiktorowicz suggests (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 208), Lav, 
on the other hand, convincingly contends that matters of dispute among the Salafi-Jihadists 
could sometimes include even creed principles depending on their applicability and 
usefulness to the main issue at stake, which is governance (Lav, 2012: 122).  
While Salafism is a theological category and does not say much about the political tendencies 
and preferences of those labelled Salafis (Hegghammer, 2009, p. 250), Salafi-Jihadism in turn 
is highly political and represents “a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three 
decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic 
tradition” (Al-Rasheed, 2009, p. 305). 
Salafi-Jihadists borrow from medieval theologians such as Ibn Taymiyya, as well as of the early 
modern period, amongst them most famously from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, or from Islamist 
writers of the 20th century such as Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj in an eclectic fashion 
and hence should not be seen as a continuation of a genealogical trajectory of religious 
 
10 Choueiri (2010), for example, draws a sharp distinction between ‘Islamism’, which he defines as “a 
movement that has decided to join the political process of its country of origin and give up strategies of 
violence or armed struggle as the means to attain power”, and a Jihadist current that is “equated with a single, 
clear-cut method of struggle, having violence as its hallmark and dominant identity” (Choueiri, 2010, p. 224). 
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reasoning. The writings and rulings of those theologians were selected from the enormous 
body of Islamic jurisprudence and given particular attention because they were found 
relevant to the present day, because they are political in nature, and because they frame the 
use of violence theologically which makes mobilisation for high-risk activism in today’s world 
easier. Meijer touches on this appropriation when he explains how “Jihadis plunder the Salafi 
terminological toolkit of intolerance, xenophobia, sectarianism, and violence, turning them 
into a terminology supporting total war against apostate governments and unbelieving forces 
of global oppression” (Meijer, 2009, p. 26). The strategic and political instrumentalisation of 
the Salafi discourse should reveal the intentionality of giving preference to certain traditions 
and methods of activism instead of being an indication of certain fixed, doctrinal 
characterisations. 
In this sense, Salafi-Jihadism is a strategic framework within which movement activists keep 
constructing and reconstructing ideational frames in response to contextual opportunities 
and constraints. There are of course key doctrinal pillars upon which Salafi-Jihadism stands 
but the order of these issues, relationships between them, and their interpretations and 
practical implications are constantly revised and assessed through purposeful processes of 
signification. Although this will be explained further in the following chapters, it should be 
made clear at this point that prioritisation and signification in Salafi-Jihadism are not 
collectively performed. Instead, these vital tasks are the work of a core group of ideologues 
and strategists. 
In a nutshell, Salafi-Jihadism is more dynamic than the ways it is usually presented by fixed 
definitions and doctrinal categorisations. Therefore, it is more useful to ponder on the 
characteristics and identities of those who decide the meaning of Salafi-Jihadism, the 
processes and factors affecting the definition of Salafi-Jihadism, and the reasons why Salafi-




Salafi-Jihadism and its metamorphoses 
Salafi-Jihadism: The ideology  
A vast majority of Muslims considers the time of the first generation of Muslims to be the 
golden age of Islam. For Salafis specifically, what makes the experience of the Muslims who 
accompanied the Prophet as well as those who came directly after him ‘golden’ is attributed 
to their unadulterated understanding of the Quran and unshakable commitment to 
implementing its rules. Qutb’s remarks and teachings echo that notion. Qutb contends in his 
Maʿalim that early Muslims were able to spread the daʿwa after the Prophet because they 
followed the Quran only and ‘activated’ its precepts. Therefore, he sees that Muslims must 
follow the path of their ancestors to restore the rule of Sharia and return hakimiyya in society 
to Allah (Qutb, 1964, p. 8). Qutb’s essential notion of “activating the Quran” entails avoiding 
reading the sacred text for the sake of acquiring knowledge but rather for putting its rules 
into practice. This stems from the belief that the Quran is not merely a book of literature and 
ethics; instead, it encompasses divine orders that set a way of life. For Qutb and his followers, 
between the covers of the Quran lies an action plan awaiting activation, and what made the 
experience of the first generation successful was that they received the divine rules and acted 
upon them, and what caused the failure of later generations is their preoccupation with 
studying and analysing the Quran (Qutb, p. 9).  
Qutb adds another reason for the success of early Muslims which revolves around their 
complete rejection of their past. He believes that Muslims during the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad isolated themselves from the jahili community around them and refused to abide 
by any inherited jahili practices (Qutb, p. 10). Using the terminology of Salafism, early Muslim 
generations fully embraced the doctrine of tawheed (oneness of God) as they constantly 
sought to free themselves of the jahili traditions and ascribe hakimiyya to God only.  
Qutb draws parallels between the present situation in Muslim countries and the formative 
period of Islam and reaches a conclusion that everything around us today is symptomatic of 
a state of jahiliyya. Numerous contemporary jihadist ideologues believe that the most visible 
sign of modern jahiliyya is the growing power of taghout (dictatorship). For instance, Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi considers that commitment to the Islamic principle of tawheed entails 
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“completely abandoning taghout, practising jihad against its followers, seeking to destroy it, 
and leading people out of worshipping it to worshipping Almighty God.”11 
As such, eradicating jahiliyya and removing the obstacles preventing people from fulfilling 
their religious duties requires a drastic political change. In his Maʿalim, Qutb counts on the 
rise of a ‘unique Quranic generation’ that surrenders to the pure and comprehensive origin, 
that is the Quran within which one finds the meaning of existence in addition to ethical, 
political and economic principles (Qutb, p. 7). For Qutb, to revive Islam and reintroduce it as 
a superior global civilisation “there should be a vanguard which sets out with determination 
and then keeps waling on the path, marching through the vast ocean of jahiliyya which has 
encompassed the entire world” (Qutb, p. 5). As such, members of Qutb’s desired generation 
are ‘vanguards of the ummah’ who take upon themselves the task of strictly applying the 
Quranic rules and embody the essence of the Quranic message of establishing the hakimiyya 
of God.  
Those motivated and committed individuals are portrayed as the ‘true Muslims’ who realise 
the true meaning of la ilaha illa allah which Qutb interprets as:  
“There is no hakimiyya but to Allah,  
there is no Sharia but from Allah,  
people have no authority over each other, and  
power belongs solely to Allah.” (Qutb, p. 15)  
For contemporary Salafi-Jihadists, the method for realising the ultimate implementation of 
sharia is also determined by Allah. The divinely designed method is jihad. Jihad in its two 
meanings: as an individual endeavour to discipline the self and as a struggle against kufr 
(unbelief) and kuffar (unbelievers). When a full application of sharia is not possible, followers 
of the Quran must self-isolate completely from the surrounding jahili society in order to 
change it (Qutb, p. 11). In this sense, Qutb’s proposed method for change that has deeply 
influenced contemporary Salafi-Jihadist activism consists of: Seeking self-isolation from 
modern forms of jahiliyya and waging jihad against kufr.  
 
11 Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad. Al-Dimuqratiyya Din (Democracy is a Religion) (in Arabic), p. 7. Retrieved from: 
www.Justpaste.it   
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Following the execution of Qutb in 1966, isolation from and jihad against kufr became a 
blueprint for many jihadists. Within Salafi-Jihadist circles, Qutb’s prescribed change is often 
translated as seeking to take power from the hands of tribal, religious, and political leaders 
and ‘giving it back to God’ (Qutb, p. 14). In other words, the way to fulfil God’s commands 
passes through revolting against temporal rulers and the appalling reality they created when 
they replaced the rule of sharia with man-made laws.  
However, later generations of jihadists gradually became aware of their limited ability to 
perform jihad or even self-isolate given the might of the state and its security services, in 
Egypt and elsewhere. Consequently, contemporary Salafi-Jihadists revived and espoused the 
notion of hijrah out of necessity. Hijrah is an old Islamic concept that means migrating from 
places of mainstream kufr when bringing about change is not feasible. Hijrah has been 
appropriated by Salafi-Jihadists who, since the Afghan jihad, have been launching propaganda 
campaigns calling on young Muslims to migrate to places of jihad to perform a religious duty 
and express solidarity with the rest of the ummah.  
The concept of hijrah is essential to the idea of “solidarity jihad”12 that grew and gained 
popularity in the eighties of the last century. The experience of the mujahideen in Afghanistan 
and the phenomenon of the Afghan-Arabs in the 1980s had been a crystallisation of this 
solidary trend in Salafi-Jihadism. The concept of hijrah formed the crux of the theory of global 
Jihadism which was implemented and developed by al-Qaeda in the 1980s and 1990s. Global 
Jihadism was based mainly on Abdallah Azzam's argument that the power of the mujahideen 
should be concentrated in one Islamic front and that jihad should be waged against the 
aggressor infidels and as a powerful expression of solidarity with fellow Muslims. When the 
infidels are defeated, the mujahideen can then move to another Islamic land where there are 
dire conditions. Azzam called on the mujahideen to keep travelling from one Islamic front to 
another until they achieve a full liberation of all Islamic lands and the establishment of the 
Islamic caliphate. It is clear that Azzam believed that jihad should be first directed against the 
"near enemy" especially where Muslims are directly invaded such as in Afghanistan and his 
birthplace Palestine. However, under the leadership of Bin Laden, al-Qaeda embarked on a 
 
12 Abu Haniyeh considers that the idea of solidarity jihad was founded by three Palestinian theorists; first, 
Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), who propagated and employed the traditional concept of obligatory defensive 




global jihadist approach favouring to target the "distant enemy" represented by the United 
States and its interests and allies in the Islamic world. 
Significantly, hijrah has been presented as an expression of the centuries-old Islamic doctrine 
of al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) which today is a cornerstone of Salafi-Jihadism. 
For Salafi-Jihadists, practising hijrah is a strong expression of one’s loyalty to the ummah of 
Islam and disavowal of kufr and kuffar. It is worth mentioning that, in contemporary jihadism, 
several important concepts and rules have originated from the principle of “loyalty and 
disavowal” such as the concept of mufasalah ʿaqdiyyah (complete doctrinal separation) and 
the concept of mufasalah ijtimaʿiyyah (complete social separation). However, like various 
other principles and rules, and despite being seemingly embraced by all Salafi-Jihadists, the 
principle of “loyalty and disavowal” has been interpreted and applied differently by jihadist 
groups for there is no agreement on who the enemies are, who is worthy of loyalty, how one 
expresses his or her loyalty, and what disloyalty entails.  
 
Salafi-Jihadism: The movement 
As a part of the more pervasive phenomenon of political Islam, the beginnings of jihadism are 
sometimes traced back to the colonial era and the fall of the Ottoman empire. This is the case 
with the explanation provided by Jordanian scholar Hassan Abu Haniyeh. Abu Haniyeh 
describes the colonial period as “the incubator that nurtured the seed of jihadist ideology” 
and paved a way for Jihadism to grow later in the context of post-colonial regimes (Abu 
Haniyeh, 2018, p. 51). He explains how the jihadist movement maintained its local character, 
engaging in confrontation with what it calls the "near enemy" of Arab regimes until the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The 1980s saw the jihadists shift towards a model of 
"solidarity jihad", which encourages those who wish to emigrate to support other 
mujahedeen and defend Muslim lands (Abu Haniyeh, p. 51).  
The theoretical and practical establishment of the idea of "defensive" solidarity jihad was an 
important shift in the direction of “globalised jihad”, which marked the last years of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the current century, especially after Osama b. Laden 
(1957-2011) announced the establishment of the "Global Islamic Front to Fight Jews and 
Crusaders" in February 1998. In practice, during the 1990s, solidarity jihad networks were 
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founded to guide the mujahedeen's activities and manage their movement between the 
fronts of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Tajikistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Chechnya. Gradually, as 
international and regional conditions shifted, previously established jihadist networks 
allowed for the emergence of highly independent jihadist cells that were able to carry out 
operations targeting Western interests in various regions, such as Tanzania, Kenya, and 
Yemen, while aiming to spite and provoke the wrath of the United States in particular. Abu 
Haniyeh states that al-Qaeda, the spearhead of the Salafi-Jihadist movement, continued to 
focus on “spite jihad” until the attacks of 11 September 2001, which were the clearest 
expression of that approach (Abu Haniyeh, p. 17). These attacks had a seismic impact on the 
jihadist movement and the United States’ relationship with the Muslim world. The ensuing 
"global war on terror" weakened Al-Qaeda and decentralised it after losing its safe haven in 
Afghanistan.  
Abu Haniyeh explains that Bin Laden's inclination, and effectively al-Qaeda’s, towards the 
globalisation of jihad and the adoption of the strategy of “spite” was the result of the failure 
of local and solidary jihadist experiments (Abu Haniyeh, p. 79). In addition, the increased 
direct American military presence in the Persian Gulf region, after Saddam Hussein's regime 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, deepened the hatred of the United States and the local regimes that 
called for it. In general, Abu Haniyeh summarises the factors that played into focusing the 
jihadists’ agenda on the issue of fighting the distant enemy as follows: the absence of 
democracy, the entrenchment of tyranny, the lack of a just solution to the Palestinian issue, 
and the growing dominance of American imperialism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 under the pretext of democratisation provided a 
historic opportunity to restore the momentum of jihadist activity through the excuse of 
resisting a foreign occupation (Abu Haniyeh, p. 113). Specifically, the George W. Bush 
administration's "identity politics" in Iraq provided a favourable opportunity for jihadist 
groups to converge, and enabled Zarqawi's jihad network to expand, fuel and exploit the 
feelings of oppression among Iraq's Sunni Arabs, especially after the first "Battle of Fallujah" 
in April 2004 (Abu Haniyeh, p. 116). According to Abu Haniyeh, Zarqawi succeeded rhetorically 
in formulating and popularising Salafi jihadist ideas that resonated with a wide range of 
Muslims and Arabs. With the help of well-known jihadist theorists such as Al-Maqdisi, Abu 
Qatada and Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (d. 2016), Zarqawi portrayed the U.S. invasion as a 
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"crusade," excommunicated Arab and Islamic regimes cooperating with the US, and adopted 
and popularised religious justifications for suicide bombings, killing civilians and strategies of 
“unrestricted terror" (Abu Haniyeh, p. 120).  
Abu Haniyeh states that the most striking feature of the reality of global Jihadism in the 
context of the United States’ occupation of Iraq was the marriage between the approaches 
of "spite operations" and "empowerment strategy" in an unprecedented way, a stage he calls 
"integration of dimensions" (Abu Haniyeh, p. 117). At this point, the local and global 
dimensions have been mixed on the agenda of jihadist organisations. Jihadists seemed to no 
longer limit their strategy to provoking and enraging the United States in line with the 
argument of the priority of confronting the "distant enemy". They also showed interest in 
seeking empowerment and control, and developed strategies for expansion and proliferation 
and engaged in a confrontation with the "near enemy" represented by authoritarian regimes 
in the Arab region taking advantage of the feelings of popular tension and insecurity. 
The outbreak of popular revolutions and uprisings in several Arab countries in early 2011 led 
to structural changes that pushed Salafi-Jihadists to enter a phase that Abu Haniyeh calls 
"ideological adjustment" (Abu Haniyeh, p. 136). 
The discourse of al-Qaeda leaders in the early phase of the Arab Spring included a transition 
from "elitism" to "populism," summed up by Abu Yahya al-Libi's advice for the mujahideen to 
"exploit the atmosphere of courage, boldness, defiance and impulsiveness that these peoples 
are experiencing" to achieve real change, namely, "establishing the rule of God" (Abu 
Haniyeh, p. 143). For his part, ʿAtiyatullah al-Libi calls on al-Qaeda's mujahedeen not to 
engage in confrontation with "the different sects with them in the Islamic movement, such as 
Ennahda brothers in Tunisia or others, but rather to start preparatory constructive activities" 
(Abu Haniyeh, p. 145). This coincided with al-Qaeda's transformation from being "a 
centralised, elitist organisation armed with a globalised agenda" to "local populist networks 
called Ansar al-Sharia" that pave the way for building a well-connected regional system that 
adopts local governance and opposes Western hegemony (Abu Haniyeh, p. 152).  
In fact, there is an ambiguity surrounding what Abu Haniyeh means when talking about 
“ideological adjustment”. Whether it is a shift towards populism and organisational 
decentralisation, or a truce with other Islamists, all of which point to an adaptation of the 
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tools and strategies adopted to achieve an extant ideological vision centred on jihad, tamkin 
(empowerment), and the application of Sharia. This change in approach also seems to have 
not reached a significant pole of Salafi-Jihadism, the Islamic State of Iraq ISI, which continued 
to adhere to its violent approach and expand its use of suicide operations, and its use of 
radical sectarian discourse remained unchanged before and after the spread of popular 
revolutions in the Arab region.  
Besides, Abu Haniyeh contends that the shift of the Arab Spring revolutions towards 
militarisation less than two years after their inception, the increasing influence of the forces 
of the counter-revolution in some Arab countries, in addition to the increase in sectarian 
conflicts, all provided a historical opportunity for the emergence of new jihadist groups, the 
revitalisation of inactive organisations and the renewal of the capacity of Salafi-jihadist 
discourse to convince, mobilise and recruit. But given this reality, which Abu Haniyeh calls 
"the jihadist spring” (Abu Haniyeh, p. 18), the strategy of "integration of dimensions" is no 
longer possible, and the differences between the strategists and theoreticians of Salafi-
jihadist organisations regarding practical priorities and policies became paramount despite 
the existence of ideological commonalities. Accordingly, global Jihadism has split into two 
approaches: on one hand, there is IS group which is more aggressive in its quest to govern by 
Sharia and establish a caliphate while focusing on confronting the near enemy and being 
motivated by sectarian factors. On the other hand, several other jihadist organisations have 
remained committed to the traditional al-Qaeda approach, which pays major attention to 
confronting the far enemy, in particular the United States, and also seeks to apply Sharia and 
establish a caliphate, but incrementally and in a more pragmatic manner (Abu Haniyeh, pp. 
161-162). 
The problem with this categorisation is that it suggests the stillness of the jihadist 
organisations' agendas and the intellectual and organisational boundaries that separate 
them. In fact, IS has targeted its near and far enemies at the same time, and justified that 
religiously by emphasising the rule: "the community of kufr is one", which is repeated in the 
speeches of IS’ spokesman Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani (d. 2016) and other leaders of the 
organisation. On the other hand, al-Nusra Front, Hurras al-Din, and other branches of al-
Qaeda have refrained from targeting the United States or any of those they classify as a far 
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enemy. There is ample evidence that the jihadist agenda is unstable and that it is difficult to 
divide jihadist groups based on their interim preferences.  
On the other hand, the observer of jihadist activities, the religious theorisations and parallel 
cost-benefit justifications in previous decades notes that what Abu Haniyeh is proposing 
regarding the succession of jihadist patterns of activism, from a struggle against colonialism 
(Abu Haniyeh, p. 9), then the jihad of the near enemy, then the solidary jihad and globalised 
jihad, then the integration of dimensions in the phase of the war on terrorism, and finally the 
fragmentation of global Jihadism, is in fact not so smooth and clear-cut and entails several 
problematic issues.  
First, the presumed historical and theoretical connection between the struggle against the 
coloniser and contemporary jihadist organisations is not convincing. The jihad against the 
foreign occupier and the struggle against colonialism were not of a purely Islamic nature, 
despite the symbolism of the term "jihad". The use of the term “jihad” by national liberation 
movements and then secular Arab regimes, among other religious vocabularies, is nothing 
more than opportunistic rhetorical employment with the aim of mobilising people and 
legitimising policies, and should not be used to establish a link or historical continuity that 
may be weak or non-existent.  
The increase in Salafi-Jihadist organisations and the recent expansion of their activities are 
linked to distinct political circumstances that have marked the last four decades. As for the 
early signs of the rise of organised jihadist activism, they are largely confined to post-Sayyid 
Qutb Egypt (1906-1966). It was only in the second half of the 1970s that it spread out of that 
historical and geographical context. 
Despite the importance of these early stages, Salafi-Jihadism, as we witness today rhetorically 
and organisationally, descends from a cross-fertilisation of Wahhabi Salafism and the Qutbist 
approach, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and has grown and become a local, regional and 
international actor only in the unipolar world. If we are dealing with the wider phenomenon 
of political Islam, however, the colonial phase and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had 
tremendously fostered employing religion as a framework for political action and popular 
mobilisation in Arab and Muslim societies.  
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Second, according to Abu Haniyeh's historical account, the global jihadist trajectory appears 
to be a series of reactions:  
  
 Jihadism first emerged in response to colonialism. 
 In the post-independence context in the Arab world, Jihadists concentrated their efforts on 
confronting their near enemy, namely the ruling authoritarian regimes.  
 Jihadists focused on “solidarity jihad” because of the suppression of authoritarian 
regimes, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the exploitation of the Mujahideen by 
Arab and Western governments.  
 Jihadism has entered the globalised phase as a reaction to the dynamics of 
globalisation and policies of hegemony.  
 The different dimensions of jihadist activism merged in response to the US 
occupation of Iraq and the sectarian policies of the Iraqi government, particularly 
the marginalisation of Sunni Arabs.  
 As a result of the militarisation of peaceful revolutions and the rise of 
counterrevolutions in several Arab countries, Jihadism was split, and its 
organisational poles diverged.  
 
 
There is a lot of truth in the previous historical analysis, but at the same time it disregards the 
agency of the Islamists themselves and portrays them as mere reactors. Clearly, there is a lot 
of dogma and ideological commitment among Islamist activists, but there is also a lot of 
rationality and strategic planning. It is precisely the continuing and unstable dialectic 
relationship between ideology and reality that makes it extremely difficult to try to predict 
the course of jihadist movements. 
In this regard, while analysing the factors that helped the rise of the Islamic State organisation 
IS, Abu Haniyeh focuses on the role of the US occupation in "solidifying religious and sectarian 
disputes between Sunnis and Shiites", where the occupation enabled pro-Iranian Shiite forces 
to dominate the government in Iraq, and worked to "marginalise Sunnis as a punitive measure 
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for their involvement in the former regime and their opposition to the occupation" (Abu 
Haniyeh, p. 184). He also adds another factor related to Zarqawi's personality and different 
jihadist approach, and his ability to harness post-occupation conditions to expand and 
strengthen his jihadist network (Abu Haniyeh, pp. 185-186). Additionally, he highlights the 
role of the Internet and social media in increasing the popularity of IS and spreading its 
messages and propaganda around the world, but he does not detail the phenomenon of 
"foreign fighters" and why the organisation has succeeded in attracting and recruiting young 
men born and raised in the West, who have not experienced first-hand the repression of 
dictatorships, sectarian discrimination, the circumstances of the US invasion of Iraq and the 
"Sunni crisis" that followed.   
Abu Haniyeh touches on the experiences of al-Qaeda's branches in the Levant, the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb, and goes on to talk extensively about Jabhat al-Nusra in 
Syria, its organisational and ideological transformations and its association with al-Qaeda, and 
the reasons for its subsequent disengagement. Abu Haniyeh observes al-Nusra's inclination 
towards pragmatism and its constant search for organisational and ideological autonomy that 
distinguishes it from other armed factions in Syria and the Islamic State group, and anticipates 
the persistence of the unsettled nature of al-Nusra, as it is perpetually stuck between its 
Salafi-Jihadist identity and the pressure of the Syrian reality with all its political and military 
transformations.  
In general, in the context of framing phenomena such as the Islamic State and Ansar al-Sharia, 
Abu Haniyeh emphasises that jihadist organisations are not exceptional from other armed 
ideological organisations around the world, especially in terms of their propensity to exploit 
the surrounding conditions and adapt to meet certain local needs. But as in most studies of 
armed Islamic movements, the question of the margin of manoeuvre and adaptation remains 
unanswered in Abu Haniyeh’s book. What are the limits to the ability of jihadist theorists and 
leaders to formulate a discourse related to the historical circumstance and the political reality 
that exists? In other words, is ideological discourse a tool in the hands of these leaders 
formulating it as needed, or are there ideological constants that impose themselves on 




It should be noted that the factor of the failure of Arab states to build national identities 
capable of accommodating ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity is almost absent from the 
analysis provided by Abu Haniyeh. The beginnings of the recent unfolding and evolving crises 
date back to decades when local political systems failed to promote an inclusive national 
belonging, and through repression and marginalisation, they debilitated the social fabric and 
paved the way for the fragmentation of identities at the first political juncture.  
This failure contributed to the retraction of citizens into their pre-national groupings and 
caused factional differences to remain present and ready to be exploited in any crisis at the 
national level, which was evident after the US invasion of Iraq and the accompanying absence 
of an inclusive national resistance movement. Similar religious, sectarian, and ethnic 
problems soured in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War (1990-1991), and also clearly 
appeared in the Lebanese civil war and more recently in the Syrian civil war, which is an 
accompaniment to Arab societies since the colonial period, and was exploited by post-
independence regimes in several Arab countries, and not only in Saddam's Iraq and Assad's 
Syria, and not limited to the circumstances of the American occupation. The responsibility of 
the USA, Russia, and Iran does not negate the responsibility of Arab regimes that have 
invested in civil conflicts and factional divisions in order to prolong their rule and to gain 
domestic and international legitimacy as the sole protector of social groups from each other 
and guarantor of civil peace. 
There is another methodological point to highlight. Abu Haniyeh promises to offer an account 
that is different from simplistic orientalist interpretations that reduce the causes of the 
jihadist phenomenon to chronic ideological and cultural factors emanating from Islam itself 
(Abu Haniyeh, p. 8). Therefore, he adopts a political and economic framework to explain the 
phenomenon which is not an entirely new framework; recent publications on studies of 
extremism and terrorism are replete with structural analyses that pay special attention to the 
impact of factors such as poverty, illiteracy, and despotism on the spread of violence and 
religious extremism. However, neither of the two structural and cultural perspectives 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the rise of the Islamic State group, al-Nusra Front, 
Hurras al-Din, and others.  
It should be noted that in addition to these objective factors, there are subjective factors 
related to jihadist groups and networks themselves, as these groups are made up of 
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individuals with their own visions, preferences and reasons that may be linked to their 
upbringings, espoused belief systems, their own interests and their relationships with each 
other and the society around them. One also needs to consider the stagnation of Islamic 
thought in general and the absence of any reformist tendency within the Islamic intellectual 
body for more than a century. All these subjective factors make jihadist organisations more 
than just passive actors, whether in terms of their response to the historical circumstances 
surrounding them, including religious interpretations, cultural and ideological patterns, and 
prevailing ways of thinking, or even with regard to their desire and ability to contribute 
consciously and purposefully to the making of reality surrounding them.  
On the other hand, the omission of the agency of Islamists leads to another problem that boils 
down to the affirmation of the propaganda of jihadist groups, as these groups tend to hold 
others responsible for violence and destruction and show themselves as helpless and have no 
choice but to defend the interests of the ummah and its vulnerable in the face of aggressions 
by others on the territories and identity. Jihadist movements have long invested in the 
grievance, and it has become a method of mobilisation and recruitment and a pretext to 
disregard many ethical and legal considerations.  
Having said the above, it is not intended to downplay the importance of anger as a motive for 
political and military action, or to question the occurrence of injustice and marginalisation in 
the first place, but rather to draw attention to the role and agency of Islamists in shaping the 






In this chapter I critically reviewed the literature on Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism, both of 
which are crucial for the study of the discourse and activism of al-Nusra Front in Syria. I started 
by demonstrating the inadequacy of sheer culturalist perspective or structuralist analysis of 
Islamism. Social Movement Theory presents a more comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon of Islamism for it allows for the consideration of the structural conditions as 
well as the subjective experiences of Islamist organisations. Pondering upon the literature, I 
suggested defining Islamism as a modern ideology, the core of which revolves around the 
inseparability of Islam and politics. As such, Islamists are necessarily anti-secular. With regard 
to Salafi-Jihadism, there are two main problems with the way it is usually defined. The first 
problem concerns over-categorising Salafi-Jihadist groups based on their strategic, and 
sometimes tactical preferences. The second problem is about viewing Salafi-Jihadism as 
signifying a religious doctrine. Perceiving Salafi-Jihadism as such deprives the phenomenon of 
its plasticity and probably strategic adaptability. It is thus important to research processes of 
strategic framing in Salafi-Jihadism as well as the impact of structural conditions and the role 
of epistemic leaders in these processes.  
For a better understanding of Salafi-Jihadism, in the third section I reviewed the main 
ideological pillars of the Salafi-Jihadist discourse. The research shows that the heavily 
politicised concepts of hakimiyya and jahiliyya have increasingly become cornerstones of 
Salafi-Jihadism especially as a consequence of Qutb’s inputs that linked the two concepts with 
the basic Islamic concept of tawheed (oneness of God). Another essential addition by Qutb is 
his prescribed method for change which has deeply influenced contemporary Salafi-Jihadist 
activism and revolves around calling for the preparation of a special group of dedicated 
jihadists who need to seek self-isolation from modern forms of jahiliyya and wage jihad 
against kufr. Later historical developments led Salafi-Jihadists, especially al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates, to move from Qutb’s idea of “jihad of the vanguards” to the populist idea of “jihad 
of the entire ummah”, particularly with the outbreak of uprisings in several Arab countries in 
early 2011.  
The final section focuses on the evolvement of Salafi-Jihadist activism in the past few decades. 
I presented a critical review of Hassan Abu Haniyeh’s important work Arab Jihadism: Defiance 
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and Empowerment between ISIS and Qaʿidat al-Jihad. I demonstrated that, while there is a 
lot of truth in Abu Haniyeh’s historical analysis, he neglects of the agency of the Islamists 
themselves portraying them as mere reactors. Salafi-Jihadist groups are made up of 
individuals with their visions, preferences, and motives that may be linked to their 
upbringings, espoused belief systems, their own interests and their relationships with each 
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In March 2011, the wave of popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world reached Syria. 
Faced by the Syrian regime’s use of excessive force, some protesters and army defectors took 
up arms and, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Syria gradually drifted into a prolonged and multi-
layered civil war. The war and the growing sectarian and ethnic polarisations have weakened 
the central government pushing Syria to the edge of a state of “failed state”13. This dire 
situation has allowed for the emergence and proliferation of militant Islamist groups that 
subscribe to the views of Salafi-Jihadism. Salafi-Jihadists in turn contributed to shifting the 
dynamics of the conflict towards more violence and polarisation. 
Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham14 (The Support Front to the People of the Levant), widely 
known as al-Nusra Front is a Salafi-Jihadist organisation that emerged in the last few months 
of 2011. From 2012 onwards, al-Nusra Front and other Islamist factions have become a major 
component of the militant opposition and succeeded in taking control over important cities 
such as Raqqa and Idlib in addition to vast areas in the countryside of Damascus, Aleppo, and 
Homs.  
The official establishment of al-Nusra Front was declared in a video appeared online on 23 
January 2012. The video contains a voice message by Abu Mohamad al-Jolani, founder and 
leader of al-Nusra, wherein he declares jihad against the Syrian regime and calls Syrians to 
preserve their lives and religion by supporting the mujahideen who came to “replace the law 
of the jungle with shariʿa law”.  
Al-Nusra’s operations started before its official declaration. On 23 December 2011, two al-
Nusra suicide attackers targeted military intelligence centres in Kafr Souseh district in 
Damascus and killed at least forty people (Lister, 2016, p. 10). Albeit sporadic, Al-Nusra’s 
 
13 Syria ranked 48th among 178 countries in 2011 on the Fragile States Index. In 2018, the country moved to 4th 
on the same Index showing worsening scores in all four indicators—cohesion indicator, economic indicator, 
political indicator, and social indicator (Fragile States Index 2018 - Annual Report, 2018).   
14 ISIS, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, and many other militant Islamist groups include the term 
al-Sham in their official names. Al-Sham, or bilad al-Sham, is a historical name that is often used to refer to the 
Levant region, or Greater Syria. The term appears frequently in Islamic literature and there are numerous 
Hadiths about the virtues of bilad al-Sham and its people. Today, most Islamist organisations prefer to use al-
Sham instead of Syria partly as a way to deny the legitimacy of Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and 
Great Britain in 1916 which divided the Middle East into spheres of influence and resulted in the creation of 
modern-day Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  
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suicide operations in early 2012 were deadly when the rest of armed opposition groups, 
known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), were engaged in low-intensity guerrilla-style warfare 
with the Syrian army (Lister, 2016, p. 11). Therefore, al-Nusra remained somehow isolated 
from the rest of the Syrian opposition at this early stage. However, the size and presence of 
al-Nusra increased steadily as it was receiving “financial support from the ISI in Iraq and from 
external financiers abroad” (Lister, 2016, p. 11) enabling it to recruit more people and adding 
to its popularity.  
The ideological discourse and historical experience of al-Nusra Front present an important 
case that deserves to be studied. Militarily, by the end of 2012, al-Nusra had become the most 
effective military faction among those who are against the Syrian regime and has since been 
a key player in the Syrian civil war. Strategically, al-Nusra has taken some unprecedented 
turns, such as changing name and affiliation, declaring war against another Salafi-Jihadist 
group (i.e., ISIS) and forming a coalition with groups that do not embrace the outlook of Salafi-
Jihadism, such as al-Zinki Movement. Significantly, al-Nusra evidently received funding from 
Gulf states, negotiated with Turkey, and allowed the Turkish army to establish ‘observation 
posts’ within and bordering the areas it controls. These are indicators of behaviour that is 
different from what researchers usually expect from a dogmatic and extremist Salafi-Jihadist 
group. It is, therefore, all the important to contextualise the rise and expansion of al-Nusra 
and underline the direct and indirect reasons for the organisation’s successes, failures, and 
behavioural and discursive shifts.  
That said, this chapter sheds light on the changes occurred to traditional religious authority 
in Syria as a result of processes of socio-political and educational modernisations and how 
such changes opened a window for Salafism and its radical version known as Salafi-Jihadism. 
Additionally, this chapter reflects of the impact of identity, and specifically the emergence of 
a distinct Sunni-Arab identity in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, on the rise of 
Salafi-Jihadism in parts of the Middle East including Syria after 2011.  
The chapter consists of three sections. The first section focuses on revealing how processes 
of modernisation and state-building in the Arab world, and particularly in Syria, contributed 
to the recent spread of the ideology of Salafi-Jihadism and the surge in militant Islamist 
activism in the region. The second section highlights the intricacies that followed the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003 including acute sectarian and ethnic polarisations across 
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the Middle East and the jihadist insurgency that eventually morphed into ISIS in 2013. The 
third section explains the impacts of the Arab Spring on the proliferation of Salafi-Jihadist 
groups including powerful organisations such as ISIS and al-Nusra Front. The last section deals 
with the rise of al-Nusra Front in the context of the civil war in Syria. The two parts of this 
section are dedicated to clarifying al-Nusra’s resource mobilisation strategies and describing 
its hierarchy and organisation.  
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Emerging opportunities  
Although conservative Salafism is not totally new to the Sunni community in Syria, its radical 
version, i.e., Salafi-Jihadism, has been on the rise since 2011 in an unprecedented scale, 
especially with the emergence of al-Nusra Front in early 2012 and ISIS in 2013. Several 
interrelated historical factors have generated political opportunities and material and non-
material resources that together offered a favourable atmosphere for the recent rise of Salafi-
Jihadism in Syria. These historical factors include recent changes, such as a rapid increase in 
sectarianism in the Middle East after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and an unprecedented 
surge in Islamist activism after the Arab Spring, in addition to longstanding structural changes 
caused by processes of modernisation and state-building. 
Earlier structural shifts  
In a time of war and acute social and political polarisations, the fragmentation and 
ineffectiveness of the traditional Sunni ulama in Syria allowed Salafi-Jihadist propagandists to 
fill the vacuum of marjiʿiyya (religious authority) through providing a discourse that exploits 
mounting sectarian tensions and promises radical changes in politics and society. On the other 
hand, the regime’s brutality against peaceful protesters and, at times, deliberate 
empowerment of militant Islamists contributed to fuelling religious extremism pushing more 
people into joining militant Islamist organisations.  
Filling the gap of religious authority  
When tackling the rise in Salafi-Jihadist activism in Syria it is imperative to take into 
consideration the state of religious authority and its shifts in modern times. The crisis in Syria 
revealed the weakness and dividedness of the traditional Syrian ulama and their inability to 
formulate a revolutionary discourse pertinent to the newly emerging circumstances and able 
to counter the spread of the inflammatory and populist Salafi-Jihadist discourse. The 
weakness of the Syrian religious authorities, however, is not a recent phenomenon. The 
process of state-building during the twentieth century stripped the traditional ulama of most 
of their power and prestige. Pierret notes that this happened mainly as a result of “the 
secularisation of law, the expansion of state control over religious institutions, and the 
modernisation-democratisation of education” (Pierret, 2013, p. 4). Pierret observes that the 
traditional ulama adapted to these structural changes by leveraging the phenomenon of 
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“Islamic awakening”—that stretched well beyond Syria—to assert the importance and 
continued relevance of “the study of the traditional scholarly corpus under the supervision of 
the custodians of that heritage – that is, themselves” (Pierret, 2013, p. 6). That was coupled 
with the fact that significant proportion of the ulama accepted to work within the confines of 
nation-state thus integrating into its bureaucratic body, particularly through the Ministry of 
Awqaf (Religious Endowments) and its affiliated modern institutes that provide religious 
education across the country. This integration ensured the survival of the class of religious 
scholars but at the cost of being closely monitored by the ruling political elite. 
In addition to the profound structural changes caused by processes of state-building, in March 
1963 Syria came under the tyrannical rule of the al-Baʿth regime that has since been trying to 
solidify its hegemony over religious affairs, part of its broader pragmatic strategy of 
manipulating state institutions to ultimately maintain a tight grip over society.15 Aiming to 
control popular religiosity and to prevent any unwanted religious mobilisation, the Syrian 
regime, particularly after the arrival of Hafez al-Assad to power in 1970, adopted a dual policy 
of containment and instrumentalization towards the class of religious figures which damaged 
their credibility and reduced their influence significantly.  
Containment 
Local Islamic authorities have for a long time been deprived of any meaningful power and 
autonomy by the al-Baʿth regime. Before 2011, these religious authorities had been enfeebled 
especially after the armed Islamist rebellion against Hafez al-Assad’s rule in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The state spied on any ulama who were not formally part of its structure and 
infiltrated their circles, eventually leaving them with limited or no credibility in the eyes of 
their audience. The non-confrontational posture these ulama assumed in response continued 
even after the spread of demonstrations across Syria in 2011. The already co-opted local 
religious authorities were unable to provide an appealing religious discourse for 
revolutionaries. Most of the traditional Sunni religious figures who had previously been close 
to or directly sponsored by the regime, such as Sheikh Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti 
(1929-2013), remained loyal or at least politically quiet. 
 
15 Al Kassir, Azzam. Formalizing Regime Control over Syrian Religious Affairs, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 
14 November 2018. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77712  
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Given their limited freedom, these ulama delivered sermons and issued fatwas only on 
marginal issues on general historical and moral topics while adopting a quietist stance 
towards the repressive political elite. As a result, in the Syrian popular culture, these local 
religious authorities were referred to in pejorative terms as either fuqaha’ al-sultan (the 
sultan’s jurists, meaning those whose task is to unquestionably justify the actions of political 
rulers), or fuqaha’ al-hayd wal-nafas (jurists of menstruation and postpartum, in reference to 
those who avoid politics and care instead about insignificant matters) and the ulama of “rice 
pudding” (denoting those religious figures seen only in social and religious celebrations where 
rice pudding is usually offered). In essence, the compromising and non-confrontational 
attitudes of the traditional ulama reduced their credibility and influence, a trend that has 
particularly worsened as they remain quietist in a time of crisis and war. 
On the other hand, the religious figures who decided to break with the regime after 2011, 
such as Sheikh Osama al-Rifai and Sheikh Mohammad Ratib al-Nabulsi, were unable to adopt 
or develop a new revolutionary discourse different from the traditional fusion of Ashʿari-
Maturidi theology and quietist Salafism that eschewed politics and focused on 
promoting taqwa (piety) and social conservatism.16 The inability of traditional ulama to 
develop a socially and politically engaging discourse after 2011 made it easier for Salafi-
Jihadism, represented by al-Nusra Front and other jihadist groups, to take advantage of the 
situation and portray itself as a revolutionary driver for change in parts of Syria. 
Instrumentalization  
The powerful ruling elite proactively engineered the scene of religious authority in Syria 
through a policy of reward and punishment. The regime promoted specific religious 
institutions and rewarded loyalist figures, compounding religious authorities’ lack of 
credibility. In this regard, the case of the current Minister of Awqaf, Mohammed Abdul-Sattar 
al-Sayyed, is a clear example of the regime’s favouritism. Al-Sayyed’s father, Abdul-Sattar, 
was also Minister of Awqaf between 1971 and 1980. The father’s loyalty to Hafez al-Assad in 
a critical period that witnessed the beginnings of the Ikhwan’s armed rebellion enabled his 
son Mohammed to climb the bureaucratic ladder quickly. Mohammed Abdul-Sattar al-Sayyed 
 
16 For more details about state-religion relations and popular forms of religiosity in Syria refer to: Pierret, T. 




has been Minister of Awqaf since 2007, and after the uprising of 2011 he became one of the 
regime’s main figures, accompanying Bashar al-Assad in numerous religious and non-religious 
occasions. His background coupled with his fierce defence of the regime’s policies has 
undoubtedly played a role in him retaining his position in three successive governments. Al-
Sayyed is one example of how the regime purposely selects those who could benefit from 
state-sponsored platforms and media coverage. 
Additionally, since the early 1980s, the al-Baʿth regime has overseen the state of popular 
religiosity through remaining close to influential and popular movements such as the 
Qubeysiyat, an influential female-only religious movement led by Munira al-Qubeysi. The 
Assad regime has also maintained a tight grip over the Ministry of Awqaf and the Office of the 
Grand Mufti.17 While the regime’s favouritism and manipulation kept the formal religious 
institutions in check, it weakened them and prevented them from establishing credibility with 
the audience. For many Syrians, these religious institutions were extensions of government 
power and instruments at the service of the political elite. 
Dictatorship and militant Islamism: an exchange of favours 
Besides its official hegemony and control over religious authorities and institutions, the Syrian 
regime has long been using militant Islamists to further its foreign and domestic policies. 
Syrian intelligence agencies covertly facilitated and controlled the flow of Sunni volunteer 
fighters, Syrians and non-Syrians, who wanted to join the insurgency in Iraq in the aftermath 
of the American invasion in 2003 (Lister, 2016, p. 9). In the mid-2000s, the Assad regime 
allowed the establishment of  “facilitation and finance networks” that controlled the flow of 
“money, weaponry, personnel, and other materiel that passed through Syria into Iraq for the 
use of AQI” (Levitt, 2010). In this way, the Assad regime assisted AQI and participated in 
keeping it alive and enabling its networks to reorganise and morph into ISI despite being 
constantly targeted by the US-led coalition in the few years preceding the Arab Spring. The 
relationship between the Syrian regime and the Salafi-Jihadist group Fatah al-Islam (FI) in 
Lebanon is another example of such an exchange of favours. The Syrian regime released FI’s 
leader, Shaker al-Absi, in 2005 among other radical Islamists aiming to strengthen  the Iraqi 
 
17 Al Kassir, Azzam. Formalizing Regime Control over Syrian Religious Affairs. 
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resistance and thus hinder US operations and protect the regime in Damascus against 
imminent threats.18  
Along with the continuously changing situation on the ground after the uprising, the regime 
tried to use a consistent narrative on the nature of the conflict by focusing on the extremist 
and anti-secular tendencies of its opponents. Specifically, the regime framed the opposition 
as a combination of Ikhwani and Wahhabi factions spreading sectarianism and religious 
extremism. 19 In October 2011, Assad told The Sunday Telegraph that the ongoing conflict in 
Syria is between Islamism and secular pan-Arabism. He also stated that: “We’ve been fighting 
the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1950s and we are still fighting with them,” and when asked 
about the regime’s excessive use of violence, he added that: “We have very few police, only 
the army, who are trained to take on al-Qaeda … Now, we are only fighting terrorists”.20 The 
regime has been attempting to legitimise its violent approach by framing its actions as 
spearheading the global war on terrorism and extremism. 
Even though it never stopped complaining about the Islamist and extremist nature of the 
uprising, the regime seems to have deliberately worked to empower the extremists among 
the rebels (Gutman, 2016). In the early stage of the conflict, the Assad regime released 
“known Sunni jihadists, many of whom later joined groups such as the al-Nusra Front and the 
Islamic State” (Becker, 2015, p. 96). Significantly, among the hundreds of Islamists who were 
released from Sednaya prison during the summer of 2011 were Zahran Alloush, the 
 
18 Haddad, Simon. (2010). Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33(6), 548–569. 
19 Salafism existed in Syria before 2011 but, as Pierret rightly notes, it was by and large elitist (Pierret, 2013). 
The following three Islamic scholars are considered the most prominent Salafis in Syria in modern times. 
Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999) is a notable Islamic scholar who lived most of his life in 
Damascus and led a Salafi branch that became relatively popular in Syria and Jordan. Albani’s Salafism 
combines social and doctrinal conservativism with political quietism and, unlike Salafi-Jihadism, is anti-takfir. 
Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (1894-1976) is another Damascene sheikh who advocated Salafism despite his Sufi 
background. Bitar lived and worked in Saudi Arabia for years wherein he embraced Salafism and wrote and 
lectured extensively about the teachings of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya—the two figureheads of Salafism. 
Bitar was close to the Saudi religious elites and well-known in the Salafi circles in the region. Additionally, 
Muhammad Surour Zain al-Abideen (1938-2016) is an influential Syrian scholar from Daraa who also lived in 
Saudi Arabia and led a Salafi current known as Surouriyah (Surourism). Surourism is marked by its anti-Shiʿa 
tone and supporting jihad against non-Muslim rulers in Muslim countries in addition to other thoughts that 
come from various Islamic traditions. Although Surourism have influenced many Islamists in the Arab world, 
including Salafi-Jihadists, it was not popular in Syria before 2011. 





commander of Jaysh al-Islam until his death by a Russian airstrike on 25 December 2015, 
Ahmad Issa al-Sheikh, leader of Suqoor al-Sham Brigades until March 2015, and Hassan 
Abboud, founder and leader of Ahrar al-Sham until he died in the mysterious explosion that 
killed top leaders of the Islamist group on 9 September 2014 (Lund, 2014).  
At first glance, it may sound counterintuitive to say that a secular regime empowered militant 
Islamists fighting against it. However, one needs to consider that in Syria this was part and 
parcel of the regime’s strategy of “presenting the uprising at once as a plot by Islamist 
extremists, agents of Israel and the West and a small number of disillusioned citizens” 
(Abouzeid, 2014). This was meant to serve two goals. Internationally, the regime wanted to 
support its claim that its harsh crackdown on its opponents is part of the global war on 
terrorism in a quest for winning the backing of the international community. Domestically, 
the regime aimed to solidify its popular base by deepening religious and sectarian divides and 
reinforcing fear and mistrust. Effectively, the main victims of this strategy were civil and 
peaceful activists whom the regime side-lined through exile, detention, or killing. Such 
measures led to a severe social and political polarisation and paved a way for the Islamisation 
and militarisation of the uprising after a period of nearly six months of peaceful 
demonstrations nationwide. Furthermore, the regime’s excessive use of violence and the lack 
of political openings, meant that more people saw violent extremist movements as viable 
conduits for social and political change—or even just survival. This has significantly 
contributed to allowing the radical discourse of Salafi-Jihadism to spread and attract more 
activists and engender support among those who are willing to raise arms.  
In opposition-controlled areas, the relationship between the newly arising (or 
imposed) religious authorities and the traditional ones is imbalanced and hegemonic. This is 
a result of: First, the absence of a coherent local Islamic discourse adopted by a cohesive body 
of ulama. Second, the newcomers’ military skills, strategic planning and claim to religious 
authenticity have given them an upper hand in the opposition-controlled areas. In addition 
to that, the uncompromising discourse of Salafi-Jihadists and its claim to authenticity were 
brought forward by well-funded and organised groups led by experienced individuals in the 
fields of theology, geopolitics, and war tactics.  
However, this should not mean that Salafi-Jihadism has replaced traditional forms of popular 
religiosity despite al-Nusra’s relative success in its military mobilisation efforts in the early 
70 
 
stages of the conflict in Syria. Instead of creating a new form of religious authority, the Syrian 
crisis allowed a revolutionary Salafi-Jihadist discourse to exist in parallel with local traditional 
forms of religiosity and religious authorities. It seems that the local religious authorities 
(marajiʿ) have always been following those in power, be them secular political elites in the 
regime-controlled areas or newly arising Salafi-Jihadist groups in the opposition-controlled 
areas. The local traditional form of religiosity, which revolves around promoting moral 
conservativism and political “quietism”, is more likely to survive and continue to exist after 
the end of the armed conflict. Reflecting on the case of opposition-controlled areas, despite 
the fact that local Islamic authorities have proven too weak and fragmented to stop or 
counter the spread of radical Salafi-Jihadist discourse of al-Nusra after 2011, the popularity 
of Salafi-Jihadism is highly contingent upon the existence of a state of chaos and war. 
Having said that, the weakness of the traditional religious authorities is part of the 
story; and the regime is only partly responsible for the surge of militant Islamism. For a more 
complete picture, one needs to keep in mind that militant Islamists are far more than mere 
reactive automatons passively waiting for political opportunities. The following sections will 





The Iraq war effect 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has given a remarkable boost to militant Islamism in the 
Middle East. This can be attributed to two factors. First, the militant Islamists’ initial framing 
of their activism as a legitimate resistance movement against foreign aggressors and thus 
becoming able to take roots, galvanise people, and expand. Second, the rise in sectarianism, 
particularly in 2006 and 2007, and the consolidation of a new cross-border identity, namely 
Sunni-Arabs. 
The evolvement of jihadist activism after the invasion of Iraq 
In the aftermath of the invasion of 2003, Iraq witnessed the emergence of an extremely 
violent form of Salafi-Jihadism that will later metastasize to Syria after the Arab Spring. Soon 
after the invasion, a Jordanian jihadist called Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi took advantage of the 
chaotic situation and started operating throughout Iraq to attract Sunnis and persuade them 
to join his armed insurgency to face the foreign occupation. What started as a limited jihad 
network against the occupation forces had gone through a series of transformations before 
it eventually became known worldwide as the Islamic State group (IS). Moving towards more 
organisation, radicalisation and territorial expansion happened under the leadership of 
experienced and charismatic leaders such as Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel Nazzal al-
Khalayleh), Abu Anas al-Shami (Omar Yousef Juma), Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Abdulmunem al-
Badawi) and Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (Abdulrahman al-Ali). These Islamist leaders, among 
others, were able to employ a Salafi-Jihadist discourse to channel Sunni grievances into 
organised militant activism that have drastically affected Middle Eastern and international 
politics. 
In September 2003, Zarqawi established a militant group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad which 
later in October 2004 gave allegiance to al-Qaeda and became known as al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia—also widely known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In October 2005, the group 
attracted several other militant Islamist factions fighting in Iraq and led a new jihadist 
coalition called Mujahideen Shura Council (Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 218). Seeking to destabilise 
Iraq and draw the USA into a hopeless quagmire, Zarqawi became preoccupied with 
instigating sectarian violence and popularising selected Islamic rulings that justify brutality 
and indiscriminate violence. Zarqawi remained committed to representing al-Qaeda in spite 
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of having disagreements with Bin Laden at the time, mainly in relation to the subject of 
targeting the Shiʿa in Iraq. 
Notwithstanding the nodal role played by Zarqawi, his death on 7 June 2006 in an American 
air raid did not obstruct the activities of the jihadist insurgency in Iraq. AQI was strong and 
organised enough to survive after Zarqawi. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a well-known jihadist from 
Eqypt, was ready to take over Zarqawi’s position and direct the activities of AQI. In fact, AQI 
intensified its operations in late 2006 which prompted the Bush Administration to send 
30,000 additional soldiers to join its troops in Iraq (Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 222). On 12 October 
2006, Hamid Daoud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi (known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) announced 
the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Bin Laden welcomed Baghdadi’s 
announcement and invited the mujahideen in Iraq to give allegiance to ISI and work under its 
auspices (Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 222). In consequence, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, decided to merge 
his group AQI into Baghdadi’s newly formed “state” making ISI a formidable jihadist 
organisation with Masri as its minister of war.  
Under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, ISI depended heavily on the tactic of suicide 
operations and carried out deadly attacks on busy street markets and Shiʿa places of worship 
killing and injuring tens of thousands of civilians. ISI’s operations triggered a series of sectarian 
attacks and reprisals in 2006 and 2007 between the Sunnis and the Shiʿa, especially in 
Baghdad, thrusting the country to the brink of civil war. Thousands of foreign fighters from 
Arab and European countries and other parts of the world began to join the jihadist 
insurgency transforming Iraq into a hotbed of Salafi-Jihadist activism. 
In the years preceding the Arab Spring, specifically between 2008 and 2010, ISI was becoming 
weaker and weaker and insignificant thanks to the continuous American airstrikes and the 
ground offensives of the Iraqi Army and the Sunni tribal forces known as quwwat al-sahwa 
(the Awakening Forces) (Al-Ali, 2014). ISI received a massive blow on 19 April 2010 when its 
top leaders, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his minister of war Abu Ayyub al-Masri, were killed in 
a joint American-Iraqi raid. As a survival strategy during that time, ISI operatives engaged in 
low profile activities and maintained clandestine cells in parts of Iraq, especially in the 
provinces of Salah ad-Din, Nineveh, and Anbar. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Ibrahim Awwad al-
Badri al-Samarrai) became ISI’s new leader on 16 May 2010. At the beginning of Baghdadi’s 
leadership, ISI was conducting sporadic, but lethal, attacks on government buildings, police 
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recruitment centres, banks, embassies, and hotels in Iraq while directing most of its efforts 
and resources towards strategic planning and reorganising ranks.  
However, the winds of change started to blow in favour of ISI around the end of 2011. The 
withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq in December 2011 left the Iraqi military exposed 
and revealed the latter’s reliance on the airpower of the US-led coalition. Moreover, serious 
societal problems remained unresolved, especially the persistence of feelings of being 
politically underrepresented amongst members of the Sunni community (Doyle & Dunning, 
2017, p. 3). This was compounded by increasing Iranian hegemony over Iraq after the 
American withdrawal, as well as the sectarian and divisive practices of Nouri al-Maliki’s 
government (Khedery, 2014; Baken & Mantzikos, 2015, p. 138). These factors helped ISI stay 
alive, mobilise people, and prepare for new waves of orchestrated attacks and massacres, not 
only in Iraq but now in Syria too. 
Sunni-Arabs: a new political identity in the Middle East 
The rise of “Sunni-Arabs” as a cross-border political identity is one of the most significant and 
least addressed outcomes of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This does not mean that there had 
been no such ethno-sectarian group as Sunni-Arabs before 2003. Rather, this refers 
specifically to the awakening of a sense of shared grievances and political aspirations among 
members of this social group. The awakening of this political identity resulted primarily from 
purposive mobilizational efforts carried out by various Islamist groups and happened in a 
context of heightened sectarianism in the Middle East and under a post-Saddam political 
system marked by confessionalism. In this regard, militant Islamists in the region, including 
Salafi-Jihadists, were the main beneficiaries of the deepening of sectarian divides and the 
consolidation and politicisation of sectarian identities in the Middle East. 
The American policies in Iraq exacerbated sectarianism and fuelled sentiments of grievance 
and marginalization especially amongst Sunnis. The George W. Bush administration gave the 
green light to the ascendance of a corrupt and incompetent political elite that replaced the 
authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein (Sawaan, 2012). The Obama administration 
remained committed to supporting the new governing elite even though it was failing to meet 
the basic needs of the Iraqi population and that it was not proportionately representative of 
the different ethnicities and religious denominations considering that it was predominantly 
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Shiʿa (Baken & Mantzikos, 2015, pp. 138-139). This was compounded by the United States’ 
neglect of the growing influence of Iran and its proxies not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon, 
Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.  
The prevalence of economic and political dissatisfactions alongside rising communal 
hostilities provided an enabling climate for numerous Sunni Arabs in the region to come to 
view themselves as a homogeneous social group that is being deliberately disenfranchised 
from political participation especially by newly arising Shiʿa elites supported by Iran. While 
members of this social group come from both urban and rural areas and from different 
economic backgrounds, they share a sense of being deliberately marginalised politically and 
economically.  
Framing shared Sunni-Arab grievances across the region has been reinforced by the Arab 
mainstream media, including leading news channels such as Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Arabiya. 
Despite their different and often conflicting political incentives, both Al-Jazeera Arabic and 
Al-Arabiya “have allowed powerful narratives to emerge that collectively cast Sunnis as 
victims” (Watkins, 2019). This was exacerbated by the proliferation of “religious” TV channels 
and radio stations, especially after the Arab Spring. Satellite channels such as the Shiʿi Fadak 
and Ahlulbayt and the Sunni Safa and Wesal provide platforms for extremist views and host 
controversial figures who use inflammatory sectarian speeches and stir up Sunni-Shiʿi 
hatred.21 
Subsequently, the prevalence of instability and insecurity and the spread of victimhood 
narratives played into the hands of Salafi-Jihadist organisations in Iraq and beyond. Salafi-
Jihadists, in turn, have capitalised on feelings of marginalisation amongst Sunnis and sought 
to appear as if they were leading an organic movement that represents the will of Sunni-Arabs 
and is fighting and making sacrifices on their behalf. AQI and later ISIS and al-Nusra Front have 
exploited and fuelled chaos partly by relentlessly fomenting anger among Sunnis and 
providing sectarian framings of the social and political crises in the Middle East. 
It is worth noting that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 fostered the destruction of an already 
feeble Iraqi national identity. Similarly, Syria’s drift into civil war and the spread of sectarian 
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narratives after 2011 are symptomatic of a fractured social structure and unsound national 
belonging. In this regard, it is not a coincidence that the intensive political mobilisation of the 
ethno-sectarian group of Sunni-Arabs happened in a time of declining national identities in 
Iraq and Syria and increasing criticisms of the legitimacy of existing political borders in the 
Arab world. While there is no space here for a detailed account of the reasons behind the 
weakening of national identities in Syria and Iraq, it is necessary to mention that the Baʿthist 
regimes were able to maintain only a superficial national unity in their respective countries. 
The ruling elites in both countries remained committed to an out-of-fashion ideology of Arab 
nationalism and Arab unity and employed state institutions to impose a rigid national 
discourse centred around praising the leader (Kamrava, 2005), without dealing with serious 
societal and economic problems. The deteriorating sense of national belonging at the expense 
of growing ‘personality cults’ created gaps that were swiftly filled with sub-national and cross-
national solidarities built on emerging feelings of resentment and political alienation. Under 
these conditions, Islamist movements capitalised on the failure of socio-economic 
modernisation and national identity formation in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, Islamists 
worked hard to awaken historical grievances and amplify senses of victimhood among Sunni 
Arabs to destabilise the region and challenge the hegemony of a nationalistic discourse 
adopted and propagandised by secular political elites in Iraq, Syria and other Arab and 
Muslim-majority countries.  
On the spectrum of political ideologies, Sunni-Arabism is closer to Islamism than pan-Arabism. 
Much the same as Islamism, Sunni-Arabism is by and large anti-secular. Among the defining 
features of Sunni-Arabism is being socially and religiously conservative; with Islam, in its Sunni 
version, being considered more than a common cultural denominator. Religion, more 
generally, is conceived to have a visible impact on the applied moral values, social norms, and 
political arrangements. Seen differently, Sunni-Arabism overlaps vastly with Islamism. It 
might be even fair to say that Islamism has played the role of a core ideology for the ethno-
religious identity of Sunni-Arabs. Admittedly, deciphering the relationship between ideology 
and identity is not an easy task. However, it is discernible that every identity needs a specific 
ideology to be its “political engine”. That said, Islamist activists have politicised Sunni-
Arabism, fostered its rise, rallied people around it, and awakened its sentiments in them.  
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At the grassroots level, the construction of this imagined community included the glorification 
of Saddam Hussein and portraying him as an icon for Sunni-Arabs. This happened particularly 
after the execution of Saddam on 30 December 2006 which was the first day of Eid al-Adha—
the time of the year when Muslims sacrifice animals to honour Ibrahim’s willingness to 
sacrifice his son Ismail. Besides this provocative timing, the fast dissemination of videos 
documenting the procedure of hanging, including Saddam’s last words and utterance of 
shahadah (the Muslim testimony of faith), engendered popular sympathy with Saddam and 
allowed numerous Muslims to consider him a “martyr”. This happened regardless of the fact 
that, although he was Sunni and Arab, Saddam lived his life as a fierce advocate of secular 
Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, the resultant idealised image of Saddam depicts a strong 
Sunni-Arab man who stood up to Iran and the West and skilfully kept Iraq stable and led it to 
prosperity. It is noteworthy that the use of glorifying titles, such as saqr al-arab (Hawk of 
Arabs) to describe Saddam, and the victimisation of Sunni-Arabs have become conspicuously 
common not only in parts of Syria and Iraq but throughout the Arab world, including countries 
as far as Algeria22. In that same regard, there is nowadays a widely viewed genre of songs on 
YouTube called Saddamiyyat that includes pop songs and poems that praise and glorify 
Saddam Hussein and lament the fate of Sunni-Arabs in the absence of their unifying leader. 
Importantly, it must be noted here that the symbolism of Saddam has rarely been used by 
Salafi-Jihadist organisations directly. However, the devised image of Saddam has undoubtedly 
played a crucial role in the consolidation of a distinct Sunni-Arab identity and the provision of 
a repertoire of angry and emotionally charged individuals for Islamist groups, including Salafi-
Jihadists. It follows that when leaders of al-Qaeda decided that the time is ripe for instigating 
organised activism in Syria they were in no shortage of human resources. 
In Syria, the initial success of al-Nusra Front and other Islamist factions is inseparable from 
the existence of longstanding sectarian and ethnic grievances. Before 2011, Syria had been 
witnessing a rising sense of solidarity amongst its Sunni-Arab community, mostly in response 
to the escalating sectarian violence in neighbouring Iraq. Signs of the rise of a cross-border  
Sunni-Arab identity appeared soon after the invasion of Iraq. For example, the Qamishli riots 
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(or the Kurdish rebellion of 2004) began after a football match between al-Futwwah FC from 
Deir Ezzor and al-Jihad FC from Qamishli wherein fans of al-Futwwah lifted pictures of Saddam 
Hussein and chanted praising the leader who is responsible for the notorious chemical attacks 
on Halabja and other Kurdish towns in northern Iraq in 1988. The clashes in Qamishli 
escalated and transformed into a Kurdish rebellion, but the Syrian regime crushed it by killing 
and arresting hundreds of Kurds, and also by supplying arms to several Sunni Arab tribes in 
the provinces of Hasakeh, Deir Ezzor and Raqqah (Balanche, 2018, p. 89). Afterwards, the 
persistence of ethnic tensions between the Kurds and the Arabs contributed to bringing 
Sunni-Arabs in Syria closer together particularly in areas adjacent to Iraq. 
After March 2011, strong sentiments of alienation and victimhood became dominant 
amongst many Sunni-Arabs in Syria largely because of the regime’s harsh crackdown on 
peaceful demonstrations, most of which took place in Sunni-majority districts. Moreover, the 
fact that Syria is a Sunni-majority country ruled by the al-Assad family which is Alawite has 
made it easier for sectarianism to grow. The accumulating Sunni grievances in Syria caused 
by regime violence and authoritarianism were linked with the previously built-up grievances 
of the Sunni community in Iraq. In effect, a continuation of injustice and victimhood has been 
established rhetorically and used by militant Islamists in their mobilisation campaigns.  
It is worth mentioning here that Iran often occupies centre-stage in the prevalent framings of 
Sunni-Arab grievances. Militant Islamists synthesise the dire experiences of Sunni-Arabs in 
Iraq and Syria and attribute them to a covert Iranian plan to create a ‘Shiʿi Crescent’ and 
convert the entire Sunni population in the region to Shiʿism. This idea has become a 
cornerstone of the Islamists’ propaganda and was boosted by the strengthening ties between 
the Iranian regime and the ruling elites in Syria and Iraq as well as the increasing role of Iran-
backed militias in Lebanon and Yemen23. Hence, facing the challenge of Iranian expansionism 
has become a rallying cry for many Sunni-Arabs, lending credence to the mobilising discourse 




23 Raine, John. Iran, Its Partners, and the Balance of Effective Force, War on the Rocks, 18 March 2020. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2DoQK6v  
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The Arab Spring effect 
The outbreak of popular uprisings in several Arab countries around the beginning of 2011 
surprised everyone. For militant Islamists, however, it was certainly a good surprise. The 
historical experience of the past few decades demonstrates clearly how jihadism flourishes in 
times of chaos and disturbance. This happened in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion of 
1979, in Somalia after the collapse of the central government in the early 1990s, in Iraq after 
the US-led invasion of 2003 and in several other places across the world. Following the same 
pattern, the chaos and escalation of violence that followed the spread of mass protests in 
Syria presented an opportunity for reviving and expanding the activities of al-Qaeda and other 
jihadist groups. However, the ensuing circumstances in Syria made divergence within the 
jihadist camp inevitable. 
When demonstrations erupted in Syria in 2011, al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in the Middle East, 
that is ISI, was experiencing a near-defeat in Iraq. Therefore, a scenario of Syria plunging into 
chaos and civil war was a silver lining for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere. Practically, the 
general leadership of al-Qaeda started monitoring the situation and working on establishing 
a branch in Syria with the help of their war-hardened representatives in Iraq.  
ISI was able to reassemble and grow enormously after the Arab Spring. In a matter of few 
months in 2013, ISI gained control over vast swaths of Iraq, expanded into Syria, and started 
operating under the name “the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham” (ISIS). On 10 June 2014, ISIS 
captured the major city of Mosul and several arms depots that belong to the Iraqi army. On 
29 June 2014, which was the first day of Ramadan, ISIS’ spokesman, Taha Subhi Falaha, known 
as Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani, proclaimed the establishment of “the Islamic State” and the 
designation of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Khalifah “the caliph of Muslims”, and stated that 
it is now mandatory upon all Muslim individuals and groups to give bayʿa (oath of allegiance) 
to the new caliph, and those who refuse to do so will be regarded sinful24. Henceforth, ISIS 
has become internationally known as the Islamic State group (IS). ISIS’ sweeping territorial 
 
24 Al-ʿAdnani stated in the declaration of Caliphate: “We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of 
khilafah, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalifah Ibrahim [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] 
and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, 
becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.” The full text 




expansion, shocking massacre and enslavement of thousands from the Yazidi religious 
minority in north-western Iraq, and the spread of videos of ruthless executions showed the 
group’s strong commitment to the Zarqawi legacy of extreme brutality (Baken & Mantzikos, 
2015, p. 138). ISIS’ fierceness and extremely violent practices grabbed the media’s attention 
and helped spread ISIS propaganda messages around the world. In consequence, thousands 
of young people left their countries and poured into Syria and Iraq through Turkey to aid the 
mujahideen and live under the promised “Islamic State”.  
The resurging activities of ISI in Iraq and its expansion into Syria happened in synchrony with 
the rise and empowerment of al-Nusra Front. When the Syrian uprising broke out in March 
2011, al-Qaeda interpreted the spread of popular demonstrations and the dominance of a 
climate of fear and uncertainty as an opportunity for breeding and expanding its operations 
in the Middle East. Therefore, al-Qaeda entrusted its Iraq branch with the task of covertly 
sending delegates to Syria to establish a Salafi-Jihadist organisation there. The processes of 
setting up a branch in Syria proceeded sufficiently smoothly and resulted in the establishment 
of al-Nusra Front in January 2012. However, the rapid growth of al-Nusra Front throughout 
2012 and early 2013 and the expansionist tendency of ISI led to their unavoidable 
confrontation in 2014 and the subsequent divergence between al-Qaeda and IS that arguably 
constitutes the deepest organisational crack in the history of Jihadist activism as will be 
clarified in the following section and later chapters.  
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The birth of al-Nusra Front 
Most researchers and analysts postulate that Al-Nusra Front had been active long before its 
official declaration in January 2012. For instance, Islamist activist Hudhaifa Abdallah Azzam 
stated that Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of al-Nusra Front25 has been active 
in Syria since 21 August 2011 and started receiving bayʿa (oath of allegiance) only three days 
after that. Researcher Abu Haniyeh considers that the group existed in Syria since July 2011 
(Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 393). In any case, it is confirmed that al-Nusra was established in the 
second half of 2011 with full financial and logistical support from ISI in Iraq. Experienced 
jihadists moved from Iraq to Syria alongside al-Jolani, while others joined him upon his 
arrival.26 Jolani and his companions set up a jihadist network with representatives in several 
parts of Syria with the help of Islamists whom the Syrian regime released from Sednaya prison 
earlier that year (Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 389).  
Albeit sporadic, al-Nusra’s early operations were deadly when the rest of armed opposition 
groups, known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), were engaged in low-intensity warfare with the 
regular Syrian army (Lister, 2016, p. 11). The first al-Nusra suicide operation was on 23 
December 2011 when two suicide attackers targeted military intelligence centres in Kafr 
Souseh district in Damascus and killed at least forty people (Lister, 2016, p. 10). At this early 
stage, al-Nusra remained organisationally separate from the rest of the Syrian opposition and 
its ideological alignment was still indiscernible. 
The official establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (The Support Front to the People 
of the Levant) was declared in a video entitled Sham al-Jihad appeared online on 23 January 
2012. The video contains an audio message by Jolani, in which he declares jihad against the 
Syrian regime and calls Syrians to preserve their lives and religion by supporting the 
mujahideen who came to “replace the law of the jungle with shariʿa law”27. Over the course 
 
25 Ahmed Hussein Ali al-Sharʿ (known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) is a Syrian national born in Saudi Arabia. 
Jolani went to Iraq and joined ISI where he became known amongst the mujahideen.  
26 Upon his arrival, al-Jolani began working with two other Syrians, Salih al-Hamawi and Anas Hassan Khattab, 
in addition to veteran jihadists such as Saudi national Dheeb Hdeijan al-Utaibi (known as Abu Ammar al-
Jazrawi), Jordanian national Iyad al-Tubasi (known as Abu Julaybib), and Iraqi national Maysar Ali al-Jubouri 
(known as Abu Mariya al-Qahtani). 





of 2012, the size of al-Nusra and the frequency of its operations increased steadily as it was 
receiving “financial support from the ISI in Iraq and from external financiers abroad” (Lister, 
2016, p. 11). Resources abundance amidst escalating violence and sectarianism across Syria 
enabled al-Nusra to recruit more people and added to its popularity. 
On 10 December 2012, the US State Department designated al-Nusra Front a Foreign 
Terrorist Organisation (FTO) on the basis of being an al-Qaeda affiliate and another wing of 
ISI. It is noteworthy that in al-Nusra’s early statements and videos there is no mention of any 
direct relations with al-Qaeda or any other Islamist group. Having read the situation in Syria 
carefully, it seems that AQC and its operatives in the region did not want the newly formed 
branch to be associated with al-Qaeda officially. On the other hand, al-Nusra’s refrainment 
from officially associating itself with al-Qaeda reflected al-Qaeda’s most recent strategy at 
the time, that is the phenomenon of ansar al-shariʿa (supporters of shariʿa). Around the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, al-Qaeda seemed inclined towards adopting a decentralised 
hierarchy that gives its geographically dispersed and loosely connected branches freedom to 
customise strategies and devise methods that best suit their specific local needs and keep 
them abreast of and responsive to their respective circumstances. In this regard, in May 2014, 
Zawahiri revealed in an audio message that: “The general leadership directed against 
declaring any official presence of al-Qaeda in al-Sham, and this was accepted by the brothers 
in Iraq” (Abu Haniyeh, 2018, p. 392). 
Al-Qaeda was aware that the Syrian protesters, who went on the streets demanding freedom, 
dignity, and respect for human rights, were not primarily driven by religious and ideological 
incentives. Under such circumstances, and in order to exploit the uprising fully, al-Qaeda 
needed to fuel sectarian animosities and push towards more militarisation for that would 
normalise its discourse and justify the military activities of its undeclared affiliate al-Nusra 
Front. The escalating crisis in Syria made that possible. First, the regime’s brutality and 
unwillingness to bring about meaningful political changes made increasing numbers of 
protestors convinced of militarism as the single realistic choice. This was exacerbated by the 
lack of international military intervention to protect civilians in addition to recurrent failures 
of Arab and international observation and peacekeeping missions28. Second, the sectarian 
 
28 For an insider account of the experience of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria and its failure to 
organize a ceasefire see: Robert Mood. My Experiences as Head of the UN Mission in Syria, Carnegie-Middle 
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practices of the Syrian regime and its supporting paramilitary groups, known as shabbiha, 
contributed to the spread of the Salafi-Jihadists’ sectarian discourse and the rising calls to 
declare jihad in Syria (Bishara, 2013, pp. 352-354). These factors allowed al-Nusra Front to 
exploit the situation and emerge as a new strong Salafi-Jihadist organisation in the Middle 
East with a steadily increasing popularity locally and internationally, at least until the meteoric 
rise of ISIS in 2014.  
 
Resource mobilisation  
From 2012 onwards, the Islamist factions, in general, have dominated the militant opposition 
and succeeded in taking control over important cities such as Raqqa and Idlib in addition to 
vast areas in the countryside of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Amongst militant Islamist 
organisations, al-Nusra Front grew rapidly and emerged a leading force by taking advantage 
of the situation after the uprising by means of mobilising resources. In addition to the 
existence of permitting and sometimes favourable political conditions in Syria after the Arab 
Spring, members of al-Nusra Front have been able to mobilise and utilise the available 
material and nonmaterial resources, including human resources, and channel them to 
advance al-Nusra’s operations and sustain its activism. The strategic management of 
resources enabled the jihadist organisation to carve a substantial space for itself in the Syrian 
civil war and increasingly play a key role in local and regional politics.   
In 2012, al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for more than 550 attacks across Syria 
that range from small-scale ambushes to sophisticated military operations mainly against the 
regular Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and security forces. Al-Nusra gained popularity in 2012 thanks 
to its demonstrable military effectiveness and increasing frequency of attacks against well-
equipped units and fortified posts. Al-Nusra benefited massively from employing the tactic of 
ʿamaliyyah inghimasiyyah (immersive operation) which is an orchestrated offensive that 
usually involves three stages. The immersive operation begins with a suicide attack that is 
meant to enable a trained jihadi or more to break through the defensive fortifications of the 
target and cause chaos behind the frontlines paving a way for a larger group of jihadis who 
 
East Center, 21 January 2014. Available at: https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54238. On the same subject, refer 




storm the site and take control. While this tactic augmented al-Nusra’s military effectiveness, 
it also showed the discipline and ideological commitment of its members. These 
characteristics motivated several factions from the FSA to carry out military operations in 
coordination with Al-Nusra Front. Towards the end of 2012, al-Nusra began to focus on 
launching large-scale attacks and leading joint operations with other militant groups.  
 
 
Figure 2: Small- and large-scale attacks claimed by al-Nusra Front in 2012. Source: Al-Nusra Front Statements 1-199. 
Al-Nusra’s increased its military capabilities through seizing arms stores from the Syrian army. 
Specifically, al-Nusra benefitted tremendously from capturing arms stores in Khan Toman 
near Aleppo in March 2013 and Mhein strategic depots near Homs in early November 2013.29 
Additionally, al-Nusra benefited from leading swift and large-scale offensives in collaboration 
with factions from the FSA. Despite having concerns regarding its Salafi-Jihadist background 
and closeness to al-Qaeda, several FSA groups were willing to coordinate with al-Nusra aiming 
to share military gains and seized assets. In 2012 and early 2013, members of Al-Nusra played 
leading roles in joint operations with Ahrar al-Sham, Suqoor al-Sham, and Liwa’ al-Tawhid.30 
 
29 Rebels capture arms stores in Khan Toman near Aleppo, Al-Arabiya.net, 17 March 2013. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3efM7I6; and: Liberation of Mhein depots, Zaman al-Wasl, 8 November 2013. Available at: 
https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/42880/ 
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By late 2012, with the increase in al-Nusra’s power and influence, it started to demand the 
lion’s share of the spoils of war for its participation in joint operations (Al-Mustapha, 2013, p. 
17).  
Concerning human resources, al-Nusra was founded by veteran jihadists most of 
whom were previously in Iraq where they received intensive military training and religious 
indoctrination as members of ISI and its precursor AQI. Given that familiarity with methods 
of recruitment and tactics of war and resistance is an essential factor for the success and 
survival of militant groups, lessons learnt from the jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq proved vital 
for the initial success of al-Nusra Front in Syria. Gradually, more Syrians began to join al-Nusra, 
some of whom were known jihadists such as Abdul Rahim Attoun (known as Abu Abdallah al-
Shami), Radwan Mahmoud Nammous (known as Abu Firas al-Suri), and Samir Hijazi (Abu 
Humam al-Shami). 
The hardening of ethnic and confessional boundaries and the consolidation of a Sunni-Arab 
identity in the Middle East offered al-Nusra Front and other militant Islamist organisations a 
pool of potential recruits. The ever-deteriorating situation in Iraq after the invasion of 2003, 
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, and the Saudi-
Iranian cold war, opened the gates for a new socio-political structure in the Middle East 
characterised by increasing numbers of young men and women who are not only dissatisfied 
economically and marginalised politically but also religiously charged. When al-Nusra started 
operating in Syria, it sought to take advantage of the situation by focusing on promising to 
satisfy the needs and aspirations of local Sunnis. Young Sunni Muslims living in poor and 
socially conservative communities were the main targets of systematic processes of 
persuasion, mobilisation, and recruitment by experienced and motivated jihadists, 
particularly in the north-western governorates of Idlib and Aleppo (Lister, 2016, p. 6). As a 
result, al-Nusra grew in one year from a small network of only a few dozens to somewhere 
between 400031 and 1000032 members. Later, when al-Nusra concentrated its presence in 
 
31 Najjar, Muhammad. Jabhat al-Nusra has learned from past mistakes (in Arabic), Aljazeera.net, 11 March 
2013. Available at: https://bit.ly/30mG0hl  
32  Ignatius, David. Al-Qaeda affiliate playing larger role in Syria rebellion, The Washington Post, 30 November 
2012. Available at: https://wapo.st/3i7sRyH  
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Idlib and the countryside of Aleppo, it was able to recruit more than 3000 additional members 
from local communities in a matter of only a few months in 2016 (Lister, 2016).  
Al-Nusra Front took advantage of the presence of sectarian tensions in Syria by focusing on 
two things. First, al-Nusra sought to appear locally as protecting the Sunni community, 
therefore, it asserted its sectarian identity since it began operating in Syria. The group’s 
statements clearly specify that al-Nusra’s mission is to support the Sunnis in Syria and protect 
their interests and to establish a “Sunni entity”. The notion of supporting Sunnis is 
encapsulated in the Arabic name “Al-Nusra” which means “support”. Second, al-Nusra 
defined its enemies as a Nusayri33 (Alawite) regime supported by Iranian military experts, the 
Lebanese Hezbollah and other proxy Shiʿa militias who are engaged in a holy war against 
Sunni-Arabs in the entire Middle East. As such, al-Nusra’s depiction of the regime revolved 
around its being first and foremost deviant religiously and a puppet to the Ayatollahs of Iran. 
On the ground, al-Nusra increased its sectarian operations around mid-2012; and that trend 
continued to evolve since then. Al-Nusra’s sectarian practices included assassinating 
influential Shiʿi clerics such as Sheikh Muhammad Ra’fat al-Madani and Sheikh Abbas al-
Lahham34, and Alawite religious figures such as Sheikh Badr Ghazal35.  
The sectarian framing of the conflict in Syria served as a mobilising discourse to galvanise 
Sunni-Arabs and convince them of al-Nusra’s propaganda. This was a necessary tactic for al-
Nusra to find a foothold in the Syrian arena. Although al-Nusra remained elitist in the early 
stages of the conflict and focused on training a selection of committed members instead of 
wanting to become a mass movement, the group cared for creating a broad popular base as 
part of a long-term strategy to become a de facto actor in Syria. Al-Nusra thus directed its 
propaganda towards the local populations. Although its videos and media campaigns were 
incomparable with ISIS’ high-quality media production, still, al-Nusra’s focused propaganda 
was able to engender support in certain parts of Syria leading to a noticeable growth in its 
popularity among Syrians between 2012 and 2015.  
 
33 Nusayriyyah is an archaic term used to refer to the Alawites who form a Muslim minority group that lives 
mainly in Syria and Turkey. Currently, the term Nusayri often carries a pejorative connotation and is used 
extensively in the statements and propaganda messages of Islamist groups.  
34 Al-Nusra statements 1-199 
35 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Execution of Alawite Sheikh Badr Ghazal (in Arabic), 06 
December 2014. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Xb9kFK  
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In addition to that, al-Nusra Front sought to manage symbolic and other nonmaterial 
resources aiming to solidify its position in Syria and within a competitive “jihad marketplace” 
that hosts traditional religious authorities and local forms of religiosity as well as fierce Salafi-
Jihadist competitors such as ISIS. Rhetorically, al-Nusra attempted to exploit the 
circumstances of the popular uprising in Syria by portraying its ideology as a revolutionary 
driver for social and political change. Strategically, the group presented itself as the most 
effective military faction focusing on demonstrating its members’ commitment, experience, 
and familiarity with tactics of war and resistance as well as its efficient resource mobilisation. 
Besides, as opposed to the Syrian traditional ulama, the Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and 
strategists associated with al-Nusra deal with contemporary social and political issues, use 
pertinent discourse and mobilisation strategies, and propose radical solutions; also, they are 
young, well-funded and capture the attention of the media easily. 
People’s familiarity with the language of political Islam is another factor that has facilitated 
the growth of al-Nusra in Syria. The tenacious jihadist movement in Iraq contributed greatly 
to popularising the Islamist discourse in the region. Key Islamist concepts such as caliphate, 
Islamic state, jihad, tamkin, jahilyyah, hakimiyya, and al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and 
disavowal) have become widespread after decades of the dominance of secular pan-Arab 
discourse. Besides, the increasing ‘sectarianisation’ and ‘Islamisation’ of the discourse of the 
traditional mainstream media, including leading news channels such as Al-Jazeera Arabic and 
Al-Arabiya (Watkins, 2019), and the expansion in the use of the Internet, have played a crucial 
role in normalising the language of Islamism, spreading sentiments of resentment and 
victimhood, and bolstering Islamist causes across the region. As a result, the pre-existence of 
an Islamist discourse in the mainstream culture in Syria and other parts of the Middle East 
increased the resonance of the al-Nusra’s propaganda and facilitated the spread of its anti-
secular messages that focus on creating a nexus between secularism, dictatorship, corruption, 
sectarianism, and foreign subordination. 
Additionally, al-Nusra’s solidary and grievance-based propaganda messages 
resonated with Muslims living in other parts of the world and attracted jihadists from other 
fronts. Notwithstanding al-Nusra’s insistence on its local Syrian character, the group attracted 
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large numbers of foreign fighters36, most of whom fought and received training in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Chechnya.  
However, when discord between al-Nusra and ISIS broke out, a majority of al-Nusra’s foreign 
fighters joined ISIS (Lister, 2016, p. 13). Other foreign fighters chose to remain neutral in the 
dispute; those were mainly members of subunits of al-Nusra such as al-Katiba al-Khadra’ 
(Green Battalion), Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters), Jund 
al-Aqsa (Aqsa Soldiers), Suqoor al-Ezz (Pride Hawks), Fajr al-Islam (Dawn of Islam), and Jaysh 
Muhammad (Muhammad Army).  
 
Figure 3: Estimated numbers of al-Nusra foreign fighters between 2011 and 2013 by country. Source: (Bishara, 2013, p. 359) 
 
Despite facing a major setback in the eastern parts of Syria at the hands of ISIS in mid-2014, 
al-Nusra maintained and strengthened its presence in other areas. Thanks to its good 
relations with the powerful Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra retained its control over 
areas in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Ahrar al-Sham’s assistance was vital for al-Nusra’s 
survival in the face of ISIS attacks and attempts to attract al-Nusra’s members (Al-Mustapha, 
2013, p. 22). Al-Nusra even expanded in the countryside of Homs in the centre and Daraa in 
 
36 Aqeel Hussein estimates the percentage of foreign fighters in al-Nusra to be around 10 percent. Refer to: 
Hussein, Aqeel. Breaking ties and al-Nusra’s difficult choices (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, 26 July 2016. 







































the south where ISIS’ danger was still relatively limited. However, with the increase in ISIS 
influence in the countryside of Daraa, defections in al-Nusra also increased37. Strong allies of 
al-Nusra in the south such as Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade clashed with al-Nusra and eventually 
gave allegiance to ISIS38. Besides, the Syrian regime’s and Hezbollah’s serious military 
campaigns to retake full control over the Damascus and Homs provinces in 2014 and 2015 led 
al-Nusra to retreat and concentrate its power in the north-west.  
Consequently, in early 2015 al-Nusra 
played a leading role in the Islamist 
military alliance called Jaysh al-Fateh 
(Army of Conquest) which seized 
control of the entire governorate of 
Idlib from the Syrian regime 
including densely populated urban 
centres such as Ariha, Jisr al-Shugour, 
Saraqib, and the provincial capital of 
Idlib as well as strategic military 
bases such as the Abu Duhur Airbase 
and Mastumeh base with most of 
their vehicles, ammunition, and 
equipment.39 As such, al-Nusra became the strongest and most equipped military actor in 
Idlib and the countryside of Aleppo. This enabled al-Nusra to become more aggressive and 
hegemonic in its relationship with the FSA factions40.  
Al-Nusra’s territorial expansion in north-western Syria, which continued until the Russian 
military intervention in September 2015, posed challenges of administration and offered 
 
37Al-Tamimi, Aymenn J. Interview with the Leader of Jund al-Malahem, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s blog, 9 June 
2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3khD4t9  
38 Al-Balkhi, Omar. A new leadership of al-Nusra in southern Syria, al-Modon Online, 20 December 2015. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2Z8Frap  
39 Syria rebels seize key regime base, The Guardian, 19 May 2015. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Zc2u45   
40 For instance, al-Nusra accused Harakat Hazm, which is widely regarded a “moderate” rebel group, of being 
supported by the United States and thus attacked its positions frequently forcing it eventually to dissolve itself 
in March 2015. Lister considers that this operation enabled al-Nusra to seize strategically important weapons , 
particularly TOW anti-tank missiles. For more details refer to: Lister, Charles. American Anti-Tank Weapons 
Appear in Syrian Rebel Hands (Updated), Huffpost, 04/09/2014, Updated Dec 06, 2017. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/330riOP  
Figure 4: The north-western province of Idlib where al-Nusra Front 
concentrated its influence and military power 
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economic opportunities at the same time. In addition to that, the separation between al-
Nusra and ISI meant that one of al-Nusra’s main sources of funding diminished and that it had 
to find alternative sources to cover the expenses of its operations and growing personnel. 
These challenges pushed al-Nusra towards focusing on cultivating the local economy through 
taxation, tariffs, and fines, in addition to ransoms and spoils of war (Triebert & Komar, 2016). 
Al-Nusra repeatedly denied the accusations of receiving external funding and insisted on 
demonstrating its unwillingness to accept financial and military support from any state41. 
However, there is mounting evidence that al-Nusra received vast sums of money from the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC) which was the highest military leadership of the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) between December 2012 and June 2014 and considered the military wing of the 
Syrian National Coalition (SNC). In this regard, an unpublished report by major general 
Muhammad Hussein al-Haj Ali, who defected from the SAA in August 2012, indicates that al-
Nusra Front was alone receiving 15 to 20 % of the budget of the FSA’s Supreme Military 
Council42 which was hosted by Turkey, funded mostly by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and received 
military supplies from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries 
(Lund, 2013). Besides, al-Nusra Front collaborated and participated in joint operations with 
factions sponsored directly by the SMC (O’Bagy, 2013, p. 45). Despite such reports, it is hard 
to determine with certainty the amount of financial support al-Nusra received from external 
sources. What is confirmed, however, is that the group gradually turned to relying on the local 
economy through taxation and tariffs, including revenues generated from border crossings, 
in addition to management of the banking sector and zakat, or alms collection.43 
 
 
41 Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, leader of al-Nusra Front, stated in an interview with al-Jazeera Arabic in May 2015 
that: “ we are self-funded… the land of Sham is prosperous; it does not need anyone’s charity or help. Support, 
if it was conditional, is very dangerous… we have refused to have even a single meeting with any intelligence 
bodies, organisations, or representatives… we don’t receive support from any state… It is vital for us to have 
free will and free choice. Most of our money comes from spoils of war we gain from the regime… there are 
also trades that we manage in liberated areas and we grow some of the spoils we gain… and we receive 
donations collected from Muslim individuals abroad…” A video of the full interview is available online at: 
https://bit.ly/331FsPP  
42 The researcher attended a conference (The Syrian Revolution: Seven Years On, What Went Wrong?) held in 
Doha, Qatar between 7-8 April 2018 wherein major general al-Haj Ali presented his appraisal of the 
performance of the armed opposition and reported important information regarding the financing of al-Nusra 
Front and other militant Islamist factions.  
43 Young, Michael. Why Kabul Has an Echo in Idlib, Carnegie Middle East Center, 17 September 2021. Available 
at: https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/85356  
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Hierarchy and organisation 
Al-Nusra began as a loose network of small groups of jihadists active in several provinces in 
Syria. Each of al-Nusra armed groups consisted of a small number of committed and trusted 
members. These groups were linked together and connected with their leadership 
ideologically more than organisationally. Through stressing the importance of religious duty, 
social solidarity, and ideological commitment, al-Nusra was able to adopt the simple hierarchy 
model. The dedication of its members, who were willing to get involved in high-risk activities 
including suicide operations, made al-Nusra popular and enabled it to gain strength and 
influence quickly. It, therefore, began to develop a sophisticated bureaucratic body and a 
more centralised system of command.  
 
Figure 5: Geographical distribution of al-Nusra's attacks in 2012 
Haid rightly notes that al-Nusra showed little interest in governance in its early phase, and 
thus remained by and large a military network during its first year. By the end of 2012, 
however, al-Nusra started to become more hierarchical and centralised. Aiming to maintain 
order and discipline in its areas, al-Nusra began in late 2012 to work with other militant groups 
on establishing joint hay’at sharʿiya (sharia commissions). Lister notes that the sharia 



















commission that was established in Aleppo in late 2012 represents “the opposition’s first 
experiment with municipal administration”; he also states that “the fact that it involved 
Jabhat al-Nusra illustrated the extent to which the group had sealed its status as an accepted 
opposition actor” (Lister, 2016, p. 12). Such joint commissions oversaw the activities of several 
technical subunits that provide policing, health, juridical and other services pertaining to 
governance and public administration (Cook, Haid, & Trauthig, 2020). However, the military 
achievements and territorial expansion of al-Nusra in 2014 and 2015 gave rise to pressing 
questions regarding the administration of its controlled areas and renewed the discussions 
regarding the group’s relations with other rebel factions. In consequence, al-Nusra started to 
form its own administrative bodies such as the Public Administration for Services (Al-Tamimi, 
2020, p. 7) as well as multifunctional “sharia courts” (Cook, Haid, & Trauthig, 2020). 
Prior to the split between al-Nusra and ISIS, al-Nusra’s Shura Council formed the group’s 
supreme leadership and encompassed leading jihadists including al-Jolani, al-Nusra 
commander in chief, al-Zawahiri, AQC general leader, al-Baghdadi, leader of ISI, al-ʿAdnani, ISI 
spokesman, al-Qahtani and others (Al-Mustapha, 2013, p. 12). While the majority in the Shura 
Council were honorary members, later developments revealed that the actual power was 
concentrated in the hands of al-Jolani and his relatively pragmatic companions, especially al-
Qahtani, al-Jazrawi and Salih al-Hamwi (Lister, 2016, p. 15) until the seismic split in the jihadist 
camp in mid-2013. In this respect, the distribution of power within al-Nusra kept changing 
throughout the phases of the Syrian civil war and those key leaders who were close to AQC 
and whose influence was strongly felt after al-Jolani declared his allegiance to al-Zawahiri 
were themselves side-lined later when the tide shifted in favour of the Syrian regime and its 
allies after the Russian military intervention in late 2015. Back to the military structure of al-
Nusra, in addition to the Shura Council, there are regional emirs who have considerable 
authorities, apart from certain critical matters that require the approval of the Shura Council. 
In every region there are small functional units that take different names including brigades, 
cells, units, etc, and each of these units is led by an “emir of the group” (Al-Mustapha, 2013, 
p. 11).  
Regarding its membership, al-Nusra wanted to stand out as consisting of trusted, disciplined, 
and well-trained members therefore it employed strict and thorough recruitment methods. 
Individuals who want to join al-Nusra had to be referred by a well-known mujahid or Islamic 
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figure. After that, members pass through several stages of religious indoctrination and 
military training. In addition to that, al-Nusra resorted to attracting elite jihadists from other 
militant Islamist factions and frequently attempted to “swallow vulnerable opposition groups, 






It is manifest that Salafi-Jihadism has been on the rise in Syria since 2011 on an unprecedented 
scale, especially with the emergence of al-Nusra Front in early 2012 and ISIS in 2013. This 
chapter explores several interrelated historical factors that have generated political 
opportunities and material and non-material resources that together offered a favourable 
atmosphere for the recent rise of Salafi-Jihadism in Syria. These historical factors include 
recent changes, such as a rapid increase in sectarianism in the Middle East after the 2003 US-
led invasion of Iraq and an unprecedented surge in Islamist activism after the Arab Spring, in 
addition to longstanding structural changes caused by processes of modernisation and state-
building. These structural changes include the traditional ulama’s inability to mobilise people 
and develop a pertinent revolutionary discourse in the wake of the Arab Spring which created 
a gap of religious authority that was filled by Salafi-Jihadists in rebel-held areas. Additionally, 
the Syrian regime has long been using militant Islamists to further its foreign and domestic 
policies in what seems like an exchange of favours between two rivals.  
The US-led invasion of Iraq has drastically changed the socio-political situation in Iraq and the 
rest of the Middle East including Syria. Importantly, the initial success of al-Nusra Front and 
other Islamist factions is inseparable from the existence of longstanding sectarian and ethnic 
grievances that have been surging since 2003. In this regard, the rise of “Sunni-Arabs” as a 
cross-border political identity is one of the most significant and least addressed outcomes of 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The awakening of this political identity resulted primarily from 
purposive mobilizational efforts carried out by various Islamist groups and happened in a 
context of heightened sectarianism in the Middle East and under a post-Saddam political 
system marked by confessionalism. In this regard, militant Islamists in the region, including 
Salafi-Jihadists, were the main beneficiaries of the deepening of sectarian divides and the 
consolidation and politicisation of sectarian identities in the Middle East. AQI and later ISIS 
and al-Nusra Front have exploited and fuelled chaos partly by relentlessly fomenting anger 




When demonstrations erupted in Syria in 2011, al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in the Middle East, 
that is ISI, was experiencing a near-defeat in Iraq. Therefore, a scenario of Syria plunging into 
chaos and civil war was a silver lining for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere. Practically, the 
general leadership of al-Qaeda started monitoring the situation and working on establishing 
a branch in Syria with the help of their war-hardened representatives in Iraq. The processes 
of setting up a branch in Syria proceeded sufficiently smoothly and resulted in the 
establishment of al-Nusra Front in January 2012. However, the rapid growth of al-Nusra Front 
throughout 2012 and early 2013 and the expansionist tendency of ISI led to their unavoidable 
confrontation in 2014 and the subsequent divergence between al-Qaeda and IS that arguably 
constitutes the deepest organisational crack in the history of Jihadist activism. 
The research reveals that, in addition to the existence of permitting and sometimes 
favourable political conditions in Syria after the Arab Spring, members of al-Nusra Front have 
been able to mobilise and utilise the available material and nonmaterial resources, including 
human resources, and channel them to advance al-Nusra’s operations and sustain its activism. 
As such, the strategic management of resources enabled the jihadist organisation to carve a 
substantial space for itself in the Syrian civil war and increasingly play a key role in local and 
regional politics. 
Organisationally, al-Nusra worked initially in small and loosely connected units which was 
possible through being held together ideologically thanks to the work of several jihadist 
ideologues. However, this mode of activism and performance became much more difficult 
when al-Nusra Front grew, clashed with ISIS, and became under immense local, regional, and 
international pressures. Finally, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters will build on this chapter 
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This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents an overview of the main 
perspectives of Social Movement Theory (SMT) which is used in this research as a general 
theoretical framework. In this section, I focus mainly on framing processes in SMT as it is 
immensely relevant to the study of al-Nusra’s discourse and activism. The second section 
deals with the agency of frame-articulators including ideologues and strategists. The third 
section is dedicated to explaining the levels of Salafi-Jihadist framing processes. In the last 
section, I propose using methods from the school of Discourse Analysis to operationalise 
frame and framing analysis. 
First of all, in this research, militant Islamism is perceived as a form of collective action that 
consists of epistemological configurations (symbols, values, and discursive elements that 
most members would use and comprehend) and ontological manifestations (organisations, 
campaigns, and networks). These two ideational and operational levels are usually studied 
under the themes of Islamist ideology and Islamist activism. However, the ways these levels 
affect each other are still equivocal. Issues concerning the extent to which Islamist ideology 
shapes the actions and attitudes of its adherents, and whether structural conditions play into 
the adoption of certain ideological and discursive frames, are still poorly examined. In this 
regard, SMT seems to offer a suitable framework for studying the different aspects of militant 
Islamism including the agency of Islamists and the relationship between ideology and 
activism. 
In the research, the three perspectives of SMT—resource mobilisation, political 
opportunities, and framing processes—are thought to offer essential conceptual and 
analytical tools that may help to advance our understanding of the different aspects of 
militant Islamist activism, and more specifically, the roles of ideology, structure, and agency 
in determining the course of militant Islamist organisations such as al-Nusra Front in Syria. 
However, I will refrain from using SMT as an exhaustive theory. Instead, I will use SMT as a 
“repertoire of tools” and appraise the relevance of (and the relationships between) its main 
concepts and perspectives. 
Certainly, SMT does not provide a straightforward and complete explanation of the recent 
rise of militant Islamist activism but it has a crucial strong point that stems from its flexibility 
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and ability to constantly incorporate new complementary factors and perspectives (Zald, 
2000). Indeed, prominent scholars of SMT, such as Staggenborg and Klandermans (2002), 
Melucci (1996), Goodwin and Jasper (2003), and Johnston (2011), have recently started to 
address the importance of subjective and intersubjective factors such as emotions, identity, 
group solidarity, and ideological commitment in their analyses of collective social actions. 
With such additions, SMT becomes more sensitive to the agency of actors and to the factors 
that motivate them to embrace certain convictions and persuade them to act the way they 
do. This adds thickness to social movement research and moves it away from the positivist-
structuralist models in social sciences that aspire to uncover simple causalities and 
generalisable findings.  
Applying an SMT perspective to the study of al-Nusra Front contributes to contextualising and 
de-exceptionalising the strategies, tactics and mobilising discourses developed and utilised by 
militant Islamists (Gunning, 2009, pp. 161-162). On one hand, contextualising the Salafi-
Jihadist organisations, culturally and historically, is intended to reveal whether their violent 
method is an essential ‘marker of identity’ or a tactic chosen by rational agents given the 
available opportunities. The political opportunities perspective, for example, helps to explain 
how the structure of polity and the practices of ruling elites in a given state may affect the 
Islamists’ method of activism and the success of their mobilisation efforts. On the other hand, 
perceiving militant Islamist activism as a form of collective action that happens within certain 
temporal conditions and cultural settings challenges the Culturalist approach that provides 
an ahistorical account of Islamism and the approach of Terrorism Studies that views militant 
Islamism as inherently and uncompromisingly violent (Burke, 2008). Simultaneously, using 
the perspectives of SMT to study Islamist activism may counter the fact that “most of the 
theories forged in the context of advanced industrial democracies stay there” (Meyer, 2002, 
p. 17), as it may provide “a new testing ground to challenge social movement theory, thus 
possibly generating insights for broader debates on social movements”, to use the words of 




In spite of the wide range of topics covered by the three main perspectives of SMT, 
one possibly can identify two under-researched themes: ideology and agency44. Firstly, SMT 
does not offer a systematic theorisation of the role of ideology in determining the objectives 
and preferred methods of activism for collective actions. Thus, while pondering on the case 
of Salafi-Jihadist activism, I will draw on the sizable body of literature on the theory of 
ideology, especially the works of Eagleton (1991) and Thompson (1990), and examine the 
feasibility of incorporating more ideology-related elements into the agenda of social 
movements research. Secondly, the issue of agency seems to be amorphously theorised in 
the current literature of SMT despite its relevance to mobilising resources, assessing political 
opportunities, and framing collective action. Therefore, this research sheds light on different 
aspects of movement agency; and specifically, the issue of strategic framing in militant 
Islamist activism—a research area that may provide evidence to further substantiate the 
centrality of human agency in the rise and evolvement of collective social and political actions.  
Revisiting the roles of ideology and agency in shaping the discourse and actions of al-Nusra 
Front is intended to challenge the assumptions of a unidirectional relationship between 
ideology and ontology in Islamist activism which underlies two antithetical propositions: the 
first one entails that Islamic ideology generates uniform actions and attitudes which is 
embedded in theories such as Kepel’s “radicalisation of Islam”; the second proposition entails 
that Islamist activists unrestrictedly instrumentalise ideology to legitimate their actions and 
self-interests as Roy’s theory of “Islamisation of radicalism” indicates. 
  
 
44 Throughout this research, the concept of agency is used to refer to the capacity of actors “to appropriate, reproduce, 
and, potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories and conditions of action in accordance with their personal 
and collective ideals, interests, and commitments” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1443). 
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The three perspectives of Social Movement Theory 
Today, it is still hardly possible to downplay the “classical agenda” of SMT as it offers a variety 
of analytical tools apt for studying the manifold aspects of collective action. The three 
perspectives of resource mobilisation, political opportunities, and framing processes, which 
are cornerstones in the classical agenda of SMT (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam, 
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), provide a general framework for the study of social movements 
through their overlapping and complementary analyses.  
Resource mobilisation 
Like other approaches to the study of social movements, the perspective of Resource 
Mobilisation (RM) seeks to explain the factors that contribute to the rise, success, and 
sustainability of social movements. RM became particularly popular in the 1970s and 
reflected a scholarly attempt to counter socio-psychological theories of mass movements that 
used to perceive protestors and movement participants as irrational actors driven by feelings 
of frustration and anger. Therefore, social movement scholars, including Mayer Zald and John 
McCarthy, began to view movement activists as rational actors, and social movements as 
being continuously affected by “organisational structure, mobilisation tactics, and intra-
movement competition for resources, members, and the sympathy of bystander audiences 
on movement outcomes” (Gunning, 2009, p. 158). While attempting to break with the socio-
psychological models, the new trend that emphasises the rationality in mobilising resources 
remained driven by positivist promises of predictability and discoverable causalities.  
It is noticeable how RM theorists have dealt with the field of social and political activism as a 
market wherein actors compete for resources and pursue utility based on their idiosyncratic 
cost-benefit calculations (Crossley, 2002, pp. 85-9). The economic modelling entails that the 
availability of resources triggers social activism and facilitates establishing affiliated 
organisations which in turn attract and mobilise more participants. In this sense, RM 
perspective shares with Rational Actor theory the notion that movement activists are self-
interested and driven by a desire to maximise their benefits (Crossley, 2002, p. 89). However, 
the portrayal of movement participants as beneficiaries raises questions about those who 
partake out of moral and ideological commitments or to preserve a social image even if that 
would put their safety and material interests in jeopardy. Militant Islamism is an example of 
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high-risk activism that sometimes may involve suicide operations. Thus, a narrow conception 
of rationality fails to provide a complete explanation of movement participation especially for 
social movements that give prominence to identity politics and ideological commitment.  
RM theorists highlight the centrality of ‘mobilising structures’ in determining the trajectories 
of social movements, particularly during their early phases (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996). As broadly laid out by McCarthy, these mobilising structures include tactical 
repertoires and certain organisational forms, in addition to some ‘micro-mobilisation social 
locations’ such as family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, workplaces, and 
even parts of the state structure (McCarthy J. D., 1996, p. 141). Despite their significance 
during the movement’s emergence, these informal configurations alone are insufficient to 
ensure the movement’s survival. To sustain their presence, social movements require a stable 
organisational infrastructure which usually takes the form of social movement organisations 
(SMOs) (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. 13). SMOs operate at the meso-level to 
transform the broad social movement from a general framework for activism into a vehicle 
for social change (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. 4). Another function of SMOs, along 
with social networks, is to constantly stimulate and channel movement participation which is 
directly linked to movement’s survival (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). However, SMOs depend on 
more than the availability of resources; they are also highly contingent on the existence of a 
welcoming or at least permitting socio-political atmosphere. For movement activists 
performing under unfavourable conditions, such as repression and political closure, it might 
be more feasible and effective to resort to informal or clandestine networks for 
communication, collaboration, and mobilisation. Wiktorowicz studies this aspect of social 
activism and states that “the efficacy of formal organizations depends upon the particular 
political context in which they operate” (2001, p. xvii), and based on his extensive research 
on the Islamist movements in Jordan, he notes that the regulative measures of state 
apparatuses played a decisive role in the Salafis’ adoption of informal social networks for 
mobilisation and communication since that SMOs are more exposed and thus vulnerable to 
state control (Wiktorowicz, 2001). On a larger scale, one possibly can see the global Salafi-
Jihadist movement as reliant on localised manifestations that take different forms in different 
times and locales, including SMOs with varying degrees of formality and centralisation, such 
as AQI, AQS, and ISIS, and informal networks that “connect like-minded Islamists to one 
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another through a complex web of personal relationships, small group interactions, meetings 
in private homes, and religious ritual” (Wiktorowicz, 2001, p. xvi). 
The evident impact of political conditions on the adopted organisational model explains why 
most RM theorists have increasingly incorporated elements from the political opportunity 
perspective (a.k.a., the political process model) into their structuralist analyses. 
Political opportunities 
One of the cornerstones of the classical framework for the study of social movements is the 
notion of political opportunities which postulates that movements are by and large shaped by 
their surrounding political conditions (McAdam D. , 1996; Johnston, 2011). According to this 
structuralist model, social movements do not emerge and evolve in a vacuum; rather, they 
are always confronted with certain political opportunities and constraints unique to the 
national context within which they appear (McAdam et al., 1996, 3). It is thus in light of the 
available options and limitations that movements structure their organisational hierarchies 
and prioritise their agendas. However, considering that every element in the surrounding 
political environment can possibly be accounted an opportunity, this may eventually reduce 
the concept’s analytic usefulness (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Therefore, social movement 
theorists tried to elaborate detailed conceptions of political opportunities by specifying their 
dimensions and impacts. In this regard, McAdam recognises four dimensions of political 
opportunities: 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird 
a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam D. , 1996, p. 27) 
For PO scholars, these different aspects of political opportunity are closely relevant to the 
movement’s success. However, this state-centric perspective draws an incomplete picture of 
the political context facing movements with globalised agendas and interstate mobilisation 
campaigns. In the case of global jihadist formations, although it is significant to assess the 
impact of the nature of political institutions and the practices of elites on the fate of jihadist 
mobilisation efforts in a given state, the sustainability of such efforts as well as the way they 
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are received are also linked to identity politics and a host of other ideological and cultural 
factors. In this sense, opportunities are not only political, but they can also emerge out of 
social and cultural changes as well.  
Another shortcoming of the perspective of PO stems from its neglect of intra-movement 
power dynamics and processes of decision making (Jasper, 2004). This is important because 
political opportunities are not independent variables; rather, they are “open to actor’s 
creative agency” (Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001, p. 3) which involves reflexive “meaning 
work” that is ignored in the “overly structural” approaches of RM and PO (Noakes & Johnston, 
2005, p. 3). Movement activists interpret the existing social, political, and economic situation 
and decide what constitutes an opportunity and when it is an opportune time for activism.  
Framing processes   
Ideas, ideologies, and identities were noticeably ignored in the study of social movements 
until the cultural and linguistic turn that occurred in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The 
earlier academic neglect of such variables was mainly due to the lack of analytical tools to 
study in-depth the impact of culture on social movements (Zald, 1996, 263). However, with 
the developments in fields like anthropology, social psychology, and discourse analysis, it 
became possible to incorporate cultural themes and processes into the agenda of social 
movement research (e.g., Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). The cultural turn in social 
sciences has resulted in a plethora of studies that focus on “the deployment of symbols, 
claims, and even identities in the pursuit of activism” (Williams R. , 2004, p. 93). 
Snow, Benford, and colleagues paid special attention to advancing a new perspective that 
takes into consideration the importance of cultural factors and cognitive processes (Snow et 
al., 1986; Benford and Snow, 1992, 2000). Their efforts resulted in a theory of framing 
processes which soon came to be regarded as an integral component of what we now call the 
classical social movement agenda (McAdam et al., 2001: chap. 2). Framing refers to "the 
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world 
and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam et al., 1996: 6). 
In this sense, the concept of framing indicates that meanings, convictions, and perceptions 
are not objectively presented by the surrounding structural conditions or the prevailing 
cultures and ideologies. Instead, movement activists are perceived as signifying agents who 
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are engaged in processes of conceptual and ideational framing (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
These cognitive processes enable movement actors to subjectively assess their circumstances 
and weigh their options before choosing the best ways to bring about the desired social 
change (McAdam et al., 1996; Zald, 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000). The outcomes of these 
framing processes are collective action frames which are ideas, metaphors, and symbols that 
act as lenses through which activists view their opportunity structures, interests, and future 
possibilities (Campbell, 2005). Considering these interpretative functions, frames are placed 
in an intermediary position between political opportunity structures, organisation activities, 
and mobilising resources (McAdam et al., 1996, 1999; Campbell, 2005). 
Frame versus ideology  
Essential to framing processes is the idea that culture and ideology provide movement agents 
with resources that are indispensable for processes of legitimation and mobilisation. These 
nonmaterial resources are extensively and innovatively utilised by the ideologues and 
strategists of Islamist movements to maintain the resilience of their followers, especially 
when economic resources become scarce.  
The use of ‘frame’ as an analytical tool has recently become noticeably popular in the 
literature of social movement theory. To the contrary, ideology is used minimally or entirely 
glossed over for three reasons: first, the generic and holistic nature of ideology renders its 
analytical utility questionable particularly for a micro-level analysis in politics and sociology. 
Second, ideologies are often thought of as static or slowly evolving normative structures 
which makes their relevance to newly emerging events difficult to establish and evaluate. 
Third, the concept of ideology has been pejoratively presented almost since its emergence, 
particularly in the Marxist traditions which associate ideology with domination and 
deception45. These reasons hindered incorporating the vast literature on the theory of 
ideology into the agenda of social movement research and facilitated the introduction of 
frame and framing processes as more operational and measurable concepts. However, 
although ideology and frame are interconnected and sometimes deal with the very same 
cognitive and cultural elements, they function differently and signify two dissimilar 
configurations of ideas. Both ideology and frame belong to the realm of epistemology and 
 
45 For a comprehensive overview of the history of the concept of ‘ideology’ and its applications, refer to 
Eagleton (1991), and Van Dijk (1998). 
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deal with ideas that promote or resist social and political change. However, ideologies are 
systems of ideas which remain relevant over a relatively long timespan due to their generic 
compositions and diverse range of subjects. Frames, on the other hand, are more dynamic 
and pertain to particular circumstances and arising matters. Ideologies do function as frames 
sometimes (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 12), but it is common that their principles are 
transmitted to the ontological realm through the interpretative functions of frames. As such, 
frames play a strategic and intermediary role that keeps ideologies fathomable and ad rem.  
Framing processes 
Framing is usually theorised as a dynamic set of processes that seek to answer two vital 
questions. The first is described as diagnostic and aims to identify the problem(s) and explain 
what is happening. The second question is prognostic and attempts to prescribe what should 
be happening in response to a situation that is diagnosed as unpleasant, unfair, or corrupt 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Benford & Snow, 2000). Clarifying the present situation 
using simple and binary terms and justifying the need for change are essential for creating a 
unifying cause as well as mobilising the popular base. These interpretative diagnoses and 
prognoses are followed by a motivational framing (see Figure 3) that aims to persuade 
movement adherents and sympathisers to move “from the balcony to the barricades” (Snow 
& Byrd, 2007, p. 128). It is a call to action that frames participation as a moral and religious 
duty and/or strategic necessity. Articulating motivational frames is vital for mobilising 
supporters to act upon the diagnostic and prognostic frames and thus bringing the cause into 
the world of social and political activism.  
 
Figure 3 Basic processes of ideological framing 
The frames that result from these diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings are 
neither “given” nor invented from scratch. Rather, they are articulated and elaborated in 




creative ways using new and old discursive elements some of which belong to cultures and 
ideologies that are familiar to the target audience (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 130). Therefore, the 
creative aspect of collective action frames does not stem entirely from the newness of their 
discursive components but from the way frames are articulated and elaborated. In the 
literature of framing processes, frame articulation refers to the way symbols, events, and 
principles are arranged and connected with each other and with the wider ideologies and 
cultures as well (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 130). On the other hand, frame elaboration means the 
act of selectively accenting specific events and moral and discursive elements in addition to 
justifying their salience and relevance to the success of collective action (Snow & Byrd, 2007, 
p. 130). This conceptualisation of framing processes entails that activists as such are more 
than mere actors; they are agents who are innovatively engaged in the core ideational 
processes of frame articulation and frame elaboration.  
After articulating and elaborating the general ideological discourse of the movement/group, 
movement activists perform continuous processes of strategic framing.  
Processes of strategic framing 
Framing is a strategic activity inasmuch as it is a purposeful process administered by human 
agents to achieve the objectives of their collective activism.46 When the moment is ripe for 
mobilisation and activism, movement ideologues and strategists perform continual 
assessments of the available opportunities and resources before adopting or constructing 
certain frames. These strategic functions are essential variables upon which movement 
success is highly dependent. Processes of strategic framing are “deliberative, utilitarian, and 
goal directed: Frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose—to recruit 
new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth” (Benford & Snow, 
2000, p. 624). These strategic processes include frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 
extension, and frame transformation.  
Frame bridging is the process of connecting fragments of the same ideology, or sometimes 
cross-ideologies (Noakes & Johnston, 2005), in a manner that makes them more pertinent to 
the available situation. In the discourse of al-Nusra Front, the presentation of ‘tawheed’ 
 
46 Strategy is perceived here as the way “we turn what we have into what we need to get what want” (Ganz, 
2009, p. 8). 
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(monotheism) and ‘fighting taghout’ (tyranny) as inherently connected is an example of this 
type of strategic framing. Frame amplification refers to “the idealisation, embellishment, 
clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624) 
which also involves the use of appealing slogans and names. For instance, choosing the catchy 
name ‘al-Nusra’ which means ‘support’ was meant to resonate with the Syrian people’s actual 
need for support at the time when al-Nusra Front first appeared around the end of 2011. 
Frame extension refers to the attempts of frame-articulators to make their proposed frames 
look appealing to audiences outside their initial targeted social group. Given the centrality of 
the Palestinian cause across the Arab and Muslim people, al-Nusra’s focus on associating 
defeating the Syrian army with the liberation of Jerusalem is meant to draw more people to 
al-Nusra’s base of popular support which can be an example of this process of discursive 
alignment. Finally, frame transformation is the process of purposively modifying an old 
understanding and sometimes even replacing an old meaning with a completely new one.  
It must be noted here that the abovementioned processes of strategic framing overlap 
substantially in practice and often progress in synchrony to materialise the ultimate purpose 
of bringing harmony into the relationship between the declared ideological principles, on one 
hand, and the practicalities of real-life activism and the interests of activists (Noakes & 
Johnston, 2005). In addition to the significance of these strategic processes, they are equally 
risky tasks. Movement activists, ideologues, and strategists are not unrestrictedly free to 
decide on how to articulate the strategic frames for their associated group. Frame-articulators 
have to meet a specific level of credibility depending on the consistency and empirical 
effectiveness of their strategic frames. Hence, unlike processes of ideological framing, 
strategic signification is always negotiated, altered, and reassessed and if it fails to prove its 
practical effectiveness in the realm of activism this will have a drastic negative impact on the 
fate of the movement and the success of its mobilisation efforts.  
Strategic capacity and militant Islamism 
Devising effective frames for collective action requires strategic capacity which Ganz sees as 
reliant on the presence of strong motivation, a salient knowledge, and innovative thinking 
(Ganz, 2005, p. 216). With regard to militant Islamism, the claim to religious authority is in 
itself a strategic capacity in the hands of Islamist epistemic leaders and is vital in determining 
the trajectory of modern Islamist activism. Leaders’ claim to exclusive access to the realm of 
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religious exegesis has noticeable consequences on the nature of diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational tasks. The possession of what we may call dogmatic power makes movement 
leaders more autonomous and widens the margin wherein they perform their framing 
activities. This authoritative role differentiates the framing processes in militant Islamism 
from those ln the rest of collective actions. The differences emanate from two sources.  
First, the dogmatic nature of the authority of Islamist marajiʿ enables them to frame 
movement participation as a moral and religious obligation which in turn expands their 
outreach and facilitates adopting a high-risk mode of activism (Wickham, 2004).  
Second, such dogmatic power makes Islamist marajiʿ less accountable before their adherents 
and followers. Regarding the issue of accountability, Snow and Benford (1992) state that 
“activists must frame issues in ways that resonate with the ideologies, identities, and cultural 
understandings of supporters and others who might be drawn to their cause” (cited in: 
Campbell, 2005). The case of militant Islamism does not seem to instantiate Snow and 
Benford’s statement. The idea that alignment and resonance always direct or restrict 
movement frame-articulators might be challenged when there is a claim to some sort of 
dogmatic power. However, although religious authority makes Islamist frame-articulators less 
questionable, they are still obliged to present a consistent and coherent narrative that 
resonates with the movement’s own master frame. Additionally, Islamist scholars and 
strategists have a vested interest in making the Islamist frames and discourses appear static 
and solid as a strategy for mobilisation and for propaganda purposes which may be one of the 
reasons behind the slowly changing discourse of Salafi-Jihadism. 
Contrary to the ostensible stability of the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, militant Islamists present 
a highly pragmatic and continuously changing performance at the operational level. 
Observing the discourse and activities of al-Nusra Front in Syria after 2011 reveals a constantly 
altered mode of activism. As such, it is useful to investigate the role of ideological and 
strategic framings in addition to the agency of activists, in making this phenomenon possible 
for an organisation that is widely deemed essentialist and uncompromisingly dogmatic. 
Caveats and considerations  
It is noteworthy, however, that although the heuristic explanation of framing processes seems 
convincing, it overlooks preliminary questions regarding the positions, authorities and 
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motivations of the activists who perform these strategic tasks. It also implies that members 
of a social movement or a social movement organisation are equally involved in processes of 
ideational framing. To overcome this shortcoming, it may be useful to perceive framing 
processes as affected by movements’ organisational hierarchies, internal power relations, 
and distribution of epistemic and normative powers (e.g., religious jurisprudence and 
exegesis, and moral guidance).  
Additionally, there is an empirical problem that revolves around the lack of a clear and 
systematic methodology for examining movements’ framing processes and their impacts on 
the success of activism. In this respect, I propose trespassing disciplinary boundaries and 
applying the more elaborate methodologies of the interpretative approach in political 
sociology, specifically depth-hermeneutics which overlaps with framing processes and SMT 
more generally.   
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The agency of frame-articulators 
Since the post-1960s turn towards the rational choice model, scholars of social movements 
have made it clear that movement actors are engaged in continuous processes of negotiations 
and rational calculations that drastically affect the development and outcomes of social 
movement activism (Gunning, 2009; Flacks, 2004). In more detail, actors assess the situation, 
utilise the present networks and create new ones, choose suitable methods of 
communication and performance, articulate the ideological framework, and establish 
organisational formations (Kurzman, 2004). However, critics of the rational choice model 
rightly contend that not all collective social actions are always rationally planned. Some social 
actions are impulsive and highly affected by emotions, habits, and social expectations 
(Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997, p. 192). Also, even if individual members chose rationally, the 
accumulation of their choices and actions does not necessarily lead to a rational collective 
action (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997, p. 192). Considering these criticisms, conceptualising 
movement members as agents rather than rational actors allows for addressing issues such 
as emotions and ideological commitments in the study of social movements. I thus use 
‘agency’ to address the factor of intentionality in framing the discourse and strategies of al-
Nusra Front and not to imply the existence of stable behavioural causalities and objective 
forms of rationality.  
In the same vein, Flacks (2004) calls for a clearer distinction between activist and mass 
participation in movement activism, aiming for a better understanding of the motivational 
factors of mobilisation and the dynamics of articulating and sustaining movement strategies 
(Flacks, 2004, p. 146). Such basic, yet key, distinction should be followed by a sophisticated 
analytical differentiation between the various specialisations, capacities, ranks, and 
authorities of movement leaders and activists. This is because movement members do not 
have the same degree of awareness of its theoretical foundations, strategies, and long-term 
objectives nor the same level of commitment to its cause.  
Even though extensive scholarly efforts have been made to elaborate the processes of 
framing in social movements, still, there are areas that remain poorly theorised, particularly 
the issue of leadership within the broader subject of movement agency (Campbell, 2005; 
Morris, 2004; Flacks, 2004; Ganz, 2003). Although the same criticism may apply to the 
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structuralist models of Political Opportunities and Resource Mobilisation (Morris, 2004; 
Campbell, 2005), dynamic issues like frame articulation and movement leadership are 
theoretically more relevant to Frame and Framing Processes as this perspective is meant to 
lessen the mechanicality and narrowness of sheer structural analyses. That said, the following 
discussions will reflect on issues and concepts borrowed mainly from the literature of the 
framing perspective.  
Acknowledging the significance of human agency in determining the trajectories of collective 
actions may not be new to the literature of framing processes. Benford and Snow, for 
example, highlight the issue of agency and state that social movement activism is “the work 
of social movement organisations or movement activists” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614), 
but without clarifying which organisations or activists are meant and what entitles them to 
practice their roles. As the analysis of the dynamics of framing developed, issues such as the 
organisational roles and the characteristics and interests of movement activists remained 
underexplored in Benford and Snow’s analysis. In this respect, Zald states: “Social 
movements, their leaders, and participants are differentially situated in the social structure. 
As such, they draw upon the repertoires and frames available to and compatible with the 
skills, orientations, and styles of the groups that make them up” (Zald, 1996, p. 267). Thus, a 
more inclusive perspective of framing processes should consider the functions and 
organisational positions of those who articulate the movement’s frames, in tandem with 
investigating the characteristics and effectiveness of the resultant frames. Yet, it is imperative 
to clarify that such agent-related topics are not descriptive as they may seem because, to 
answer the question of “who?”, one needs to research intra-movement power dynamics, 
sources of authority, and levels of leadership and activism. 
Movement activists always find themselves surrounded by already existing cultural rules, 
social norms, and discursive practices. If actors abide by them and apply them literally and 
uncritically that means an absence of human agency. McLean (2007) and other social 
scientists argue that the human agency appears when actors behave as agents and begin to 
deliberately modify these existing rules by changing them or interpreting them differently. 
However, the agency of actors may also appear in the form of an intentional projection of an 
exaggerated commitment to norms and traditions. In Salafi-Jihadism, the strategic use of 
discourse in ways that tend to focus on demonstrating cultural and religious authenticity and 
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commitment to the literal meaning of foundational texts and traditions may reflect the 
agency of Islamist actors as well. Agency does not have to always be associated with devising 
creative contents and improvised practices. It can appear in the utilisation of resonant 
messages and in the strategic use of discourse in pursuit of certain interests in the world of 
activism, whether the employed discourse is considered creative or not. For that matter, the 
espousal of a strictly conservative discourse may be intended to mobilise ideologically and 
religiously committed followers willing to engage in high-risk activities and also to ensure that 
the group or the individual stands out from the crowd in a competitive marketplace within 
which authenticity is a highly valued commodity. In essence, what is at stake, mainly, is the 




Levels of Salafi-Jihadist framing  
While levels of collective actions may vary in terms of their formality and organisation, 
framing activities vary considerably as well. According to Benford and Snow, collective action 
frames may differ in their extents of inclusivity, exclusivity, rigidity, flexibility and the number 
of matters they cover (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 618). With regard to the subject of Salafi-
Jihadist activism, one may differentiate between three types of frames that represent the 
outcomes of three levels of framing activities:  
The first frame is the generic frame of Islamism (or political Islam) which is loosely articulated 
and acts as an ideological container that encompasses ideas and themes that may be shared 
amongst multiple Islamist movements and organisations—whether militant or non-militant. 
The wide scope of Islamism is apparent in the way it is described by Barton: “Islamism covers 
a broad spectrum of convictions. At one extreme are those who would like to see Islam 
accorded proper recognition in national life in terms of national symbols. At the other 
extreme are those who want to see radical transformation of society and politics, by whatever 
means, into an absolute theocracy” (Barton, 2004, p. 28). Following this conceptualisation, 
Salafi-Jihadists are Islamists: Despite their distinct strategic and organisational features, 
Salafi-Jihadists remain committed to the ideological premises of Islamism. The Salafi-Jihadist 
discourse underscores the importance of power and governance in society and is profoundly 
anti-secular and driven by the idea that Islam contains solutions to the social, political, and 
economic ills that confront Muslims societies.  
The second one is a “movement-specific frame”, that is the frame of Salafi-Jihadism. The 
specificity of Salafi-Jihadism is derived primarily from its insistence on performing jihad as an 
inescapable obligation to realise the movement’s goals. For example, Abo Muhammad al-
Maqdisi defines Salafi-Jihadism as “the current which seeks to implement monotheism 
through jihad against the tyrants” (cited in Hegghammer, 2009, p. 255). This insider definition 
confirms the centrality of jihad for those who subscribe to Salafi-Jihadism. However, the 
profound impact of jihad should not lead to overlooking other elements of Salafi-Jihadism. It 
is not only a call for waging jihad anytime and anywhere; rather, there are always careful 
processes of strategic framing that accompany calls for jihad aiming to make it look convincing 
and culturally resonant to targeted audiences. Matters such deciding who the enemy is, what 
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constitutes apostasy, whom to mobilise, where and when to operate, are crucial 
determinants of Salafi-Jihadist activism that are usually found in the discourses constructed 
by a group of strategists. Functionally, this strategy-oriented discourse deals with translating 
the generic terms of Islamism into a meaningful plan for action directed towards clearer and 
more identifiable objectives that correspond to available economic resources, political 
opportunities, and cultural settings.  
The third one is an “organisational frame” which is more contingent and less stable than the 
first two frames. This frame encompasses tactics and actionable values that are presumably 
in harmony with the movement’s strategy and the broader ideology. Although militant 
Islamist activism is, in any moment, bound to the strategic confines of Salafi-Jihadism, what 
dictates the day-to-day activities is the organisational frame which provides immediate 
responses to the continuously changing structural circumstances. The tactics and ephemeral 
discursive practices of al-Nusra Front in Syria constitute organisational frames that can be an 
example of the latter type of Islamist frames. Salafi-Jihadist groups develop clusters of 
organisational frames that together distinguish the group and determine its relations with 
other Salafi-Jihadist groups. Under the strategic discourse of Salafi-Jihadism, there is an 
organisational variation depending on issues of timing and prioritising as well as the kind of 
image they want to project to the world, to competing Islamist factions, and to their own 
members. For instance, ISIS and al-Nusra Front differ in their stances towards documenting 
violence and not towards violence per se. The immediacy of applying hudood (Islamic capital 
punishments) in the areas that they take control over represents another point of divergence 
between ISIS and al-Nusra Front.  
It is noteworthy that when it comes to the issue of frame articulation, and the broader subject 
of decision-making, scholars of SMT do not discuss the dynamics of these issues at the 
different levels of collective action. Rather, framing is often presented as a product of 
collective activities performed by unspecified actors (SMOs, activists, etc.). Therefore, they 
unconvincingly ignore a potential distinction between the authorities and contributions of 
ideological frame-articulators, strategists, operational leaders, lay members, and 
sympathisers. In the case of militant Islamism, the three aforementioned frames are 
articulated, aligned, and translated by signifying agents who follow a specific division of roles 
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(See Figure 6) and whose decisions are heavily affected by their respective interests, 
ideological commitments, and intersubjective experiences.  
 
Finally, dealing with the question of agency in Salafi-Jihadism is a challenging task for many 
reasons. First, despite the fact that more and more scholars are starting to acknowledge the 
importance of agency in their social research, still, there is no established theory or an 
incorporated methodology to examine the role of human agency in social and political 
activism. The second reason concerns the fear that, due to the highly subjective experiences 
of social agents, any findings or observations will not be easily generalisable which does not 
meet the commitments of the conventional structuralist model of social research. Third, 
focusing on agency goes against the mainstream presuppositions of Terrorism Studies which 
tend to view militant Islamists as irrational or even brainwashed actors who subscribe to a 
static extremist ideology. These reasons have contributed to the unpopularity of social 
research that deals with the role of human agency in Islamist activism, and in collective action 






Figure 6 Division of responsibilities in Salafi-Jihadist activism. 
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Another set of difficulties result from the fact that the main studied case in this research is a 
contemporary phenomenon with many of its ramifications and manifestations still unfolding. 
While the recency of the timeframe of the study adds to the originality and significance of this 
research, it also requires close and continuous observation of the state of the political field in 
Syria and the wider Middle East in addition to keeping an eye on the emerging Salafi-Jihadist 
writings and speeches that respond to a continuously changing political milieu.   
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Discourse Analysis as a Tool for Analysing Salafi-Jihadi Frames 
The discourses of militant Islamists are not given or simply rediscovered. Instead, there are 
Salafi-Jihadist processes of framing that reflect conscious attempts by a core group of 
ideologues, strategists, and operational leaders to manage a dynamic discursive field. This 
discursive field encompasses the broad ideological framework as well as the less stable 
strategies and the ephemeral and more specific tactics found in Salafi-Jihadist activism.  
Contextual discourse analysis  
How do we examine processes of ideological and strategic framing and their impact on 
militant Islamist activism?  
Textual analysis is one way that could possibly provide valuable insights into the nature of 
both the ideologies and the strategies devised and adopted by Salafi-Jihadists. Also, through 
an interpretative study of the texts that inform the activities of Salafi-Jihadists one may detect 
whether there are any shifts in perceptions and priorities. However, limiting the study to a 
mere analysis of texts will not help to understand the dynamics of frame-articulation or 
recognise the underlying causes of any shifts in the Salafi-Jihadist discourses and strategies.  
What is needed is a situational study of texts that is sensitive to changes happening in the 
fields of society, economy, and politics, and that examines their impacts on the adopted 
discursive and strategic elements. In this regard, the field of hermeneutics has witnessed the 
emergence of critical approaches that take into account both texts and contexts. This 
reciprocal relationship thus brings together in a practical manner two theoretical trajectories 
of SMT, namely Framing Processes and Political Opportunities. Paltridge explains that a 
critical approach to discourse “may start with a textual analysis and move from there to 
deconstruct and challenge the text(s) being examined” (Paltridge, 2012, p. 186). Such 
deconstruction “may include tracing underlying ideologies from the linguistic features of a 
text, unpacking particular biases and ideological presuppositions underlying the text, and 
relating the text to other texts and to people’s experiences and beliefs” (Paltridge, 2012, p. 
186). In this way, the critical study of discourse exhibits a potential to complement and 




The construction of discourse is not seen as intending to only provide meanings and readings 
of things, concepts, and relationships; it is theorised as a “social practice” that aims to affect 
the way real-life events develop (Van Dijk, 2013, p. 176). In this sense, discourse is not any 
linguistic composition; more specifically, it is a linguistic representation of an ideology. 
Practically, ideologies are usually “written down in explicit textbooks, Bibles, catechisms, 
histories of movements, party programmes, corporate ‘mission statements’, organisational 
statutes, and similar ideological writings by ideologues” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 149).  
In this research, discourses are regarded as contextual and thus historical (Wodak & Meyer, 
2001, p. 15). Perceiving discourses as entwined with the socio-political reality means that an 
accurate and meaningful textual analysis is that which takes into consideration the different 
political, social, economic, and psychological conditions that may affect the production and 
consumption of the discursive elements found in the analysed text. In this respect, the 
relationship between discourse and its surrounding historical conditions is not mechanistic or 
arbitrary. The construction and dissemination of discourse often aim to “produce and 
reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, 
and ethnic/cultural and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and 
position people”, and therefore any meaningful textual analysis should aspire “to make more 
visible these opaque aspects of discourse as social practice” (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 
2011, p. 358). 
These remarks are closely relevant to the study of ideology and human agency in Salafi-
Jihadist activism since that they underscore the need to research the ways agents use their 
ability to construct meanings and symbols to increase their authority and maintain certain 
hierarchies of power within their social groups. In the fields of Islamist activism and Islamic 
studies, this translates as the way Islamist ideologues and strategists use their epistemic and 
normative power to assert their authority and socio-political influence and implement their 
plans and strategic visions.  
Alongside deconstructing and analysing the selected Salafi-Jihadist texts, I will present 
interpretative discussions on the less visible motives and interests that may be contributing 
to the adoption of certain discourses in response to specific events. This will be done through 
a before-and-after analysis of the texts’ structures and main themes. A situational study of 
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discourse may help to uncover motives as well as the changing and the stable in the Salafi-
Jihadist discourse of al-Nusra Front.  
Sampling  
I used the method of ‘purposive sampling’ to select written and visual materials for the 
research. Based on my extensive observations of the field of Islamist activism in Syria after 
2011 and my discussions and interviews with other researchers of Islamism and Middle 
Eastern Studies, I chose to focus on comparing, contrasting and analysing materials that 
belong to the following ideologues and strategists: 
Abdul Rahim Attoun (known as: Abu Abdullah al-Shami) 
Attoun is a well-known Islamist scholar, member of al-Nusra’s Shura Council, and is thought 
to be the second most important leader of al-Nusra Front, after Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. 
Like al-Jolani, Attoun is Syrian and based in the al-Nusra-controlled areas in north-western 
Syria. Between 2012 and 2018, he frequently appeared in numerous video recordings and 
issued statements and fatwas on various religious and strategic matters. Significantly, he 
represented al-Nusra in al-mubahala, which is a doctrinal and strategic dialogue held over 
Skype with Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani, ISIS’ spokesman.  
Selected research materials: In this research, I will analyse one of Attoun’s most influential 
works that is: fi zilal dawhat al-jihad (In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad). This 209-page 
book was published in early 2016 but is a collection of lectures and propaganda materials that 
were already being used in al-Nusra’s daʿwah centres and taught to new recruits. The book 
consists of three chapters: The first chapter is about general Islamic ethics and how to raise a 
new Islamic generation. The second chapter is dedicated to detailing the doctrine of jihad, in 
addition to few other social and political topics including ‘basics of sociology’, the concept of 
ummah, and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the last chapter, Attoun deals 
with contemporary themes regarding the Islamist activism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and 
evaluates the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and other Islamist 
organisations.  
Eyad al-Qunaibi 
Qunaibi is a famous Islamist preacher based in Jordan and of a Palestinian origin. He was born 
in Kuwait in 1975. In 2003, he obtained a doctoral degree in pharmacology but never stopped 
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preaching. Qunaibi is close to the well-known Salafi-Jihadist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi and he regularly delivers inflammatory and highly ideologized speeches focusing on 
the need for implementing shariʿa and performing jihad. In December 2018, Qunaibi’s official 
Facebook Page had nearly 1,300,000 followers. Reportedly, extracts from his writings are 
used in al-Nusra’s daʿwah centres and circulated among the jihadis in the al-Nusra-controlled 
areas. 
Selected research materials: I intend to analyse the transcriptions of nusratan lil-shariʿa 
(Supporting Shariʿa) which is a series of 30 videos that were broadcasted sequentially 
between March and June 2012. Each video is about 10 minutes featuring Eyad al-Qunaibi 
giving instructions to the Islamists on how to respond to the newly unfolding circumstances 
under the Arab Spring. The videos are available on YouTube and Qunaibi’s website (www.al-
furqan.org). 
Tariq Abdelhaleem  
Abdelhaleem is an Egyptian-Canadian Islamist scholar based in Toronto. He is a close friend 
and an ally of the London-based Salafi-Jihadist preacher Hani el-Sibaʿi; both of whom are 
advocates of al-Qaeda and fierce critics of ISIS since 2014. Abdelhaleem strongly supported 
al-Nusra when it was officially representing al-Qaeda in Syria and then distanced himself from 
al-Nusra when it disbanded from al-Qaeda in July 2016. Abdelhaleem expresses his views in 
the form of written articles and occasionally through online video messages. He uses several 
Internet platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and his publicly accessible website: 
https://tariq-abdelhaleem.net) to disseminate his strategic thoughts and religious rulings. 
Selected research materials: I will analyse a text written by Abdelhaleem in late 2015, entitled 
qiyam dawlat al-Islam: bayn al-waqiʿ wal-awham (Establishing the Islamic State: Between 
Reality and Illusion). Abdelhaleem published this work, which he introduces as a ‘research 
paper’, as a part of his three-volume documentary collection ahdath al-Sham kama 
ʿayashtuha (the Circumstances in the Levant as I Witnessed Them). I purposively selected this 
43-page text as it captures most of Abdehaleem’s views regarding the ‘Islamic state’, 
contemporary Salafi-Jihadist activism, and the wider Islamist activism. In this propaganda 
piece, Abdelhaleem intends to distinguish the ‘authentic’ Salafi-Jihadist approach of al-Qaeda 
from the ‘deviant’ and ineffective approaches of both the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS.  
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These works have constructed al-Nusra’s ideology and outlook and established its brand in 
the world of militant Islamist activism. I will also analyse a selection of al-Nusra’s statements 
that were released in response to major organisational and military developments during the 
civil war in Syria in addition to extracts from the speeches of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, 
founder and leader of al-Nusra Front, and from al-Nusra-affiliated publications such as Al 
Risalah Magazine and Ebaa Weekly Newsletter. 
Numerous Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists emerged from within the ranks of the 
mujahideen in Afghanistan, key among them were Abdullah Azzam, Osama b. Laden, and Abu 
Musʿab al-Suri. The written and recorded messages of these marajiʿ have defined the doctrine 
of Salafi-Jihadism and furnished the ideological underpinnings for organisations such as al-
Qaeda and its offshoots, including al-Nusra Front. Having said that, the analysed set of texts 
includes Abdallah b. Muhammad’s al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum) 
and Istratigiyyat al-Harb al-Iqlimiyyah ʿala Ard al-Sham (Strategy of Regional War on the Land 
of Sham),  in addition to quotes from Abdullah Azzam and several articles by Abu Basir al-
Tartousi. In addition to these materials, I frequently refer to the works of Abu Musʿab al-Suri, 
who was described by Brynjar Lia (2008) as the “architect of global jihad” and “al-Qaeda 
strategist”. Al-Suri wrote extensively, and his writings have been used as references by many 
jihadist groups around the world including al-Nusra Front in Syria. I specifically draw on al-
Suri’s influential book: Daʿwat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah al-ʿAlamiyyah (The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call) which encompasses most of his thoughts regarding strategic framing. 
Digital copies of most of these selected materials are readily available online, particularly on 
Tariq Abdelhaleem’s website (https://tariq-abdelhaleem.net) and (https://archive.org). Some 
videos and short texts are also found on Facebook and Twitter. All the primary sources are in 
Arabic, which is my first language; therefore, I will be able to understand the texts and study 
them in their original forms. Besides, these works have not been studied systematically and, 
apart from some media reports, one cannot find any comprehensive analyses of these texts 





In this research, SMT is used as a general framework and a toolkit rather than an exhaustive 
theory with straightforward explanations of militant Islamist activism. The Three SMT 
perspectives of Political Opportunities, Resource Mobilisation, and Framing Processes provide 
a comprehensive framework for the study of militant Islamism because they together 
consider the structural conditions in addition to subjective factors such as strategic frames 
and processes of meaning-making more generally.  
The perspective of Framing Processes is particularly relevant to the study of the discourse and 
activism of al-Nusra Front. Processes of signification include ideological framings and strategic 
framings. On one hand, the ideological discourse of movements encompasses diagnostic 
frames, prognostic frames, and motivational frames. This theorisation helps to reveal the 
ideological structure and the main features of the discourse of al-Nusra Front and whether it 
conforms to the general discourse of Islamism. On the other hand, Benford and Snow (2000) 
observe that processes of strategic framing include frame bridging, frame amplification, 
frame extension, and frame transformation, all of which are goal-oriented ideational 
processes. The latter processes are relevant to the study of al-Nusra’s strategic frames since 
they help to explicate the purposeful work of the organisation’s marajiʿ. Still, the impact of 
changes in the surrounding environment on processes of strategic framing is unclear due to 
a methodological deficit in this regard.  
To operationalise the perspective of framing processes I suggested trespassing disciplinary 
boundaries and employing the techniques of Discourse Analysis to analyse processes of Salafi-
Jihadist processes of ideological and strategic framings.  I will first analyse the discourse found 
in key Salafi-jihadist texts and compare their ideological structures with that of Sayyid Qutb’s 
seminal work Milestones to decide whether they belong discursively to the phenomenon of 
Islamism. This will be followed by a textual analysis of key strategic frames and themes found 
in the discourse of al-Nusra Front. The final empirical study involves tracing changes in al-
Nusra Front’s strategic frames in light of certain “transformative events” which represent 
fundamental structural changes. The main focus will be on studying al-Nusra’s responses to 
the rise of ISIS in 2013 and 2014, the Russian military intervention in September 2015, and 
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the initiation of political negotiations between the Syrian regime and parties from the Syrian 
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In this chapter, I present the findings regarding the ideological nature and defining features 
of the mobilising discourse of al-Nusra Front. In the tradition of frame and framing processes, 
the ideological composition of discourse appears through three interrelated elements: 
diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Following this outline, in this chapter, I employ techniques from CDA and utilise the software 
NVivo to analyse the discourse found in key texts written or articulated by three marajiʿ, all 
of whom were respected ideologues for members of al-Nusra Front especially in its early 
tears. Texts (1), (2), and (3) belong to Tariq Abdelhaleem, Abdul Rahim Attoun (aka Abu 
Abdallah al-Shami), and Eyad Qunaibi respectively. Using the same methods, I will also analyse 
the ideological discourse in Sayyid Qutb’s seminal work Maʿalim fi al-Tarik (Milestones) (1964) 
and use it as a point of reference. 
The research methods involve coding the selected texts using an original matrix of codes that 
I developed based on my extensive review of the literature on Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism. 
The matrix consists of 64 codes assembled into nine discursive strands which in turn fall under 
three general themes: diagnoses, prognoses, and call for action. Together, these discursive 
fragments form the skeletal structure of the ideological discourse found in the studied texts 
(see Figure 7).  
The main purpose is to examine the existence of “ideological fidelity”, or lack thereof, which 
is an established methodological technique in studies of frame and framing processes. 
Therefore, based on the frequency of codes and their corresponding strands and themes, I 
will juxtapose the three analysed materials and compare the structures of their ideological 
discourses, firstly with each other, and then with the ideological structure found in Qutb’s 
Milestones, individually and collectively. To maintain a high degree of methodical consistency, 





Figure 7  Illustration of the devised ideological matrix 
The chapter starts with a brief description of the essential features of the discourse of 
Islamism as developed by key ideologues such as Qutb, Maududi, and al-Banna. After that, I 
present the outcomes of analysing the selected texts using the software NVivo. Relevant to 
the purpose of the analysis is the function cross-matrix which helps to determine the 
frequency of codes and their proportional presence as well. The findings are presented in 
three thematic sections: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. 
This is followed by an overall discussion of the main findings and their significances and 
implications. In the last section, I discuss the mobilising role of ideological framing and its 
impact on the processes of radicalisation and one’s involvement in high-risk activism.   
A point of reference: Basic Islamist principles  
The pillars of Islamism were constructed by numerous Islamic scholars who kept building on 
each other’s contributions in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth 
century. As it was discussed in the first chapter, Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Muhammad Iqbal 
(1877-1939), Abul Aʿla Maududi (1903-1979), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Hasan al-Banna 
(1906-1949) and other Islamist scholars, led an intellectual movement that tried to assemble 



















a political ideology based on Islamic traditions, ethos, and vocabularies. They thus formulated 
a political discourse that has since provided an ideological marjiʿiyya (or a discursive 
repertoire, using the terminology of SMT (Steinberg, 2002; 1998)) for numerous Islamist 
movements and individual activists.  
The efforts of the Islamist ideologues can be described as normative and generative. First of 
all, they are normative because they identify what is wrong, sketch an abstract image of the 
ideal society, and highlight specific values and attitudes (for a discussion of the basic elements 
of ideology refer to (Martin, 2015, pp. 11-15)). Seen from the perspective of framing 
processes, the normative/interpretative aspect of the works of Islamist ideologues 
encompasses ideational diagnoses and prognoses. To clarify, the discourse of Islamism 
provides a critique of the modern institution of the nation-state and the social and political 
arrangements that have been in place since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The creation 
of new nation-states ruled by manmade constitutions and dominated by secular elites is often 
framed by Islamist ideologues as the root cause of all aspects of backwardness in Muslim 
societies, Western domination over Muslim lands, and the overall decline of Muslim 
civilisation (Akbarzadeh, 2011, pp. 1-2).  
In addition to that, these ideologues were involved in prognostic framings that present an 
alternative image of society wherein Islam assumes a pivotal public role and informs the 
discourses and various functions of state apparatuses. To that end, the Islamist ideologues 
embarked on purposively accenting specific Islamic traditions and even inventing new ones. 
Driven by the aim of providing a culturally resonant alternative to the modern institution of 
nation-state, the Islamist ideologues put immense efforts to develop a political Islamic theory 
focusing on concepts such as hakimiyya  (usually translated as: Islamic governance) and 
‘Islamic state’. However, the concept of an Islamic state itself is a product of modernity and 
was first elaborated by Abul Aʿla Maududi. Despite this, great efforts were exuded to find 
ideological roots for an Islamic state grounded in historical and theological evidence. 
Regarding hakimiyya, it is conceptualised by Maududi as: replacing popular sovereignty with 
the sovereignty of God through governing by the rules of shariʿa. Interestingly, the 
term hakimiyya which resides in the discourse of contemporary political Islamist movements 
does not exist in Arabic lexicography, and is not mentioned in the Qur’an or Hadith, similar to 
the term ‘Islamic state’. Furthermore, Tibi (2012) explains how shariʿa, albeit an old Islamic 
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concept, has in modern times become “a claim for a state law, to be written into national 
constitutions”, which he perceives as “an entirely new phenomenon within Islam” (Tibi, 2012, 
p. 45). Tibi continues that “the claim that it restores some historical institution is precisely an 
invention of tradition: an effort to inculcate certain behavioural values and norms by asserting 
continuity with imagined past practices” (Tibi, 2012, p. 45).  
In light of the above, the following sections will include analyses of the discourses of three 
epistemic leaders of al-Nusra Front to examine the extent to which they follow the common 
principles of Islamism as expressed in Sayyid Qutb’s seminal work: Milestones.  
The three analysed materials are:  
Text (1): Tariq Abdelhaleem - Establishing the Islamic State: Between Reality and 
Illusion. 
Text (2): Abdul Rahim Attoun - In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad. 
Text (3): Eyad Qunaibi - Supporting Shariʿa. 
In the analysis of texts, I will focus on what is known in the literature of frame and framing 
processes as ‘ideological fidelity’ which overlaps substantially with what is known as 




Ideological framing analysis 
Diagnostic framing 
In this section, I explore the way Salafi-Jihadists criticise the present order and the extent to 
which their critiques conform to the classic Islamist diagnostic framing. The discourse of 
Islamism provides a critique of the modern institution of the nation-state and the social and 
political arrangements that have been in place since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The 
creation of new nation-states ruled by manmade constitutions and dominated by secular 
elites is often framed by Islamist ideologues as the root cause of all aspects of backwardness 
in Muslim societies, Western domination over Muslim lands, and the overall decline of 
Muslim civilisation. Islamist ideologues, such as Abul Aʿla Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, criticised 
and rejected the social and political reality in Muslim societies based on their claim that it 
constitutes a new phase of Jahiliyya; a term that signifies two things: pre-Islamic Arabia and 
a situation wherein people are ignorant of the laws of God.  
Practically, I analysed the selected Salafi-Jihadist texts focusing on the following discursive 
strands and their linked parameters/codes. 
Blaming the “other”:  
Parameters: blaming the “other”, occupation, crusaders, anti-West, anti-Semitism, 
sectarianism, anti-Shiism, anti-Sufism. 
Criticising the nation-state  
Parameters: criticising nation-state, colonialism, corruption, dictatorship, economic 
crisis, fallible legislature, civil war, insecurity, chaos, jahiliyya. 
Grievance and victimhood 
Parameters: victimhood, genocide, exclusion, moral breakdown, migration, foreign 
domination, conspiracy. 
At this stage, I will use NVivo to analyse the coded texts considering the presence and 




Table 1 NVivo cross matrix - diagnostic framing in texts 1, 2, 3, and 4 












A : blaming the “other” 3.95% 2.56% 5.22% 4.08% 
B : anti-Semitism 2.63% 2.56% 0.00% 0.00% 
C : anti-Shiism 2.63% 0.00% 0.75% 0.00% 
D : anti-Sufism 2.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
E : anti-West 11.84% 3.85% 3.73% 3.40% 
F : crusaders 6.58% 1.28% 0.75% 0.00% 
G : occupation 0.00% 1.28% 1.49% 0.68% 
H : sectarianism 6.58% 1.28% 2.24% 0.00% 
  
    


















A : criticising nation-state 19.74% 7.69% 3.73% 0.00% 
B : chaos 1.32% 0.00% 5.22% 4.76% 
C : civil war 0.00% 0.00% 0.75% 0.00% 
D : colonialism 1.32% 5.13% 2.24% 0.68% 
E : corruption 2.63% 2.56% 11.19% 8.84% 
F : dictatorship 9.21% 2.56% 5.97% 5.44% 
G : economic crisis 0.00% 0.00% 11.19% 4.08% 
H : fallible legislature 7.89% 8.97% 17.16% 10.88% 
I : insecurity 0.00% 1.28% 6.72% 3.40% 
J : jahiliyya 5.26% 26.92% 9.70% 36.05% 
  
    


















A : victimhood 1.32% 2.56% 0.00% 0.68% 
B : conspiracy 3.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
C : domination 9.21% 11.54% 5.97% 6.80% 
D : exclusion 1.32% 3.85% 0.00% 0.00% 
E : genocide 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
F : migration 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
G : moral breakdown 0.00% 14.10% 5.97% 10.20% 
 
Key facts 
Text (1): Tariq Abdelhaleem - Establishing the Islamic State: Between Reality and Illusion 
An anti-West tone is easily discernible in Abdelhaleem’s text. In most places, he refers to 
Western powers as either “crusaders” or “the Crusader-Zionist alliance”. Throughout the text, 
he insists on drawing parallels between the Crusade campaigns in the medieval period and 
recent military interventions in Muslim-majority countries. Framing military conflicts as 
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manifestations of an eternal clash of civilisations is another commonality among Islamist 
ideologues. These discursive practices seek to mobilise Muslims by awakening age-old 
grievances in the Muslim world. Besides, Abdelhaleem repeatedly criticises democracy and 
modern nation-states and condemns Arab and Islamic regimes as being un-Islamic and 
puppets to the West. 
Text (2): Abdul Rahim Attoun - In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad 
The data show that Attoun’s diagnostic framing is primarily based on three topics: prevalence 
of jahiliyya, foreign domination, and problems associated with democracy and modern 
political traditions. Attoun demonstrates a familiar Islamist tendency to focus on the concept 
of jahiliyya. In fact, more than a quarter of Attoun’s diagnostic framing deals with jahiliyya 
which is also the most repeated theme in his entire text. In addition to that, he focuses on the 
role of external powers and foreign agendas in the current state of backwardness in Muslim 
societies; but he tends not to specify which foreign powers. Instead, he generally blames the 
West and clearly seeks to provoke a sense of grievance by portraying Muslims and Islamist 
factions as victims. In addition, criticising the modern institution of the nation-state as well as 
its political traditions, parliament, and constitution occupy a central position in the text. The 
latter aspects of the text form another familiar topic in the mobilising discourses employed 
by Islamists and serve together as a foundation to justifying the need for an alternative Islamic 
model of the polity. However, it must be noted that the diagnostic discourse represents only 
14% of the overall ideological content of the text.  
Text (3): Eyad Qunaibi - Supporting Shariʿa 
Among the three studied samples, the diagnostic content is most apparent in Qunaibi’s series 
of videos. Analysing the transcripts reveals that criticising the nation-state occupies centre 
stage in Qunaibi’s propaganda messages. Specifically, he directs most of his criticisms towards 
democracy and man-made laws which he presents as the causes of corruption and moral and 
economic crises in Muslim societies. In this way, Qunaibi conforms to the conventional 
Islamist discourse that ascribes all sorts of problems to modern politics, particularly electoral 
and representative systems. Qunaibi also stresses that corruption, insecurity, and foreign 
domination are all symptoms of a state of jahiliyya. Analysing the transcripts shows that these 
diagnostic elements are often followed by an emphasis on the need for applying shariʿa as an 
effective commonly desired alternative. 
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Text (4): Sayyid Qutb - Milestones 
Qutb’s diagnostic framing has been studied by many scholars, most of whom rightly focus on 
analysing his excessive use of the concept of jahiliyya (Khatab, 2006; Toth, 2013; Abu-Rabi', 
1996). Structurally, the data show that more than a third of Qutb’s diagnostic discourse deals 
directly with the concept of jahiliyya. A more thorough textual analysis, however, reveals that 
the topic of jahiliyya remains present almost in every section of Qutb’s text. For Qutb, the 
prevalent state of jahiliyya in Muslim societies is expressed by widespread corruption and 
general moral breakdown. The ones to blame, in Qutb’s view, are the political leaders in Arab 
and Muslim countries because they chose to ignore Islamic traditions and resorted to ruling 
by fallible man-made laws that replaced the rule of God. In essence, the absence of shariʿa in 
modern societies is seen by Qutb as the reason behind the weakness of Muslims and the 
Western domination over Muslim lands.  
Ideological fidelity  
Reflecting on the diagnostic discourse of the three al-Nusra ideologues, one can draw several 
notes. The three ideologues of al-Nusra share with Sayyed Qutb their framing of the main 
problem as being the state of jahiliyya that is preventing Muslims from fulfilling their religious 
duties and living under powerful states ruled by shariʿa. This diagnostic framing is usually 
utilised by all Islamists, and the ideologues of al-Nusra are no exception in this regard.  
 
However, when measuring the overall weight of diagnostic framing, the texts show different 
results. Attoun’s and Abdelhaleem’s texts show more resemblance with the Qutb’s 





Attoun Qunaibi Abdelhaleem Qutb
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mobilising discourse that pays more attention to criticising the present order and the social, 
political, and moral situation in the Muslim world. It is not possible to explain these 
differences non-contextually. Qunaibi’s videos were broadcasted sequentially in the mid-
2011 when al-Nusra Front was still emerging and establishing its brand of Islamist activism. 
Like other al-Nusra propagandists at the time, Qunaibi’s main goal was to mobilise as many 
Muslims as possible and persuade them to join or support al-Nusra in Syria. Therefore, he 
attempts to provide an alternative account of the problems that led to the uprisings of the 
Arab Spring focusing on criticising secularism, democracy, and nationalistic sentiments. For 
their part, Abdelhaleem and Attoun pay more attention to the management of Islamist 
activism and as a result they direct their propaganda messages mostly to those who are 
already al-Nusra members or sympathisers. Hence, they are more inclined to focus on 
providing solutions and methods of activism than on mobilising people outside the circles of 
active Islamists.  
Prognostic framing 
Around the mid-twentieth century, several Islamist ideologues were involved in prognostic 
framings that seek to present an alternative image of society wherein Islam assumes a pivotal 
public role and informs the discourses and various functions of state apparatuses. To that 
end, the Islamist ideologues embarked on a process of politicising Islam through purposively 
accenting specific Islamic traditions and even inventing new ones. Driven by the aim of 
providing a culturally resonant alternative to the modern institution of nation-state, the 
Islamist ideologues put immense efforts to develop a political Islamic theory focusing on 
concepts such as hakimiyya  (usually translated as: Islamic governance) and ‘Islamic state’. 
However, the concept of an Islamic state itself is a product of modernity and was first 
elaborated by Abul Aʿla Maududi. Despite this, great efforts were exuded to find ideological 
roots for an Islamic state grounded in historical and theological evidence. Regarding 
hakimiyya, it is conceptualised by Maududi as: replacing popular sovereignty with the 
sovereignty of God through governing by the rules of shariʿa.  
Interestingly, the term hakimiyya which resides in the discourse of contemporary political 
Islamist movements does not exist in Arabic lexicography, and is not mentioned in the Qur’an 
or Hadith, similar to the term ‘Islamic state’. Furthermore, Tibi (2012) explains how shariʿa, 
albeit an old Islamic concept, has in modern times become “a claim for a state law, to be 
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written into national constitutions”, which he perceives as “an entirely new phenomenon 
within Islam” (Tibi, 2012, p. 45). Tibi continues that “the claim that it restores some historical 
institution is precisely an invention of tradition: an effort to inculcate certain behavioural 
values and norms by asserting continuity with imagined past practices” (Tibi, 2012, p. 45). 
I examined the envisioned and propagated Salafi-Jihadist solutions as presented in the 
selected texts. Practically, the analysis is based on locating and weighing the following 
discourse strands:  
The application of shariʿa  
Parameters: applying sharia, obedience, divine law, just law, comprehensive law. 
The Islamic state/caliphate 
Parameters: caliphate, Islamic state, political Islamic theory, justice, prosperity, 
powerful state, liberation.  
Cultural protectionism 
Parameters: Islamic marjiʿiyya, Islamic traditions, Islamic customs, Islamic identity, 
honour, dignity. 
Table 2 NVivo cross matrix - prognostic framing in texts 1, 2, 3, and 4 















A : cultural protectionism 0.00% 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 
B : dignity 0.00% 0.44% 1.90% 1.41% 
C : honour 0.00% 0.00% 1.27% 1.17% 
D : Islamic customs 0.00% 1.33% 0.00% 1.41% 
E : Islamic identity 2.26% 12.39% 1.27% 4.93% 
F : Islamic marjiʿiyya 19.55% 7.52% 11.39% 16.67% 
G : Islamic traditions 15.04% 16.37% 10.13% 20.42% 
H : Loyalty and disavowal 2.26% 10.62% 0.00% 0.00% 
  
    











A : applying Shariʿa 0.00% 2.21% 5.06% 2.11% 
B : applying sharia 6.02% 8.85% 23.42% 7.51% 
C : comprehensive law 1.50% 3.98% 3.16% 6.10% 
D : divine law 0.75% 6.19% 15.19% 13.38% 
E : just law 0.00% 1.77% 2.53% 1.17% 
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F : obedience 6.02% 10.18% 12.66% 11.74% 
  
    











A : Islamic state - Caliphate 3.01% 1.77% 0.63% 0.00% 
B : Caliphate 5.26% 1.77% 0.63% 0.00% 
C : Islamic state 19.55% 1.33% 1.27% 0.70% 
D : justice 0.00% 2.65% 3.80% 1.17% 
E : liberation 0.00% 0.44% 1.27% 4.23% 
F : political Islamic theory 14.29% 4.42% 0.00% 4.23% 
G : powerful state 4.51% 2.21% 1.27% 0.23% 
H : prosperity 0.00% 2.65% 3.16% 1.41% 
 
Key facts: 
Text (1): Tariq Abdelhaleem - Establishing the Islamic State: Between Reality and Illusion 
Following his criticisms of the West, Abdelhaleem stresses the need for protecting Islamic 
culture and Muslim societies from foreign interferences. As such, he repeatedly deals with 
the theme of Islamic marjiʿiyya. The data reveal that cultural protectionism and Islamic 
marjiʿiyya often appear in the context of his theorisation and justification of Islamic state. 
Within this discursive context, Abdelhaleem criticises the model and methods applied by ISIS 
and he instead presents the model adopted by al-Nusra as more “authentic”. Generally, 
Abdelhaleem’s ideological discourse revolves around the importance of hakimiyya and 
establishing an Islamic state that preserves Islam, protects Muslims, and puts an end to 
jahiliyya.  
Text (2): Abdul Rahim Attoun - In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad 
The main themes in Attouns prognosis revolve around preserving Islamic identity and 
instating the rule of shariʿa. His recipe for success and prosperity underscores the importance 
of abiding by the laws of shariʿa not only for strategic considerations but most significantly for 
religious reasons. In order to overcome the present crises, Attoun stresses that Muslims must 
follow the salaf and deal with Islam as their only reference in every domain, particularly 
politics. Advocating a pervasive role of religion is the main pillar of the ideology of Islamism 
as the writings of Qutb, Maududi, and other ideologues clearly indicate. Also, Attoun’s 
prognostic framing highlights the need for Islamist leaders who must be committed to Islamic 
traditions and set an example for lay Muslims. 
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Text (3): Eyad Qunaibi - Supporting Shariʿa 
The data show that a sizable proportion of Qunaibi’s prognostic discourse is dedicated to 
demonstrating the need and urgency for applying shariʿa to eliminate the state of jahiliyya. 
Qunaibi maintains that the need for shariʿa stems primarily from its being a divine law and 
that Muslims must put it into effect as part of fulfilling their religious duties. This is a familiar 
ideological discourse that seeks to mobilise people based on targeting their sense of duty. 
Qunaibi also highlights the need for dedicated Islamist leaders who are committed to their 
religion and willing to sacrifice for the sake of establishing the rule of God. The latter point is 
another commonality among the writings of Islamist ideologues and appears most clearly in 
Qutb’s Milestone wherein he stresses the need for a vanguard of dedicated Islamists willing 
to suffer and live in isolation until they fully defeat jahiliyya and “re-Islamise” society.  
Text (4): Sayyid Qutb - Milestones 
Central in Qutb’s prognostic framing is the concept of hakimiyya. The term hakimiyya, which 
is usually translated as Islamic governance, is used in Islamist circles to mean installing the 
rule of God instead of the rule of people. Hence, applying shariʿa is framed as both a remedy 
to current socio-political ills and a religious duty. Qutb’s text reflects that and stresses the 
need for an Islamic marjiʿiyya so that Islam can assume a pivotal authoritative role in the 
realms of politics and public affairs. The idea that “Islam is the solution” permeates the text 
especially when Qutb discusses the problem of taghout (dictatorship) in Muslim countries. He 
considers that eliminating jahiliyya in society and facing the problem of dictatorship requires 
applying shariʿa by committed Islamists who are willing to strictly follow the Quran and the 
example of the salaf (pious ancestors). 
Ideological fidelity  
Comparing the ideological contents in the three analysed texts with the discourse in Qutb’s 
Milestones reveals a shared generic prognostic framing that emphasises the necessity of 
replacing the rule of people by the rule of God. Structurally, the three ideologues dedicate 




They all share the essential Islamist feature of assigning a central role to Islam in the 
management of social and political affairs. This characteristic does not usually take the form 
of a detailed Islamic theory; rather, it appears as a dogmatic and populist cry that frames Islam 
as an absolute system that is capable of keeping society on track and empowering Muslims in 
every time and place. This simplistic discourse is a common mobilisation strategy that glosses 
over actual circumstances and capitalises on stimulating senses of belonging and 
responsibility.  
Motivational framing 
To identify the characteristics of the Salafi-Jihadist motivational framing, I revealed the 
following main strands: 
Seeking power in society 
Parameters: Islamic governance, Islamism, seeking power, activism, anti-secularism, 
anti-quietism.  
Islamist activism 
Parameters: Islamists, Islamist movements, jihad, Islamist activism, collective action, 
planning, respecting leaders. 
Mobilising discourse 
Parameters: dedication, volunteerism, religious duty, moral duty, strategic necessity, 









Table 3 NVivo cross matrix - motivational framing in texts 1, 2, 3, and 4 











A : Islamist activism 2.60% 0.38% 1.20% 4.42% 
B : collective action 1.95% 3.85% 1.20% 2.32% 
C : Islamist activism 9.74% 8.85% 8.98% 12.84% 
D : Islamist movements 7.14% 0.77% 4.79% 0.42% 
E : Islamists 4.55% 0.00% 8.98% 0.42% 
F : jihad 9.09% 14.62% 1.80% 6.95% 
G : planning 10.39% 5.77% 6.59% 7.16% 
H : respecting leaders 11.04% 3.85% 1.20% 0.84% 
  
    














A : mobilising discourse 1.30% 0.00% 2.99% 1.47% 
B : dedication 0.65% 10.77% 1.20% 9.26% 
C : following orders 1.95% 6.92% 1.80% 4.42% 
D : moral duty 0.00% 5.00% 0.60% 1.26% 
E : populism 2.60% 5.77% 10.18% 2.95% 
F : religious duty 1.30% 13.85% 17.37% 7.16% 
G : strategic necessity 0.65% 0.77% 1.20% 2.74% 
H : urgency 0.65% 1.15% 4.79% 0.84% 
I : volunteerism 0.00% 1.54% 0.00% 0.42% 
  
    










A : seeking power in 
society 0.65% 0.38% 1.80% 2.95% 
B : activism 1.95% 3.08% 2.99% 9.89% 
C : anti-quietism 0.65% 1.92% 0.60% 4.00% 
D : anti-secularism 5.19% 0.00% 2.40% 0.00% 
E : Islamic governance 18.18% 6.15% 6.59% 10.74% 
F : Islamism 2.60% 0.77% 5.99% 0.42% 
G : seeking power 5.19% 3.85% 4.79% 6.11% 
 
Key facts: 
Text (1): Tariq Abdelhaleem - Establishing the Islamic State: Between Reality and Illusion 
The main aspect of Abdelhaleem’s motivational discourse concerns the importance of 
achieving hakimiyya through planned collective activities, violent or otherwise. He criticises 
secularism and calls Muslims to change the status quo and end the separation between Islam 
and politics. In addition to that, Abdelhaleem underscores the importance of jihad but he also 
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calls on Muslims to participate in politics whether through protesting or by any other way 
possible. However, he states that active Muslims must follow Islamist leaders and engage in 
planned activities. For Abdelhaleem, through orchestrated collective actions Muslims can 
defeat their main enemies which he frames as the ruling regimes, especially in the Arab world.  
Text (2): Abdul Rahim Attoun - In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad 
The motivational aspect of Attoun’s ideological discourse is apparent in the text. He states 
that hakimiyya, or Islamic governance, is necessary but remains unachievable without a 
carefully planned Islamist activism. Thus, his propaganda focuses on mobilising Muslims to 
participate in Islamist activism and convincing them of the importance of practising jihad. 
Through jihad and activism, Attoun contends, Muslims can establish the rule of shariʿa and 
overcome their weakness. Again, Attoun presents a mobilising discourse similar to the 
ideological discourse in Qutb’s and Maududi’s texts. Promoting an active engagement in 
politics and public life generally is a commonality among the messages of Islamist ideologues, 
and jihad in particular, regardless of its conditions and targets, can be found almost in every 
mobilising text by Islamist ideologues. 
Text (3): Eyad Qunaibi - Supporting Shariʿa 
The transcripts show that Qunaibi seeks to persuade Muslims to take action by framing 
participation as a religious and moral duty. Throughout the texts, he uses provocative 
language and blames Islamists for being lenient and indecisive. Qunaibi mentions jihad only 
minimally, but he frequently stresses the importance of Islamist activism and calls for 
supporting the mujahideen in Syria and elsewhere. For him, eliminating jahiliyya is possible 
only through seeking power in society which in turn requires decisive action by committed 
Islamists.  
Text (4): Sayyid Qutb - Milestones 
For Qutb, moving from jahiliyya to hakimiyya and instating the rule of God requires planned 
Islamist activism. The analysed text reflects that, and Islamist activism is repeatedly framed 
as a religious duty upon Muslims. It is noteworthy that Qutb gives special importance to elitist 
activism which takes the form of a committed vanguard of Islamist activists who must be 
trained well and willing to perform jihad against dictators. Seeking power in society is framed 
by Qutb as an unavoidable way to Islamising society and facing taghout.  
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Ideological fidelity  
An ideological discourse is distinguishable by its emphasis on the need for acting in the real 
world, whether to change or to preserve certain social and political conditions. In this regard, 
similar to Qutb’s discourse, all three al-Nusra ideologues talk extensively about the 
importance of organised Islamist activism. Such activism is framed religiously and presented 
to Muslims as an intrinsic part of Islam. Attoun, Abdelhaleem, and especially Qunaibi call 
young Muslims to unquestionably “act on their religion” by joining Islamist organisations or 
supporting Islamists. Within this generic discourse, al-Nusra is presented as an exemplary 
Islamist organisation with an authentic Islamic doctrine. Jihad is essential here but is dealt 
with tacitly most of the time. Qunaibi, for example, dedicates less than two percent of his 
motivational discourse to promoting jihad. This should not be taken at face value because it 
is vital to consider that Qunaibi was arrested several times in Jordan and faced charges related 
to instigating violence and disrupting the public order. Attoun, on the other hand, dedicates 
a sizeable proportion of his motivational call for action to the topic of jihad. Attoun is active 
in Syria within the al-Nusra-controlled areas and occupies a crucial position in the hierarchy 
of al-Nusra which may explain his direct reference to jihad, unlike Abdelhaleem and Qunaibi 
who reside in Canada and Jordan respectively.  
 
As such, the overall structures of the ideologues’ motivational discourses are similar and share 
their insistence on the need for organised collective actions that seek to implement the rule 
of shariʿa and end the state of jahiliyya. However, the contents of their motivational calls 




Attoun Qunaibi Abdelhaleem Qutb
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Discussion of findings and theoretical implications 
Analysing the selected texts reveals a common ideological thread that starts with exposing a 
generic and pervasive problem and then moves on to present a solution and the general 
approach to changing the unpleasant status quo. While this may be a typical mobilisation 
manner, the texts share a distinct ideological discourse that by and large resembles the 
classical discourse of Islamism. Firstly, the texts frame the main problem as being the 
dominance of jahiliyya which signifies the public ignorance of God’s laws. Jahiliyya appears 
frequently in the three analysed texts and is often linked to other problems such as 
corruption, economic crises, and dictatorship. Secondly, the al-Nusra ideologues are on 
agreement on the need to give Islam a decisive referential role in the management of social 
and political affairs. The texts exhibit a common tendency to frame the application of Shariʿa 
as a religious obligation and, to a lesser extent, a strategic necessity. Thirdly, the three marajiʿ 
use a motivational discourse similar to Qutb’s call for action which urges Muslims to be active 
in the public sphere and join ideologically committed groups. In this respect, like Qutb, al-
Nusra’s ideologues stress the need for a vanguard of leading Islamists who are 
uncompromising and willing to engage in high-risk activities against taghout represented 
particularly by Arab regimes. But what do these shared discursive practices mean?  
Strategic use of ideology 
To make sense of the above findings one needs to keep in mind that the ideology of Islamism 
has in the past hundred years offered a discursive repertoire for various individuals and 
movements. Before the jihadist turn in Islamist activism in the Middle East after the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, the decline of Arab nationalism after the 1967 War (Manduchi, 2017) and the 
increasing American military presence in the Gulf region since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, 
among other reasons, paved a way for Islamism to become a strong ideological and cultural 
competitor in the battle over public discourse in the region. The simplistic and binary language 
of Islamism that is centred around accenting the political aspects of Islam has been used to 
mobilise people and frame various grievances across the world. With that in mind, the use of 
the general discourse of Islamism is strategically lucrative as it resonates with many people, 
rendering mobilisation easier. Later, a more distinct and methodically specific strategic 
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discourse targets those who have already joined or shown sympathy with the ideologues’ 
propagated version of Islamist activism.   
Additionally, within the world of Islamist activism, the majority of the Salafi-Jihadist 
ideologues reflect on the historical experience of other Islamists who adopt non-violent 
methods of activism. They capitalise on the failure of their counterparts in reaching power or 
having an influential role in the management of their respective societies. They then use a 
generic ideological discourse that resonates also with other Islamists. This may contribute to 
Salafi-Jihadist mobilisation efforts attracting members from other Islamist movements who 
have failed to materialise their objectives. This is particularly relevant in the case of Syria as it 
seems that al-Nusra leaders sought to attract those who are close to or members of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood which failed in Syria and was faced by the Syrian regime’s excessive 
violence in the 1980s. 
Using the language of frame and framing processes, at the ideological level, the framing 
processes undertaken by the Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and propagandists is limited to "frame 
extension" and "frame elaboration". This is meant to maximise frame resonance and enable 
frame-articulators to take advantage of an already established discursive repertoire in order 
to facilitate mobilising a broad popular base. Processes of ideological framing are 
mobilisation-oriented therefore using modern Islamism as a backdrop is perceived as 
beneficial and lucrative. In this sense, claiming authenticity through establishing ideological 
fidelity and cultural resonance is pursued expecting to facilitate mobilisation efforts, 
especially under an unstable organisational structure and when access to material resources 
is restricted which is particularly the case in the early stage of activism. Al-Nusra’s heavy 
reliance on the mobilising activities of several jihadist ideologues in its early phase validates 
that and shows how that was used to compensate for lacking resources and organisational 
cohesion.  
Theoretical implications 
Such ideological conformity entails that Salafi-Jihadism is an extension of the modern 
phenomenon of Islamism. Salafi-Jihadists share with other Islamists the centrality of politics 
in their discourse, the long-term objectives of activism, and the vision of how an ideal society 
should be. This has important theoretical implications. Earlier in this research, I suggested 
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defining Islamism as an ideology the core of which revolves around the inseparability of Islam 
and politics. Its ideological aspect stems primarily from the use of simplistic and binary 
language and the fact that it presents a comprehensive critique of the present socio-political 
order, challenges it and seeks to change it (Denoeux, 2011, p. 60). Thus, Islamists are 
individuals, networks, and organisations who share an anti-secular tendency and uphold the 
notion that Islam has a political and legislative role to play in Muslim-majority countries, 
ranging from a merely consultative role to a total and exclusive hegemony over the issue of 
governance. The essential political aspect of Islamism is expressed in several ideological 
principles, chief among them are the Islamisation of society, implementing shariʿa, and the 
conviction that Islam is comprehensive and provides solutions to the present political, social, 
and economic ills, and is encapsulated in the slogan “Islam is the solution”.  
The centrality of politics and governance in the Islamist discourse differentiates the Islamists 
“from such religiously inspired but apolitical collectives as the Jama'at-i Tabliq-i Islami, a broad 
transnational movement that is not interested in holding governmental power but is involved 
in a missionary movement of spiritual awakening among Muslims” (Bayat, 2013, p. 4). 
Adopting this delineation helps to find a middle ground between the expansive definitions 
that use the label “Islamist” to describe any form of Islamic activism, even if it was limited to 
promoting piety and social conservatism (e.g. Pierret, 2013, p. 331), and narrow definitions 
such as the one provided by al-Haj Saleh which uses Islamism to refer to the Muslim 
Brotherhood only (al-Haj Saleh, 2016).  
Politicising Islam or Islamising politics?  
The intertwinement of religion and politics is a recurrent theme in the writings of the founders 
of modern Islamism such as Rashid Rida, Muhammad Iqbal, Abul A'la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, 
and Hasan al-Banna. In the introduction of his influential Milestones, Qutb states that “Islam 
cannot play its prescribed role without being embodied in a society… Humanity, especially 
today, does not listen to an abstract belief whose veracity cannot be observed in real life.” 
Likewise, the works of Qunaibi, Abdelhaleem, Attoun, and other contemporary Salafi-Jihadist 
ideologues echo Qutb’s remarks and warn Muslims that ignoring politics leads to a society 




Being excessively political and anti-secular and linking the implementation of shariʿa with the 
very existence of Islam and Muslim societies, are commonalities among the writings of the 
Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ. The works of these marajiʿ reveal that the discourse of Salafi-Jihadism 
remains committed to the overall objectives of modern Islamism and reliant on the principles 
and terminology of Islamism.  
Analysing the discourse of Salafi-Jihadism helps to answer the question of whether it is a 
modern political phenomenon or the latest manifestation of a traditional religious doctrine 
rooted in Islamic history and theology. In fact, attempting to provide a simple and definitive 
answer to this question does not add much to our knowledge about Salafi-Jihadist activism. 
It is not one or the other, i.e., political pragmatism or religious fanaticism. Understanding the 
Salafi-Jihadist discourse and activism requires elucidating the interplay between politics and 
religion and clarifying how political preferences are affected by theology and how the 
theological discourse is tailored to fit certain political opportunities.  
It does not require much effort to realise that the discourse of those who subscribe to Salafi-
Jihadism shows no ostensible distinction between religion and politics. This stems from a 
belief that Islam is both religion and state meaning that there is no religion without the 
application of shariʿa and there is no politics without Islam as its only source of reference. 
Drawing on the above textual analysis, contemporary Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ follow Qutb’s 
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Applying Sharia & establishing the Islamic state
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obedience to social and political authorities other than God (Milestones, p.29). Therefore, it 
is of questionable utility to focus on the provision of a conclusive answer to whether politics 
serves religion or the other way round, because both fields are purposely interwoven in a 
single discursive synthesis that is meant to advance the multifaceted enterprise of Salafi-
Jihadism. As an example, Abdallah b. Muhammad, one of the most influential Salafi-Jihadist 
strategists, describes the Salafi-Jihadist project as centred on establishing the Islamic 
caliphate that will preserve the resources of the ummah against the conspiracies of 
international superpowers, liberate Jerusalem, and achieve the great goals shared among all 
Muslims.47 This part-religious, part-worldly project is the subject of an in-depth analysis later 
in the following chapter to look for any motives behind this framing of objectives and methods 
of activism. 
Therefore, there is a need to dig deeper to look for any real motives and interests behind the 
ostensibly heterogeneous discursive façade of Salafi-Jihadism. It is such motives and interests 
that justify and push for the adoption of a familiar Islamist discourse, particularly in the early 
phases of activism.  
 
47 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum) (in Arabic), pp.10-11. 
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Unravelling the nexus between ideology and radicalisation 
Processes of radicalisation are complicated and multi-dimensional. However, while I share 
with Cross and Snow (2012) the conviction that “there is no single pathway to radicalization, 
or type of radical, but that different types, and thus pathways, result from the different ways 
in which the contributing factors can interact and combine”, I consider the strong and 
uncritical espousal of specific ideals and the construction of dogmatic views to be central 
among the contributing factors to radicalisation.  
At the individual’s level, radical Islamist groups, such as IS and al-Qaeda, capitalise on certain 
psychosocial vulnerabilities to mobilise people and to implement their strategic plans. These 
groups seem to realise that there are two prerequisites for becoming actively receptive to the 
jihadi messages. The first condition is the lack of any sense of belonging to this world which 
results from a state of cultural, social, or economic alienation. The second condition is a 
psychological one and is characterised by a state of disorientation concerning the meaning 
and purpose of life. These psychosocial gaps are essential preconditions for an individual to 
become engrossed in a process of radicalisation, leading eventually to him/her justifying or 
even committing horrendous acts of violence. 
Nevertheless, despair, anger, alienation, and poverty remain insufficient to trigger acts of 
mass violence. They necessarily need ideological channelling before transforming into an all-
out destructive force. Unlike low-risk activism, such as protesting or social media 
campaigning, joining radical Islamist groups, which will probably involve being willing to carry 
out a suicide attack, require full commitment to a cause or a dogmatic conviction. In the same 
vein, Olivier Roy rightly notes that “young radicals are sincere believers: they truly believe 
that they will go to heaven, and their frame of reference is deeply Islamic.”48 As such, ideas 
matter, and the discourse of Salafi-Jihadism is not insignificant; rather, it is at the heart of the 
process of radicalisation.  
If we zoom out and look at militant Islamist activism in its totality, we will notice that 
radicalisation is manipulated and channelled towards certain strategic objectives. Even in its 
most individualistic form, i.e., the “lone wolf” phenomenon (Bakker & Graaf, 2010), 
 
48 Roy, Olivier. Who are the new jihadis?, The Guardian, 13 April 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/3741zH8  
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radicalisation and its violent outcomes are directed towards certain objectives. Such 
“management of radicalisation” is done in a purposeful and deliberate manner, usually not 
by the individuals who adopt pre-prepared radical views or carry out terrorist operations, but 
by radical strategists, ideologues, and frame-articulators. In this equation of radicalisation, 
the role of radical preachers and ideologues is to offer a simple blueprint for life within which 
approaching death is presented as an empowering and emancipatory act while at the same 
time recognising the consequences of such ideological framing in the world of militant, 
political, and social activism.  
The strategic functions of ideology and ideological framing are recognised and theorised by 
Islamist ideologues. For example, HTS’ ideologue Yahya b. Tahir al-Farghali captures that 
notion and states that: “Whether in Afghanistan, Algeria, or elsewhere, there have been 
bright examples from our Islamic world that highlight one of the sources of resilience in the 
face of an extremely equipped enemy, that source is ideology.”49 Farghali, who is one of the 
leading ideologues in HTS, and its forerunner al-Nusra Front, defines ideology as “a set of 
dogmatic, moral, and operational preferences upheld by an individual or a group.” For him, 
the concept of ideology is so pervasive that one does not encounter a person or a group who 
is without an ideology “including those who subscribe to pragmatism or utilitarianism.” But 
he explains that the version of ideology that he specifically advocates is the one “contrary to 
utilitarianism and pragmatism, meaning a person having values and thoughts that transcend 
material cost-benefit calculations, so they live for an idea or a dogma defending it, and 
fighting for it—if they have to—until victory or death.”50 
When it comes to strategic planning, Farghali believes that “reality has proven that ideology 
counterbalances or even outweighs the enemy’s military advantages.”  Therefore, he reminds 
leaders of HTS to give special attention to matters of ideological preparation because “the 
war in Syria has shown, time and again, that ideological organisations have always been the 
most enduring and effective regardless of the type of ideology they uphold.”51  
 
49 Al-Farghali, Yahya bin Tahir. Ideologies Triumph over Jets (1) (in Arabic), Ebaa Weekly Newsletter, issue 21, 2 





According to Farghali, the most important element for a powerful and effective ideology is 
the strength of the belief of its adherents, and their commitment and complete readiness to 
live and die for it, regardless of its type and its intellectual, moral, and behavioural 
components. He, therefore, urges his fellow ideologues and strategists in HTS to establish 
strong rules and disseminate motivating thoughts that have the potential to be upheld as a 
“moving ideology that ignites the blaze of determination and steadfastness in the conscience 
of its adherents, while benefiting from the existence of a strong organisation that helps to 
entrench it.”52 
In conclusion, ideologies do not only mobilise support and persuade followers to move “from 
the balconies to the barricades”, but they also hold members of jihadist groups together when 
deploying a conventional hierarchical structure is not feasible. Moreover, ideologies are 
instrumental to militant groups that adopt high-risk methods. With these remarks in mind, 
the writings of al-Nusra’s marajiʿ demonstrate that they realise the strategic functions of 
ideology and thus they purposely use their authority as frame-articulators to devise an 
ideological discourse that resonates locally, garners support, and prepares committed 
members to carry out high-risk activities. In a nutshell, ideologues use their authoritative 






52 Al-Farghali, Yahya bin Tahir. The Hanafi Doctrine Triumphs over Jets (in Arabic), Ebaa Weekly Newsletter, 




In this chapter, I validated the idea that the ideologues of al-Nusra Front use an ideological 
discourse familiar to all Islamists, whether militant or non-militant. The ideological structure 
of al-Nusra’s discourse shows a high level of resemblance with that of Qutb’s work Milestones. 
The texts frame the main problem in Muslim societies as being the dominance of jahiliyya 
which signifies the public ignorance of God’s laws. The concept of Jahiliyya is central in the 
discourse of Salafi-Jihadism, appears frequently in the three analysed texts and is often linked 
to other problems such as corruption, economic crises, and dictatorship. Like Qutb, the al-
Nusra ideologues are on agreement on the need to give Islam a decisive and authoritative 
role in the management of social and political affairs. The texts exhibit a common tendency 
to frame the application of Shariʿa as part and parcel of religious duties. Additionally, the three 
marajiʿ use a motivational discourse similar to Qutb’s call for action which urges Muslims to 
be active in the public sphere and join Islamist organisations. 
These remarks offer a strong indication that Salafi-Jihadism is another manifestation of the 
modern phenomenon of Islamism, which goes against the mainstream idea that Salafi-
Jihadists are exceptional and have in the past four decades fashioned an entirely different 
discursive and organisational identity. However, this should not be taken at face value. The 
use of a familiar ideological discourse can itself be a strategy for mobilisation.  
In this regard, the use of a familiar ideological discourse can be seen as an attempt by Salafi-
Jihadist ideologues to increase the cultural resonance of their ideational frames and hence 
increase the probability of success of their mobilisation efforts. This is significant as it 
contributes to our understanding of the reasons for the rapid rise in the popularity of al-Nusra 
Front in the year following its inception in January 2012. The strategic use of ideology will be 
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In the previous chapter, I showed aspects of al-Nusra’s ideological conformity with the generic 
discourse of political Islam and argued that Islamism remains the jihadist group’s primary 
framework. In this chapter, I argue that, notwithstanding such ideological conformity, the 
discourse and performance of al-Nusra between 2011 and 2017 demonstrate that there is 
ample room for strategic prioritisations, manoeuvrings, and adaptations in Salafi-Jihadist 
activism.  
Although Salafi-Jihadism offers a strategic framework that is distinguishable by its ostensible 
intransigence and constant emphasis on the violence that usually takes the form of 
performing jihad against unbelievers and apostates, the historical and discursive experiences 
of Salafi-Jihadists reveal a dialectical interplay between ideology and pragmatism. In this 
respect, jihadist strategists play a decisive intermediary role that determines the momentary 
outcomes of the ideology-reality relations. The necessity to bridge the gap between the 
discourse of Salafi-Jihadism and real-life considerations has given rise to new and modified 
branches in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). These aspects of religion that deal with reality are 
theorised, elaborated, and appropriated by an increasingly empowered class of jihadist 
strategists.  
Reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front and pondering upon its referential writings, it seems 
that the traditional form of religious authority is transforming and being replaced with 
strategic leadership. The dominance of a Salafi outlook that eschews political and pragmatic 
reasonings coupled with the absence of religious authority because of the shortage of 
qualified scholars among the Salafi-Jihadist activists, left a window for the rise of strategic 
marjiʿiyya. This, in addition to changes on the ground, led to giving primacy to strategy and 
strategic framing53.  
In this chapter I explain how the increasing significance of strategic framing has not led to a 
departure from religion per se; instead, I argue that it has led to changing the nature of 
religious discourse itself. This took the form of new and modified branches of Islamic 
 
53 In the context of Social Movements, strategic framing is a purposeful and deliberate ideational endeavour 
that aspires to advance a shared cause and achieve certain goals in light of specific historical conditions. It 
reflects the vision of a movement, or a group within a movement, and often takes the form of written notes 
and plans sketched by strategists. 
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jurisprudence. The emerging practical aspects of religious reasoning usually fall under the 
generic category of fiqh haraki (activism jurisprudence) and include various sub-branches 
most significant among them are fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality jurisprudence), fiqh al-jihad (jihad 
jurisprudence), and fiqh al-awlawiyyat (priorities jurisprudence). These aspects of Islamic 
jurisprudence enjoy unique importance in today’s Salafi-Jihadist activism and form the base 
for jihadist process of strategic framing. Besides, the increasing significance of strategic 
planning allowed for the rise of a new class of strategic leaders who are in a constant 
confrontation over power and influence with religious and dogmatic leaders which will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter.  
Methodologically, I use a generic qualitative approach that benefits from various discourse 
analysis methods, particularly thematic coding. The selected texts are studied by highlighting 
specific thematic patterns and analysing their explicit and implicit meanings. The themes are 
purposively determined in light of the literature and the researcher’s observation of the 
jihadist discourse and activism especially during the years of the civil war in Syria. The themes 
include “reality jurisprudence”, “jihad jurisprudence”, “priorities jurisprudence”, “marjiʿiyya”, 
“the Islamic state”, “pragmatism”, “incrementalism”, and “elitism vs populism”. The analysed 
set of texts includes Abu Musʿab al-Suri’s Daʿwat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah al-ʿAlamiyyah 
(The Global Islamic Resistance Call), Abdul Rahim Attoun’s work Fi Zilal Dawhat al-Jihad (In 
the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad), Abdallah b. Muhammad’s al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah 
(Strategic Memorandum) and Istratigiyyat al-Harb al-Iqlimiyyah ʿala Ard al-Sham (Strategy of 
Regional War on the Land of Sham),  in addition to several articles by Abu Basir al-Tartousi 




(Re)emerging strategic tools in Islamic jurisprudence  
The main argument in this section revolves around the idea that “reality jurisprudence” has 
recently been gaining significance in the Salafi-Jihadist circles in a way that indicates a shift in 
jihadist activism towards prioritizing political and strategic reasoning. This shift, however, 
does not signify a departure from religion and ideology altogether; instead, the increasing 
importance of “reality jurisprudence” demonstrates the jihadists’ instrumentalization of 
religious teachings and traditions to justify certain preferences that serve the interests of 
specific leaders. In other words, religion has retained its central mobilizing role, but it has 
been infused with more strategic elements and its aspects that deal with reality and the 
management of social and political affairs have been given primacy purposely. As such, for 
current Salafi-Jihadists, matters pertaining to strategic planning are part and parcel of faith 
and belief and participating in activism is inseparable from practising religion. 
I analyse the discourse in a set of chosen works by well-known jihadist ideologues and 
strategists including Abu Musʿab al-Suri, Abu Basir al-Tartousi, Tariq Abdelhaleem, Abdul 
Rahim Attoun, and Abdallah b. Muhammad. The carefully selected texts are analysed through 
revealing their strategic content which in turn is verified by a set of themes and codes that 
deal with strategic framing. In this section, I frequently refer to the works of Abu Musʿab al-
Suri, who was described by Brynjar Lia (2008) as the “architect of global jihad” and “al-Qaeda 
strategist”. Al-Suri wrote extensively, and his writings have been used as references by many 
jihadist groups around the world including al-Nusra Front in Syria. I specifically draw on al-
Suri’s influential book: Daʿwat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah al-ʿAlamiyyah (The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call) which encompasses most of his thoughts regarding strategic framing and 
“reality jurisprudence”. 
“Reality jurisprudence”: religiously justifiable pragmatism  
In the context of modern Islamist activism, reality jurisprudence is often defined as the branch 
of Islamic jurisprudence that concerns reconciling generic religious principles with 
geostrategic considerations bound by time and space. It forms the area where theological 
reasoning and strategic planning overlap. This is the dynamic part of Islamic jurisprudence 
that aspires to bridge the gap between theory and praxis, discourse and practice, ideology 
and organized activism, and vision and reality. It involves using religious discourse extensively 
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to approve or disprove certain practices. Even though this aspect of Islamic jurisprudence is 
particularly important for Salafi-Jihadists, it is absent from the vast literature on jihadism and 
militant Islamist activism. 
Reality jurisprudence has gained significance in recent decades almost in all political Islamic 
circles regardless of their doctrinal alignments. For example, prominent Islamic scholar Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi, who is regarded an esteemed marjiʿ by various political Islamic movements 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, wrote extensively during the 1990s and 2000s about the 
importance of having up-to-date knowledge of scientific discoveries, social norms, and 
political affairs for a pertinent Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and meaningful religious reasoning 
(ijtihad) (al-Qaradawi, 1996). Qaradawi advocated and called for activating ijtihad and 
expanding the remit of the mujtahid to respond to constantly emerging issues in science, 
technology, and social affairs. He lists “familiarity with real-life conditions” among the 
requirements for a person to become a mujtahid and issue fatwas. In this regard, he states 
that “a mujtahid must have a considerable knowledge of the circumstances of his age as well 
as the conditions of his society, its problems and religious, political and intellectual trends, 
and its relations with other societies” (al-Qaradawi, 1996, p. 47). Politically, Qaradawi called 
on leaders of the Islamic movement to assess their surrounding situation carefully and be 
more adaptable. He called them to become uncompromising in their adherence to the core 
theological principles of Islam and be flexible when dealing with transactions and social and 
political practices (al-Qaradawi, 1994).  
Similarly, calls that urge individuals and groups to be adaptable and equipped with an all-
round knowledge are echoed in the Salafi-Jihadist circles and have been increasing in the past 
two decades. Analysing the data reveals that such calls often take the form of instructing the 
mujahideen, especially top leaders and influencers among them, to become acquainted with 
branches of Islamic jurisprudence that deal with strategic planning and the management of 
activism including reality jurisprudence, jihad jurisprudence, and priorities jurisprudence.    
In his Daʿwat al-Muqawama, Abu Musʿab al-Suri repeatedly stresses the importance of reality 
jurisprudence and focuses on the need for obtaining a deep understanding of the political 
context. For al-Suri, political education and raising the individual’s awareness of reality 
jurisprudence are complex and lengthy processes (al-Suri, p. 1331). He maintains that while 
acquiring these practical sorts of knowledge is advisable to the lay mujahid, it is incumbent 
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upon leaders and cadre of jihadist groups, because such knowledge forms the base of all 
strategic decisions and shapes activism’s prospects. Besides, he also states that a minimum 
level of such practical disciplines is required for lay members to be able to comprehend the 
reasons that led their leaders to take certain decisions, based on considerations of benefits, 
harms, and repercussions. Following this pragmatic reasoning, al-Suri directs the mujahideen 
to educate themselves in all essential branches of knowledge especially history, geography, 
demography, economics, politics, and geopolitics (al-Suri, pp. 1331-1333). 
For al-Suri, mastering these branches of knowledge differs according to the individual’s level 
of understanding, smartness, comprehension, and the amount of information he can obtain 
(al-Suri, p. 1331). One’s overall ability to deconstruct and reconstruct depends on talent, 
intuition, comprehension, smartness, and cognition, on one hand, and on acquired 
knowledge that activates and sharpens talents, on the other hand (al-Suri, p. 1333). 
In addition to accumulating a broad knowledge of various fields and sciences, al-Suri calls on 
the mujahideen to constantly watch the situation around them, follow the news, and interact 
with people where they are active (al-Suri, p. 1331). As such, having a sound knowledge about 
the conflict in which the mujahid is involved is considered essential, and al-Suri regards it 
critical for the mujahideen to possess an accurate and comprehensive understanding of 
themselves, their numbers and capabilities, the battleground, and any influencing powers and 
factors.  
Al-Suri calls on the mujahideen, especially cadres and leaders, to be acquainted with the 
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Politics and geostrategy take centre stage in writings of contemporary jihadist marjiʿ. In the 
writings of al-Suri, he instructs the leaders and the intellectuals among the mujahideen to 
become acquainted with 1) political science and its beginnings, 2) old and modern political 
schools, including nationalism, democracy, socialism, communism, and liberalism, 3) global 
conflicts and alliances, and 4) geopolitics of superpowers, and their components and internal 
contradictions, especially the ones that are actively fighting the mujahideen (al-Suri, p. 1332). 
In addition to that, al-Suri asserts that it is necessary for jihadist leaders to obtain a decent 
mastery of the language of politics as well as its constantly changing vocabularies. On this 
regard, al-Suri states that political reasoning passes through four stages: 1) hearing the news, 
2) comprehending the news, 3) analysing all aspects of the news, and 4) anticipating the 
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consequences (al-Suri, p. 1332). Given that, al-Suri warns that military decisions remain 
invalid without grasping political reality, otherwise a fighter would make fatal mistakes in the 
field, and, likewise, legal reasoning remains invalid and fatwas become irrelevant without 
taking reality jurisprudence into account (al-Suri, p. 1333).  
Daʿwat al-Muqawama is mostly an insider’s appraisal of Salafi-Jihadist activism. In this two-
volume work, al-Suri provides an assessment of the mujahideen’s experiences in Afghanistan, 
Algeria, and other parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. He contends that the 
mujahideen’s ignorance of the significance of reality jurisprudence led to recurrent failures 
and miscalculations. He postulates that given that the confrontation is no longer limited to 
conventional armed warfare but also extended to politics, media and economy, therefore, 
the generally low level of reality jurisprudence for the majority of the mujahideen negatively 
affected their methods, media messages and the content of their discourse (al-Suri, p. 848). 
This is presented as having destabilised the balance of priorities and led to conflating the 
important and the most important, what the scriptures and traditions necessitate and what 
reality requires, and those who are with the mujahideen and those who are against them, 
rendering the priorities of the battle blurred (al-Suri, p. 849).  
He considers that the lack of reality jurisprudence caused a dire situation wherein all jihadist 
organisations have failed to build and promote convincing plans for change politically, 
socially, and economically (al-Suri, p. 803). He states that the main problem lies in these 
organisations’ fixation on the past, isolation from the Islamic world’s contemporary problems, 
and ignorance of reality jurisprudence. In consequence, he concludes that neglecting real-life 
considerations led to stagnation being a marker of the contemporary Salafi school, including 
Salafi-Jihadism (al-Suri, p. 804).  
The other serious problem, for al-Suri, is the chaos resulting from the method of Salafi 
jurisprudence which is widespread in the ranks of the mujahideen especially among the 
young. He explains that a jurisprudence of extremism and intransigence dominated during 
the second half of the 1990s because of some opportunists who disseminated takfiri 
publications and pushed for more extremism in the peripheries of the Salafi-Jihadist current, 




In addition to al-Suri, Abu Basir al-Tartousi is another influential Islamist marjiʿ who deals with 
the jurisprudence of reality extensively in his writings. Al-Tartousi draws analogies from the 
history of Islam to vindicate both the significance and religiousness of acquiring a deep 
knowledge of the surrounding reality and socio-political conditions. He criticises that some 
Muslims say publicly that they never read a newspaper and do not listen to the news because 
they are busy seeking knowledge and practising religion (Al-Tartousi, 2002, p. 134). He notes 
that some of them attribute their sayings and positions to the practices of Salaf and the 
doctrine of Salafism. He also notes that some Muslims even do not consider him a Salafi 
anyone who cares about reality jurisprudence or believes that it is significant (Al-Tartousi, p. 
134). 
In his defence of the importance of reality jurisprudence, al-Tartousi explains how the Prophet 
Muhammad himself cared about reality jurisprudence. He argues that this was apparent 
when the Prophet instructed his persecuted companions to migrate to Abyssinia specifically 
and not to Persia or the Roman empire. The Prophet was aware that Abyssinia “has a king 
under whose rule no one is persecuted”, which is used by al-Tartousi as evidence that the 
Prophet was aware of what was happening in the region and the conditions of kings and 
nations at the time (Al-Tartousi, p. 138). The practices of the companions are also used to 
indicate the importance of reality jurisprudence, especially their care about the war between 
the Persians and Romans. In this regard, al-Tartousi states that “the infidels hoped that 
Persians win because they worship fire and hence are closer to paganism, while Muslims 
hoped that the Romans win because they are people of the book who remain less deviant 
that pagans and fire-worshippers” (Al-Tartousi, p. 138). As such, the practices of the Prophet’s 
companions are portrayed as reasoned in a way that reflects their familiarity with the politics 
of the time and reality jurisprudence. 
Al-Tartousi believes that pursuing daʿwa incrementally in the formative period of Islam suited 
the reality back then, and the Prophet chose to migrate to Medina specifically where he dealt 
with all existing parties using any methods that he found appropriate (Al-Tartousi, p. 136). 
Besides, he states that “the religiousness and righteousness” of reality jurisprudence is also 
found in the Hadiths that portray Muslims as one body and as members of one nation who 
must support one another. Al-Tartousi contends that the religious duty of showing solidarity 
cannot be achieved without reality jurisprudence as “it enables Muslims to keep abreast of 
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what is happening to other Muslims in other parts of the world and what is being plotted 
against them” (Al-Tartousi, p. 137). 
Reality jurisprudence is divided into four categories, according to al-Tartousi. These 
categories are mandatory, desirable, forbidden, and permissible. The mandatory aspect of 
reality jurisprudence includes everything that pertains to faith and is considered necessary 
for the safety of faith and tawheed, including familiarity with the practices of tawaghit 
(tyrants) and keeping informed about the situations of Muslims in other parts of the world 
(Al-Tartousi, pp. 139-141). Al-Tartousi uses the traditional rule: Ma la yatimmu al-wajib illa 
bihi fahuwa wajib (what is required for the fulfilment of a mandatory duty is mandatory) to 
indicate the necessity of reality jurisprudence since it prepares the ground for the fulfilment 
of Islamic duties (Al-Tartousi, p. 141). Yet, he explains that certain sophisticated aspects of 
reality jurisprudence are mandatory only to specific leaders and scholars especially those in 
charge of planning and making decisions. The desirable aspects of reality jurisprudence 
encompass staying abreast of beneficial worldly sciences, such as pursuing military, economic 
and industrial sciences after a sufficient level of them has been reached (Al-Tartousi, p. 143). 
Some aspects of reality jurisprudence are prohibited especially harmful things that emanate 
from the culture of the time and are thought to lead to error and sin unless the intention is 
to expose them (Al-Tartousi, p. 143). Al-Tartousi concludes that everything else that does not 
fall under any of these three categories is considered permissible.  
In contemporary jihadism, having received religious education alone has become insufficient 
for a scholar to be considered a marjiʿ for the Mujahideen. For example, Abdelhaleem states 
that the problem with the well-known, and once highly influential, Sheikh Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi is that he has only a high-school certificate.54 Abdelhaleem explains that lack of 
academic education and scientific knowledge affects the way al-Maqdisi deals with theology 
and jurisprudence and leads him to commit grave mistakes affecting the mujahideen in the 
field. Abdelhaleem concludes that the main problem with al-Maqdisi and numerous other 
religious scholars is a result of their unfamiliarity with scientific methods and not because of 
a lack of religious knowledge.55 
 
54 Abdelhaleem, Tariq. A Talk on Doctrine and Doctrinairism (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s Website, 10 




In this way, the writings of al-Suri, al-Tartusi, and Abdelhaleem in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the subsequent war on terror reflect a collective effort to raise awareness among the 
mujahideen of the importance of “reality jurisprudence” and strategic planning. Their effort 
has impacted the discourse of contemporary jihadism including the discourse of al-Nusra 
Front in Syria. 
“Jihad jurisprudence”: the management of violence 
The jurisprudence of jihad revolves around setting the rules of jihad including its conditions, 
timings, methods, and goals. In Islamic traditions, there are two aspects of jihad which are 
the lifelong struggle to discipline the self and the struggle against the unbelievers and the 
aggressors. Salafi-Jihadists clearly adopt and promote the latter notion of jihad and present it 
as a duty upon all Muslims.  
Jihad as an armed struggle can be either fard kifayah (collective duty) which is a duty on the 
entire ummah and is fulfilled when a sufficient number of Muslims defend their land and 
people, or fard ʿayn (individual duty) which requires all Muslims to practice jihad when there 
is a serious danger threatening their religion, land, welfare, or dignity.    
Al-Suri is a marjiʿ for many contemporary jihadists especially concerning matters relating to 
jihad jurisprudence. He uses a discourse centred around grievance and victimhood to justify 
his calls for all Muslims to join the mujahideen. Following a purposeful framing of the current 
political conditions, jihad is theorised throughout Daʿwat al-Muqawama as mandatory upon 
all Muslims at present. In this respect, al-Nusra’s ideologues echo al-Suri’s framing of jihad. 
Al-Nusra’s marjiʿ, Abdul Rahim Attoun (known as: Abu Abdullah al-Shami), deals with the 
jurisprudence of jihad and quotes Abu Musʿab al-Suri and Abdallah Azzam extensively. Attoun 
promotes the idea that jihad has become a defensive jihad that is incumbent upon individual 
Muslims “until the liberation of all Muslim lands from kuffar, both originals and apostates” 











(mandatory defensive jihad) 
Muslimness  ✓ ✓ 
Maturity  ✓ ✓ 
Reason ✓ ✓ 
Physical fitness ✓ ✓ 
Freedom  ✓ × 
Masculinity  ✓ × 
Affordability  ✓ × 
Parents’ permission  ✓ × 
Lenders’ permission ✓ × 
Table 4 Jihad al-Talab and jihad al-Dafʿ, source: Attoun pp.96-97 (quoting Abdallah Azzam) 
 
For al-Suri, jihad jurisprudence entails that a mujahid needs to be acquainted with two types 
of knowledge. The first one is a theological knowledge on rules of jihad, including its religious 
importance, rewards, and what God has prepared for martyrs. The mujahid must also know 
the sins that leaving jihad causes, its afterlife punishments, and worldly consequences, 
individually and collectively. The second type of knowledge is practical. Al-Suri calls on the 
mujahideen to educate themselves on the best ways to perform jihad because “it’s a matter 
that must not be taken lightly as it affects people’s lives, wealth, rights, etc., therefore, the 
mujahid needs to be aware of the purposes, objectives, and rules of jihad” (al-Suri, p. 889). 
Al-Suri warns that the latter issues concerning the strategic management of jihad are 
inherently complicated and hence every jihadist group and organisation must have its own 
strategically informed marajiʿ to whom they refer when they face novel practical problems.  
By applying his reasoning to the modern world, al-Suri outlines the fundamental principles of 
the contemporary jurisprudence of jihad listing the following (al-Suri, pp. 940-1077): 
1. Rebelling against the apostate or unbeliever ruler is a duty for all Muslims. In effect, 
governments ruling Muslim countries today must be fought because they are apostates 
and infidels as a result of their suspension of the rule of shariʿa, alliance with infidels, 
betrayal of God, the messenger, and the believers.   
2. The lands of Islam are under foreign occupation and thus jihad is mandatory for all 
Muslims. 
3. The rules of shariʿa entail the apostasy of those who collaborate with the kuffar 
(unbelievers) and aid them against Muslims and the need for fighting them. 
4. Shariʿa entails the necessity of fighting aggressors against the religion, lives, honours, or 
wealth of Muslims, even if they themselves were Muslims.  
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5. Shariʿa entails that the blood, wealth, and honour of Muslims must be protected, and 
that all sorts of occupation and foreign presence are legitimate targets. 
6. Muslims must support other Muslims, regardless of their sins and wrongdoings, when 
they face aggression from the kuffar. 
7. Democracy is a religion and the rules of shariʿa entail that democracy necessarily 
contradicts Islam.  
These rules have become pillars upon which contemporary jihadism rests. However, they are 
interpreted and applied differently by jihadist groups performing under different historical 
conditions. While issues like rejecting democracy entirely, emphasising Muslim solidarity, and 
framing jihad in our time as a mandatory duty for all Muslims have been adopted by all Salafi-
Jihadist organisations, other issues like the extent of takfir, the definition of “Muslim”, and 
the order of priorities have been points of dispute and contributed to creating serious rifts 
between ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria, for example.   
The jurisprudence of jihad is strongly shaped by one’s reading of the available situation and 
therefore it is an immensely adaptable practice. For instance, al-Suri justifies framing 
terrorism as a religious duty based on his assessment of the circumstances of the global war 
on terrorism. He states: “Simply and bravely we accept the American definition of terrorism. 
Terrorism is an abstract concept that, like many other words, may carry a positive or negative 
connotation according to the context” (al-Suri, p. 1374). The two types of terrorism are 
framed as 1) despised terrorism: that is “every action, utterance and behaviour that 
unjustifiably leads to inflicting harm and fear on innocents”, and 2) welcomed terrorism: that 
is “the terrorism of the rightful and oppressed who fights oppression by terrorising and 
deterring his oppressor” (al-Suri, p. 1375). Using selectively chosen verses from the Quran 
and examples from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, al-Suri states that “terrorism is 
obligatory in the book of God” and concludes that “we do not find any derogatory connotation 
in the term (terrorist) when it is used to describe the muqawimeen [those who resist] and 
mujahideen.. because they, in fact, terrorise their enemies and the enemies of God and his 
vulnerable slaves, so what’s wrong and where’s the insult?!” (al-Suri, p. 1376). The way al-
Suri frames terrorism is a clear example of the jihadists’ discursive adaptations and their 
strategic instrumentalization of religious discourse.  
More recent examples from the discourse of al-Nusra Front in Syria show a different framing 
of terrorism in ways that further substantiate contextual adaptations in the Salafi-Jihadist 
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discourse. Under the circumstances of the Syrian civil war, al-Nusra Front endeavoured to 
avoid being labelled “terrorist” and since it was officially designated a “terrorist group” by the 
US Foreign Office in December 2012 it has relentlessly criticised the decision calling instead 
for labelling the Syrian regime and its backers as terrorists. Al-Nusra’s discursive attempts to 
distance itself from “terrorism” and “terrorist organisations” has become a strategy pursued 
by the Salafi-jihadist group as will be further clarified in later sections.  
 
“Priorities jurisprudence”: towards a systematic decision making  
The jurisprudence of priorities aspires to systematise and standardise processes of 
prioritisation. By practising this type of jurisprudence, Islamic scholars attempt to provide 
practical and contextual translations of the traditional Islamic rule of jalb al-masalih wa dar’ 
al-mafasid (the attainment of benefit and prevention of harm) taking into consideration 
maqasid al-shariʿa56 (the purposes of shariʿa). this branch of Islamic jurisprudence has enjoyed 
a considerable significance in Salafi-Jihadist circles recently. The influential jihadist marjiʿ 
Abdelhaleem considers that “priorities jurisprudence is the base for establishing the rule of 
sharia and the gate to applying its rules”.57 
Al-Suri has also urged the mujahideen to acquire the skills needed to develop systematic and 
nuanced processes of prioritisation of their strategic choices. Al-Suri sees that any decision 
must be made through a process of three interrogations: 
1- Sharʿi judgment: is it halal or haram. 
2- Political judgment: is it beneficial or harmful. 
3- Realistic judgment: is it feasible or not. (al-Suri, p. 1094) 
 
56 The theory of maqāṣid is an Islamic legal theory that entails that God has sent shari’a to guide people 
towards realising specific essential purposes. Medieval Islamic scholar Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388) in his 
influential legal work al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Sharia (Reconciliation of Fundamentals of Sharia) identified five 
essential purposes of shari’a and arranged them based on their importance as follows: 
The preservation of religion, self, reason, progeny, and wealth (Al-Shatibi, 1395/1997, p. 31). Various Islamic 
doctrines espouse that the existence and survival of humanity is dependent on the preservation of these 
essentials. There seems to be a consensus among Islamic scholars that the preservation of religion is the most 
important divine purpose. For contemporary Islamists, the preservation of religion is done by implementing its 
rules so that they govern the individual Muslim’s way of life as well as the entire nation’s judicial and political 
systems. 
57 Abdelhaleem, Tariq. Priorities Jurisprudence in Contemporary Jihadism, Tariq Abdelhalem’s Website, 11 
September 2013. Available at: http://www.tariqabdelhaleem.net  
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This process of filtration applies to all decisions, especially those pertinent to militant 




Overall, it seems that making decisions happens as follows: A decision is formed in light of the 
present circumstances. The preliminary decision is then judged based on three factors: 
religion, interest, and feasibility. The decision is adopted if it meets all three criteria.  
In practice, processes of prioritisation in Salafi-Jihadist activism are not as standardised and 
thus predictable as they are usually theorised. All decisions are coloured not only by their 
surrounding contexts but also by the preferences and tendencies of those who are in charge. 
The following example is meant to clarify the processes of prioritisation put into practice. In 
this example, Abdelhaleem applies the jurisprudence of priorities on the options available to 
Sunnis in Syria under the context of the civil war and the rise and expansion of ISIS58: 
 
 








Figure 8 Stages of decision filtration according to the jihadist marjiʿ Abu Musʿab al-Suri. 
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Table 5 A practical example of applying priorities jurisprudence on the options available to Sunnis in Syria in September 




There are five fronts: 
▪ Sunni groups and their supporters, deviant or otherwise 
▪ The group of awwadiyya haroriyya59 [i.e., ISIS] 
▪ Rafidis in Iraq (the Twelver Shiʿa) 
▪ Nusayris in Syria (the Alawites) 




When weighing their options, Sunnis need to consider the following: 
▪ Possibility of a direct physical attack by the group 
▪ Possibility of knowing and exposing the enemy 
▪ The anticipated danger if the group won and dominated  




Considering these factors reveals the following: 
▪ All other groups share a desire to kill the mujahideen and 
assassinate their leaders 
▪ Fighting all groups is corroborated by rules of sharia since they 
all are aggressors against Muslims  
▪ In principle, ISIS is more secretive and thus more dangerous than 
the Alawites  
▪ In the long run, the Alawites are the most dangerous if they were 
to win and remain ruling, followed by Rafidis and then ISIS 
▪ The Alawites are considered unbelievers and apostates, whereas 
both Rafidis and ISIS constitute ahl bidʿa (people of innovation) 
▪ The danger of the international coalition cannot be accurately 
measured since the enemy does not have boots on the ground 





Following the reasoning of priorities jurisprudence, one finds: 
▪ Fighting ISIS is a priority in the areas where fighting and 
assassinations are taking place 
▪ In the places where ISIS members do not exist, or they exist but 
do not assault, fighting Rafidis and Alawites becomes a priority 
 
It is noteworthy that, faced by the meteoric rise of a competing jihadist organisation, that is 
ISIS, numerous Salafi-Jihadist groups found themselves forced to alter their agenda and find 
supporting historical precedents and textual evidence swiftly. Abdelhaleem’s example 
 
59 Tariq Abdelhaleem does not use the title “the Islamic State group” to avoid legitimising ISIS. Instead, he 
refers to the group as both awwadis, in reference to ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi whose real name is 
Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri al-Samarrai, and harories, which is another name for Khawarij (or Kharijites). 
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reflects that as he seeks to bestow religious legitimacy on his strategic choices and responses 
to a novel situation. 
Having said the above, it is then not religion that solely guides militant Islamists. Real-life 
considerations play a crucial role in the processes of decision making and goal setting. But all 
decisions have to meet certain religious standards. However, these religious standards seem 
flexible because anything that serves jihad and the interests of the mujahideen is permissible. 
Hence, everything boils down to defining “the interest of jihad”; a matter that falls within the 
strategists’ sphere of responsibility. 
Pursuing interest: whose interest though?  
In contemporary jihadism, furthering the interests of the mujahideen is dealt with as a 
deciding factor in decision-making. Al-Suri summarises that when he states that “everything 
that would serve the interest of jihad, whether by benefiting Muslims or harming kuffar, must 
be pursued because the interest of jihad is more significant than anything else” (al-Suri, p. 
1143). To legitimise and normalise his opinion he claims that “all four jurists agree that, before 
and during the battle, anything that would serve the interest of Muslims and harm kuffar is 
permissible even it was to kill a human being or an animal or to cut trees and destroy buildings 
because the ultimate goal of the battle is to terminate strife, spread daʿwa and elevate the 
religion of God” (al-Suri, p. 1043).  
Such pragmatic reasoning has been essential to freeing the mujahideen from common ethical 
considerations enabling them to reframe the use of violence and constantly redefine its 
targets, scale, timing, and goals in the field of activism. It should not come as a surprise here 
that the writings of al-Suri, Abdelhaleem, and other Jihadist marajiʿ deal with jihadist activism 
mostly as a worldly project. Religious concepts such the afterlife rewards, martyrdom, and 
divine commands appear sporadically to support certain arguments and choices while the 
political concepts of liberation, empowerment, governance, and establishing a state 
dominate throughout the jihadist referential writings.  
In the same way, aqidat al-wala’ wal-bara’ (the doctrine of Loyalty and Disavowal) is often 
used to legitimise the use of excessive violence against the enemies and sometimes including 
civilians. Like other jihadist marajiʿ, al-Suri refers to the Quranic verse: “Muhammad is the 
Messenger of Allah. And those with him are firm with the disbelievers and compassionate with 
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one another” [Al-Fath 48:29] to support his position. The well-known principle of Loyalty and 
Disavowal is inherently generic therefore it is differently interpreted and translated in the 
world of Islamist activism. Its broad notion allows the jihadists’ to continuously redefine the 
“self” and the “other” in ways that further their interests and plans.  
The questions of identity have long affected Salafi-Jihadist activism. The boundaries between 
“us” and “them” are continually demarcated with several groups and communities falling 
somewhere between the two categories. Prior to the jihadist insurgency in Iraq and the Arab 
Spring uprisings, Salafi-Jihadist focused on presenting themselves as Muslims; but the most 
dedicated and selfless among the ummah. They seem to have refrained from 
excommunicating or apostatising followers of other doctrines and denominations. However, 
they never shunned from labelling other Muslims as mistaken or deviant but usually without 
making a final verdict of their Muslimness. Such ostensible “openness” is justified by al-
Qaeda’s marajiʿ using strategic and pragmatic terms. As an example, Bin Muhammad 
postulates that materialising the envisioned Caliphate requires considerable organisational 
flexibility and adaptability. As such, Bin Muhammad reaffirms al-Suri’s views regarding dealing 
pragmatically with a multiplicity of doctrinal backgrounds and holds that organisational 
boundaries must not be fixed, and doctrinal diversity among active jihadist factions should be 
tolerated for the sake of unifying ranks and preserving resources.60 
Although al-Suri avoids dealing with matters of takfeer and adopts an inclusive definition of 
the ummah, he praises Salafi-Jihadism and places it at the centre of Islam. Doctrinally, al-Suri 
assesses the correctness of the religious beliefs of various Muslim sects and schools of 
thought and adopts the following order:  
 
60 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum). 
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The ummah is comprised of Sunnis, Shiʿa, Kharijites and others. Sunnis are the most righteous 
within the ummah, the best among Sunnis are the people of Salaf, the best among the people 
of Salaf are the jihadis (al-Suri, p. 1063). 
  
Apart from matters of religious authenticity and correctness, al-Suri pays considerable 
attention to evaluating the effectiveness of different Islamist doctrines and comparing their 
approaches and performances in the world of social, political, and militant activism (see Table 
6).  
Table 6 Al-Suri’s comparison between different Islamic doctrines (p.1125) 
 Sufism Salafism Political parties  Jihadism 










Political reasoning & 
reality jurisprudence 
Very weak Weak or 
moderate 
Good  Weak or 
moderate 
Military preparation  Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent Good  
Performing jihad Non-existent  Non-existent Non-existent Moderate  
 
 
Figure 9 Islamic sects ordered based on their closeness to the 
essence of Islamic faith, as perceived by al-Suri 
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Abdelhaleem represents another current in jihadism that is distinguishable by its employment 
of strong sectarian rhetoric. He is pro-Sunni and uses an excessively sectarian discourse in 
contrast to al-Suri, for example, who is pro-Muslim in general despite being highly supportive 
of the mujahideen among the ummah. For Abdelhaleem, the ummah does not exist today 
and the mujahideen and particularly members al-Qaeda constitute the only true believers. He 
considers that today one finds only individual Muslims and small groups that adopt true 
Islamic principles.61 Al-Suri, on the other hand, considers that the ummah exists and consists 
of a variety of sects, traditions, and schools of thought that vary in their authenticity and 
closeness to the core of Islam.  
Broadly speaking, al-Suri is much more influential than Abdelhaleem, and his impact on the 
ideology of al-Nusra in Syria is more profound than Abdelhaleem’s. Even though, al-Nusra 
Front seemed closer to Abdelhaleem’s sectarian discourse as it capitalised on appearing as a 
protector of Sunnis in Syria given the escalation in sectarianism in Syria after 2011. 
For the majority of jihadist marajiʿ, Salafi-Jihadists adopt a correct doctrine and recognised 
methods and are engaged in jihad against the enemies of Islam which makes them the 
victorious sect. Al-Nusra’s marjiʿ Abdul Rahim Attoun adopts a similar notion  (Attoun, p. 81). 
For him, al-Qaeda’s reliance on Salafi Wahhabism and Qutbism has led to them being more 
committed and closer to the essence of Islam than others (Attoun, p. 176). He contends that 
al-Qaeda, the spearhead of Salafi-Jihadism, adopts a theory of conflict that revolves around 
focusing jihad on “the real enemy, that is the US-led world order, and exhausting it 
economically and militarily in order to deter it somehow so it becomes possible to have a 
reckoning with the local tyrants who rule by manmade laws and ally with the West, and to 
eventually fight the Jews” (Attoun, p. 176). Attoun argues that such framing of the enemy 
does not constitute hostility towards others. In the discourse of Attoun and the ideology of 
al-Nusra generally, violence is justified based on considerations of victimhood and self-
defence. In his words, “the enemy is waging aggression against the ummah day and night, 
and provides Jews with unlimited support, otherwise [al-Qaeda] does not target the kuffar 
 




who are not engaged in an aggression against Muslims, like Argentina for example” (Attoun, 
p. 176). 
In this regard, to establish the importance of strategic thinking in jihadist activism, al-Qaeda’s 
marjiʿ Abdallah b. Muhammad refers to the reasoning of al-Qaeda’s leadership in the early 
stages as a case of “successful strategic thinking”.62 He draws an example from the early 1990s 
when al-Qaeda decided to turn against the rulers of Saudi Arabis. Bin Muhammad considers 
that Bin Laden’s independent reasoning and understanding of the reality at the time led him 
to realise that jihad against the present Saudi regime passes through a confrontation with the 
United States despite the expected heavy cost of such decision.63  
Attoun, on the other hand, focuses on demonstrating al-Qaeda’s “bravery” and “selflessness” 
when it decided to engage in fighting the Americans in spite of their might and the fact that 
they constitute “original Kuffar”. He explains that leaders of al-Qaeda chose so even though 
fighting the near enemy is a priority and fighting apostate Kuffar is prioritised over fighting 
original Kuffar (Attoun, p. 177). To explain al-Qaeda’s strategy he states that “the nature of 
the conflict proves that the existing world order is dominating over the Muslim ummah, and 
the apostate rulers are nothing more than one of the international system’s tools for 
perpetuating slavery of Muslims” (Attoun, p. 177). He continues that, consequently, the 
leaders of jihad have realised the impossibility of fighting the ruling apostate tyrants without 
triggering “their masters’ intervention” so the mujahideen chose to face both due to their 
strong alliance (Attoun, p. 177). 
 
62 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum). P.52 
63 In this respect, Bin Muhammad quotes al-Suri when he states that Bin Laden weighed his options and 
reached the following political equation:  
“The ulama bestow legitimacy upon Al Saud. Al Saud legitimise the American presence in al-Jazeera 
[Arabian Peninsula]. Hence there is one of two ways to confront Al Saud: 
1- Facing Al Saud and then necessarily facing the ulama to expose their hypocrisy in order to strip Al 
Saud of legitimacy. For many people, this is a losing battle because of the weight and influence of the 
religious establishment and the legitimacy and prestige it enshrined in people’s minds over more than 
70 years.  
2- Targeting the American presence directly so that Al Saud will be compelled to defend it which will 
remove their legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims in the land of two holy mosques ... the religious 
establishment will defend them [Al Saud] so its legitimacy too will be removed. As Such, the battle 
becomes clear before people’s eyes.  




Importantly, Attoun explains that such strategic reasoning is not permanent; instead, such 
decisions are based on reality considerations so “if the context changes, the strategic 
preferences will be altered accordingly” (Attoun, p. 177). He explains that what actually 
happened after the Arab Spring is evidence of such strategic adaptability. “The reality of the 
ummah after the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq and after the revolutions especially the 
revolution and jihad of Sham is a completely different reality from what was before”, Attoun 
states (Attoun, p. 178). 
Given the new reality in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, al-Qaeda and its local branches 
rearranged their preferences and modified their tactics. Attoun clarifies that “jihad was 
previously elitist; today, it is a jihad of the ummah, jihad of entire Muslim nations” (Attoun, 
p. 178). He continues, “yesterday it was at the peripheries of the Muslim world; today, it has 
become closer and reached the borders of the holy land” (Attoun, p. 178). In this regard, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jolani, leader of al-Nusra Front issued a message on 17 March 2016 that states: 
“We congratulate the people of Sham and the Muslim ummah on the fifth anniversary of their 
blessed revolution and blessed jihad … you have taught the world how to restore rights and 
commit to principles! You have prevented the world from deterring you from your goal!”. Al-
Jolani continues and says: “We belong to the people of Sham, and al-Sham belongs to us, and 
only death will separate us inshallah, and we renew our promise to continue the journey until 
the last breath, with Allah’s permission.”64 This populist turn is celebrated by almost every 
marajiʿ for al-Nusra Front who often present this adaptation as indicative of the maturing of 
Salafi-Jihadists. 
Finally, reviving the jurisprudence of reality, the jurisprudence of jihad, the jurisprudence of 
priorities, and other branches of Islamic jurisprudence that deal with managing worldly 
affairs, has made a plethora of religiously justified approaches and interpretations available 
for the mujahideen. What remains is that the mujahideen choose what best suits their 




64 Written message by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani entitled Risalah Ila Ahlina fi al-dhikra al-khamisah lil-thawrah 
(A Message to Our People in the Fifth Anniversary of the Revolution) (in Arabic), al-Manarah al-Bayda’, 17 
March 2016.  
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Al-Nusra’s Strategic Framing  
The sections below reveal how the re-emergence of reality jurisprudence and the increasing 
importance of strategic framing and political reasoning in jihadist activism provided al-Nusra 
Front with desperately needed religious justifications of the group’s pragmatism and 
recurrent strategic adaptations, discursively and practically. In this section, I draw on the 
writings of Abdallah b. Muhammad and Abdul Rahim Attoun, both of whom are influential 
referential figures for al-Nusra Front.  
Vindicating and promoting pragmatism  
Al-Nusra Front is someway a by-product of the Arab Spring. Salafi-Jihadists found in the 
sweeping uprisings an opportunity that is serious enough to trigger comprehensive and 
fundamental revisions of the jihadist discourse and applied methods. The revisions, however, 
led to two different responses. On one hand, there was the Islamic State of Iraq’s aggressive 
approach that seeks to exploit the climate of instability and disorder to expand militarily, 
impose its rule, and re-educate people in the areas it controls. On the other hand, there was 
another jihadist position that promotes dealing pragmatically with the unfolding situation and 
exploiting the rising revolutionary sentiments in the Arab world in ways that create a broad 
popular base that stands behind the jihadist project and enables it to take roots and last long. 
The establishment of al-Nusra Front in Syria reflected the latter stance as the referential 
writings of al-Nusra reveal.  
The Salafi-jihadist writings that form al-Nusra’s ideological and strategic frame of reference 
acknowledge that Arabs revolted around the turn of 2010-2011 to achieve a better status in 
terms of freedom, dignity, and living conditions. Yet, they all share that the uprisings will 
cause overwhelming chaos that will make people realise the limits of democracy and liberty. 
In this regard, Bin Muhammad holds that the confrontations with Arab regimes will result in 
a series of civil and sectarian wars that in turn will cause immigrations, genocides, and 
destructions. Under such dire conditions, he believes that “the psyche of the losing majority 
will turn towards accepting any force that can restore security and stability, even if it was a 
foreign one”.65 He continues and explains that the superpowers will not find it profitable to 
intervene and hence the only solution left is to resort to the force that has “indigenous 
 
65 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum). P.8 
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characteristics”, that is the mujahideen.66 He illustrates that a similar scenario happened in 
Afghanistan when the Taliban took over in the 1990s. He states that the Taliban did not 
present any developmental projects or political visions and, unlike other parties, it did not 
have the popular support that would enable it to be welcomed and accepted by the Afghan 
people; instead, it possessed the one thing that the people needed amidst the chaos, that is 
security, “which they were able to provide with the help of almighty God”.67 
With Bin Muhammad, the project of establishing the Caliphate is not a utopian idea but rather 
it is theorised as first and foremost a worldly project that requires a realist approach and a 
high level of pragmatism. He calls on the mujahideen to take advantage of the climate of fear 
and insecurity to provide the desperate people in the region with an alternative 
comprehensive project. he urges the mujahideen to learn from the Arab Spring and observe 
how the idea of revolution sneaked and moved from one country to another due to 
resemblances of circumstances, conditions, and common denominators such as language, 
religion, history and traditions. Following that, Bin Muhammad states that the Islamists need 
to develop an alternative political project built on an idea that is able to cross borders, transfer 
among people, and address their dreams and aspirations as did the idea of revolution. In this 
regard, Bin Muhammad believes that “the only idea that can attract the fragmented Arabs 
and Muslims, in general, is the khilafah (the Caliphate)” because it is “the only political 
enterprise that will bring stability and security to the region, the only project that will protect 
the resources from the conspiracies of superpowers and the only project that will return the 
first kiblah of Muslims”.68 
Bin Muhammad incorporates opportunism into his sketched approach. This is most apparent 
in his calls for the mujahideen to benefit from the climate of freedom that will follow the Arab 
revolts. He considers that such freedom will enable the mujahideen to employ a long-term 
mobilisation strategy that utilises various media tools such as visual releases, books, studies, 
press conferences, and intellectual workshops which will eventually produce an intellectual 
acceptance or at least normalisation of the project of Islamic Caliphate. In this respect, Bin 
Muhammad exemplifies the “success” of Sayyed Qutb and Abdullah Azzam in disseminating 
 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid, pp.8-9 
68 Ibid, pp.10-11 
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and reviving forgotten Islamic concepts. He illustrates that Qutb succeeded in popularising 
the concept of hakimiyya and clarifying its significance, while Azzam travelled far and wide 
and delivered hundreds of lectures and participated in conferences urging Muslims to practice 
jihad. He believes today’s jihadist media campaigns must learn from the experiences of Qutb 
and Azzam who furnished the foundations of the current jihadist thought. Additionally, Bin 
Muhammad believes that it is important to benefit from the heritage that some intellectuals 
from Hizb-ul-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood have left.69 
In this way, the Caliphate is depicted as a viable grand projective that will unite Muslims and 
bring them back to the arena of superpowers. The Caliphate appears in Bin Muhammad’s 
writings as a multi-faceted project that can become a framework for a common Islamic 
market, shared defence system, shariʿa-protected rights, educational systems, 
comprehensive pedagogy, and other subprojects.70 As such, Bin Muhammad considers that 
the project of Caliphate is capable of leading Muslims to a status similar to the present 
solidarity and collaboration among European nations. He illustrates that the Caliphate will 
enable Muslims to follow the European nations that assembled in three entities that pursue 
shared strategic interests—the European Market as an integrated economic system, the 
European Union as an independent political entity, and the NATO as a military coalition that 
maintains the safety and security of its member states.71 For Bin Muhammad, the Salafi-
Jihadist marajiʿ play a central role in the materialisation of the unifying and multi-faceted 
project of the Caliphate.  
Moreover, reinstating the Caliphate is theorised as involving an intellectual mobilisation that 
takes place in parallel with working on establishing an “attractive model”. Bin Muhammad 
states that rallying Muslims around this project needs an intellectual and emotional 
preparation which is a responsibility he assigns to the thinkers, preachers, influencers, and 
media personalities of the ummah. For him, jihadist marajiʿ play a particularly important role 
and are asked to “become like bursting charge that inserts the idea into the minds of Muslims 
as [they] did in the aftermath of the raids of New York and Washington”.72 Despite the 
importance of such preparatory work, Bin Muhammad considers that presenting a tangible 
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example is the best and most convincing piece of propaganda the mujahideen can offer. To 
engender support and draw the attention of the Muslim community to the idea of reinstating 
the Khilafah, he believes that the mujahideen have to invent a small but successful model 
that works as an ideal example of how the life of the Muslim society would be when shariʿa 
is applied in real life. Hence, he emphasises the importance of mobilising Muslims through 
setting good examples of supporting Muslim causes, good management of resources, 
maintaining security, implementing creative education, looking after adolescents, etc.73 He 
continues that an existing practical model must embody the ideas embraced and developed 
by the Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ in a way that will make Islamic thinkers, preachers, and 
influencers say to their audiences and followers around the world to “look at that given entity 
and see the goodness of applying shariʿa and contemplate the grace of security, social 
solidarity and Muslims taking pride in their faith”.74 This way of dealing with the Caliphate 
signifies a realist turn in the discourse of al-Qaeda after decades of promoting generic ideas 
about fighting unbelief and liberating the lands of Muslims everywhere. The Arab Spring was 
a sobering event that fostered the transformation of al-Qaeda from a set of ideas that loosely 
bind a global network of jihadists to localised and fairly organised groups that symbolically 
belong to al-Qaeda and practically devise their own strategies and methods. Al-Nusra Front 
in Syria best represented this shift in al-Qaeda.  
To validate this approach, the history of Islam is read using modern political lenses. For 
instance, Bin Muhammad contends that when Muslims assumed power in Medina, they 
began by maintaining peace and finishing the “civil war” between the Arab tribes of Aws and 
Khazraj there. He continues that when Muslims expelled the Jews from Medina, “they made 
sure not to damage commerce given that Jews were the people of gold and money and 
instead Muslims led an unprecedented architectural, commercial, and military movement”.75 
Bin Muhammad states that by setting an example of good governance and leadership in 
political, economic, and military sectors, the Prophet and his companions encouraged Arabs 
to join them and get involved in the emerging Islamic project. Importantly, he notes that not 
all those who joined the Prophet and converted to Islam did so out of conviction and belief; 







equity, protecting rights and interests beside revealing the divine message of Islam.76 Bin 
Muhammad considers that consequently “large numbers of people entered Islam after seeing 
this religion’s pride and unique system of governance”.77 Following that, he concludes that 
“this is what we have to provide to the Muslim peoples so no one would utter: you want to 
transform our countries into another Somalia!”.78 
Bin Muhammad applies his pragmatic approach to the post-Arab Spring geopolitical situation. 
Like many other Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ in the early stages of the Arab Spring, Bin Muhammad 
appeared exceedingly optimistic and hopeful that the uprisings will produce welcoming and 
accommodating political conditions for the jihadists. His rationale revolves around the idea 
that the forthcoming period will be chaotic and thus will not require the mujahideen, who will 
be controlling and ruling spacious areas, to provide the same services known previously 
because the climate of war and instability eradicates most luxuries. For him, “the 
overwhelming chaos will limit people’s choice to only concentrating on satisfying their basic 
needs such as food, water and security and then comes medical services, sewage, fuel and 
the likes”.79 Bin Muhammad believes that under such situation the tasks of the mujahideen 
will become easier since they will not have to experience the complexities of modern systems 
in rich states.  
When discussing the best places to launch jihadist activities, Bin Muhammad highlights the 
significance of the following conditions and prerequisites:  
“The location should not be in a geostrategically dead-zone and politically such as Sudan, 
Somalia, Mauritania, and Upper Egypt… The location has to be within or in close proximity to 
places of religious influence such as Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem… The location should 
have altitudes that facilitate defensive military activism, like natural barriers such as 
mountains, forests, swamps, jungles, and other barriers that hinder the advancement of 
regular troops or neutralise some advanced weapons such as jets and artilleries… The 
location should contain agricultural lands, rivers, and natural lakes that provide a reservoir 
for self-sufficiency in terms of water and food… The characteristics of the region’s 
demography should include an acceptable percentage of religiosity, bravery, perseverance, 
mobility and openness.”80 
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Considering the abovementioned prerequisites, Bin Muhammad states that such suitable 
conditions exist mostly in two regions in the Arab world, which are Yemen and Syria. He 
explains that “both regions are located within the living field around the heartland of the 
Islamic world, contain decent locations of natural barriers with plenty of water and food, and 
from there [the mujahideen] will be able to mobilise most Muslims”.81 Hence, for Bin 
Muhammad, the rise of al-Nusra in Syria and the intensifying operations of Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen are complementary efforts that will benefit the end goal 
of establishing the Caliphate.  
After detailing his strategic vision, Bin Muhammad concludes with: “This is a dynamic plan. 
The only thing missing is an overwhelming chaos”.82 This statement echoes Bin Laden’s 
assertion in the wake of the Arab Spring that “the continuation of a state of turmoil is the 
suitable environment for the spread of the thought of al-Qaeda and Islam”.83 
In a nutshell, Bin Muhammad calls on the mujahideen to pursue calculated and realistic steps 
and urges the jihadist leaders in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere in the Arab world to manage the 
upcoming chaos and ensure that Muslims have become accustomed to the discourse of Salafi-
jihadism and accepted the idea of reinstating the Caliphate. He considers that the climate of 
chaos and the state of information transparency and religious freedom that has been growing 
since the outbreak of Arab revolutions will eventually play into the hands of the mujahideen.84 
This further validates the proposition that Salafi-Jihadism is an ideology of contention. It 
flourishes only in situations of chaos, turmoil, uncertainty, and conflict. This observation is 
supported by the historical fact that Jihadist groups extend their offshoots only in places 
where there have already been conflicts and feelings of grievance and despair, such as in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria and more recently Syria. It is clear that Salafi-Jihadism is 
an ideology of confrontation and contention, and jihadist strategists realise and capitalise on 
that. 
Bin Muhammad’s strategic ideas have found their way into the strategies adopted by al-Nusra 
Front in Syria. His emphasis on the need for well-planned media campaigns that aim to 
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disseminate the jihadist messages widely and persuade the audiences to join or at least 
support the jihadist activism was reflected in the approach of al-Nusra in Syria since its 
inception.  
 
Figure 10 A propaganda message showing a camera and its accessories arranged in 
the form of a rifle. Source: Al Risalah magazine, issue 2 
 
Figure 11 A Grenade made with keycaps. Source: Al Risalah magazine, issue 4 
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Reflecting on the above, Abdullah b. Muhammad’s writing is not an attempt to theorise and 
organise processes of strategic framing. While al-Suri and Abdelhaleem tend to be methodical 
and make reference to religion frequently, Bin Muhammad’s writings contain applications of 
the political and strategic reasoning laid down by al-Suri, Abdelhaleem and other marajiʿ. 
Another dissimilarity is that theology and mythology are almost absent in Bin Muhammad’s 
writings. His texts outline a worldly project and contain strategic plans along with their 
pragmatic justifications and historical analogies. With Bin Muhammad and other rising Salafi-
Jihadist marajiʿ, strategic reasoning has become an intrinsic and dominant part of the 
discourse of al-Qaeda particularly in response to the evolving Arab Spring uprisings. 
 
Theorising the transition from elitism to populism after the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring represented a pivotal point in the evolvement of Salafi-Jihadism. The 
unexpected outbreak of popular uprisings in several Arab countries drove al-Qaeda to move 
from “elitism” to “populism”. In response to the sweeping uprisings in 2011, al-Nusra’s marajiʿ 
Abdullah b. Muhammad, Tariq Abdelhalem, and Abdul Rahim Attoun advocated and 
theorized moving from the “jihad of vanguards” to the “jihad of the ummah” embodying al-
Qaeda’s new localized strategy and more populist discourse.  
Since the beginning of al-Qaeda, its leaders and ideologues used to pride themselves in the 
assertion that their organisation consists of the sincerest and most committed Muslims. They 
pointed out that they are not aiming to achieve the ultimate goals immediately and by 
themselves, but they instead aim to stimulate the ummah and destabilise the status quo to 
create suitable conditions for carrying on a jihad to liberate the lands of Islam and eventually 
establishing the Islamic state that is governed by the rules of shariʿa. This idea of a unique 
jihadi group that is willing to make heavy sacrifices for the “common good” of all Muslims 
finds its roots in Qutb’s theory of “vanguards of the ummah” which promotes preparing a 
special group of Muslims who are committed ideologically and prepared militarily to engage 
in a prolonged fight against unbelief and tyranny and set an example for the rest of Muslims 
(Qutb, 1964). Qutb’s ideas became cornerstones of al-Qaeda’s approach until the Arab Spring 
that brought al-Qaeda closer to populism and propelled the Salafi-Jihadist organisation to 
adopt the theory of “jihad of the ummah”. The transition began when Bin Laden welcomed 
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the Arab uprisings and continued with his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri who started talking 
about the need to engage normal people in social and political change85. Zawahiri called for 
making lay Muslims aware of the goals of jihadist activism and justifying al-Qaeda’s chosen 
means of activism to local people. In this regard, Abdelhaleem states that past arbitrary 
operations in different parts of the world tarnished the reputation of al-Qaeda and drained 
its supporting popular base thus he advocates focusing on fighting the regimes in the Arab 
and Muslim world and organising awareness campaigns that inspire normal Muslims to 
sympathise with al-Qaeda and support its operations. These discursive changes have found 
their way to the discourse of the newly emerging Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, namely al-Nusra 
Front. 
In his messages to the mujahideen in Syria, Abdelhaleem states that any successful Islamic 
movement will have to grow organically from within a Muslim community and not at its 
peripheries. He explains that people need to be familiar with the movement and its discourse 
and work before they can trust it and supply it with support. Following that, he calls on the 
Islamists to: 
1- be close to their popular bases and not remain exclusive and elitist. 
2- realise that having a close and supportive community is a safety net that is essential to the 
continuation of activism and sustaining its resources.  
3- be multifunctional and use different methods, including preaching and organising social 
activities. 
4- engage with their followers and supporters and not be authoritative because one’s 
involvement in activism does not constitute a binding allegiance.  
5- not render jihad a profession for an exclusive militant group. The idea of standing armies 
is a modern invention and not Islamic. Normal Muslims should be made aware of their duty 
to perform jihad.  
6- shift their strategy towards becoming entrenched in Muslim society by focusing on 
correcting people’s beliefs and reforming curricula and educational systems. Purifying 
people’s creed has become a priority given past experiences. They should take people’s 
hands and be humble with them instead of antagonising them or acting as their superiors.86 
 
85 Abdelhaleem, Tariq. Where is the Problem? And what is the solution? Part 2 (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s 
Website, 1 October 2014. Available at: http://www.tariqabdelhaleem.net  
86 Abdelhaleem, Tariq. Where is the Problem? And what is the solution? Part 3 (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s 
Website, 1 October 2014. Available at: http://www.tariqabdelhaleem.net 
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Bin Muhammad, on the other hand, sees that this necessary pivoting has become possible 
after the spread of the idea of revolution in the Arab world. He underscores the importance 
of imitation meaning that people’s perceptions are getting increasingly influenced by what is 
happening around them and that the rise of a new idea in one place does not have to remain 
confined geographically. With this being the case, Bin Muhammad considers that the 
challenge is how to popularize the idea of jihad and make it galvanize the masses and 
eventually spur a pervasive and persistent cross-border movement.87 He sees that al-Qaeda’s 
approach should become an exemplary model for those living under authoritarian rules and 
are subjected to alienation and impoverishment.88  
Bin Muhammad believes that the uprising in Syria will transform into a popular jihadist 
revolution. He maintains that if the revolution succeeds in toppling the Assad regime and 
protecting itself in an extremely hostile environment, this will encourage the rest of Arab 
peoples that had experienced failed revolutions to follow suit and adopt al-Qaeda’s approach. 
He believes that such a scenario will lead to a departure from western hegemony to the jihad 
of the ummah.89  
Al-Nusra’s marjiʿ Abdul Rahim Attoun frames of the Syrian Revolution similarly and considers 
it a turning point in the course of global Jihadism. He states that “this revolution, whether we 
call it a peaceful, popular or jihadist revolution or all of these … it is a divine mercy for Muslims 
in Sham in particular and for the entire ummah, even for all disenchanted inshallah”.90 Attoun 
maintains that the events in Syria began as a peaceful uprising that evolved gradually until it 
became an Islamic jihadi revolution. He explains that the marginalised Sunnis took to the 
streets peacefully calling for “dignity, freedom and toppling the criminal Nusayri regime”.91 
Using a mixture of religious and political terms, Attoun states that the Assad regime faced a 
“divine trick” meaning that “the tyrant thought that if he released a bunch of Islamist and 
political prisoners and ended the emergency law and the notorious State Security Court, he 
will encircle the revolution and put up its flame that almighty God ignited”.92 He explains that 
what actually happened in response to these measures is that “the battle raged more, and 
 
87 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Strategy of Regional War on the Land of Sham (in Arabic), 2011. 
88 Bin Muhammad. Strategy of Regional War on the Land of Sham (in Arabic), 2011. 
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various jihadist factions emerged as they had long waited for such days and opportunities; 
among these factions was al-Nusra Front for the People of Sham.”93 
For Attoun, the evolvement of the Syrian uprising led to drastic changes in the strategies 
adopted by jihadists around the world and the very nature of jihadism. For him, and for most 
of al-Qaeda’s marajiʿ, jihadism is no longer an elitist activity. Attoun asserts that “the reality 
of the ummah after the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq and after the revolutions especially the 
revolution and jihad of Sham is completely different from what was before.”94 He maintains 
that “previously, jihad was elitist and happening at the peripheries of the Muslim world; 
today, it is a jihad of the ummah, jihad of entire Muslim nations, and has reached the borders 
of the holy land.”95 
The strategic notes sketched by al-Nusra’s marjiʿ demonstrate how al-Nusra embodied and 
represented al-Qaeda’s decision to adopt a decentralised hierarchy after the Arab uprisings 
of 2011 giving its geographically dispersed and loosely connected branches freedom to 
customise strategies and devise methods that best suit their specific local needs and keep 
them abreast of and responsive to their respective circumstances. Given that, al-Nusra 
employed a populist discourse that exhibits little conformity with al-Qaeda’s earlier discourse 
of global Jihadism. Instead, al-Nusra gradually concentrated on looking entrenched into the 










Strategic framing is a purposeful ideational endeavour that aspires to advance a shared cause 
and achieve specific goals under given historical conditions. In the literature on militant 
Islamist activism, the importance of strategic framing is often downplayed since radical 
Islamist groups are usually presented as extremely dogmatic and thus intransigent. However, 
this chapter showed a recent shift in Salafi-Jihadist activism, the most violent and extremist 
component in the world of Islamism. The shift revolves around giving primacy to strategy and 
strategic planning in the jihadist discourse. The necessity to bridge the gap between the 
discourse of Salafi-Jihadism and real-life considerations has given rise to new and modified 
branches in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). These aspects of religion that deal with reality are 
theorised, elaborated, and appropriated by an increasingly empowered class of jihadist 
strategists. 
The increasing significance of strategic framing has not led to a departure from religion per 
se; instead, it has led to changing the nature of religious discourse itself. This took the form 
of new and modified branches of Islamic jurisprudence. The emerging practical aspects of 
religious reasoning fall under the generic category of fiqh haraki (activism jurisprudence) and 
include various sub-branches most significant among them are fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality 
jurisprudence), fiqh al-jihad (jihad jurisprudence), and fiqh al-awlawiyyat (priorities 
jurisprudence). These aspects of Islamic jurisprudence enjoy unique importance in today’s 
Salafi-Jihadist activism and form the base for the jihadist process of strategic framing. 
The re-emergence of these branches of jurisprudence and the increasing importance of 
strategic framing and political reasoning in jihadist activism provided al-Nusra Front with 
desperately needed religious justifications of the group’s pragmatism and recurrent strategic 
adaptations, discursively and practically. In this regard, in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 
2011, al-Nusra’s marajiʿ formulated a discourse that justifies riding the wave of popular 
protests by utilising activism jurisprudence. The various branches of activism jurisprudence 
were used to promote pragmatism and theorise the transition from elitism to populism in 
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In the previous chapter, I explained how the increasing significance of strategic framing has 
not led to a departure from religion per se; instead, it has led to changing the nature of 
religious discourse itself. In this chapter, I argue that the increasing significance of strategic 
framing and strategic planning has besides allowed for the rise of a new class of strategic 
leaders who are in a constant confrontation over power and influence with religious and 
dogmatic leaders within the world of Salafi-Jihadist activism. Backed by an emerging religious 
discourse that justifies their importance and relevance and stresses the criticality of their 
responsibilities, strategists have recently assumed a nodal position in jihadist activism. 
Reviewing the literature on contemporary jihadism and its transformations reveals that 
several scholars, including Abu Haniyeh (2018) and Lister (2019), have observed the 
occurrence of adaptations at the levels of discourse, strategy, and performance. In this 
chapter, I build on such observations and add that these adaptations are indicative of a 
deeper change that basically touches on the issue of marjiʿiyya in Salafi-Jihadist activism. In 
the fields of Islamic studies and Islamist activism, the core group of epistemic leaders is 
referred to as marjiʿiyya (a source of reference) which I introduce and explain in the first 
section of this chapter. I then distinguish between an ideological marjiʿiyya and a strategic 
marjiʿiyya and explain how they function differently despite being parts of the same 
community of discourse. I conclude by highlighting the importance of researching the roles, 
occupations, and authorities of those who frame the discourse and inform the activities of 
militant Islamist factions. 
To acquire a better understanding of al-Nusra’s adaptations and processes of decision-making 
and sensemaking, one needs to differentiate between short-lived tactics and relatively stabler 
strategies. At the operational level, there are visible momentary changes that reflect al-
Nusra’s highly adaptable behaviour on the ground. Adaptations at this level are hard to follow 
and predict for they are constantly happening and affected by a volatile political and military 
environment.  
One the other hand, there are strategic adaptations that are addressed and studied by Lister 
and Abu Haniyeh and others. Abu Haniyeh notes that al-Nusra’s experience reflects al-
Qaeda’s move from elitism to populism in the aftermath of the outbreak of popular uprisings 
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in several Arab countries (Abu Haniyeh, 2018). Lister, on the other hand, explains that al-
Nusra aimed to become a leading part of the Syrian opposition, therefore, it pursued a 
strategy that is characterized by controlled pragmatism, strategic patience, incrementalism, 
and localism (Lister, 2019). In this chapter, I argue that behind these adaptations there is a 
major, but less visible, change that revolves around authority in militant Islamist movements. 
The issue of marjiʿiyya is becoming more and more linked with being well-versed in strategic 
planning in addition to, and sometimes instead of, possessing traditional religious knowledge 
and oratory skills.  
During the years of the civil war in Syria, al-Nusra moved closer to populism and localism and 
adopted an incremental approach. Al-Nusra was able to embark on such strategic trajectory 
thanks to the rise of strategists as the new marajiʿ. Al-Nusra’s central leadership, represented 
by al-Jolani and a circle of trusted companions, was able to side-line the traditional religious 
marajiʿ who were dogmatic, ideological, less flexible, and less acquainted with political and 
strategic reasoning. Now a marjiʿ must be armed with proven and demonstrable knowledge 
of strategic planning, the reality of the situations, the balance of power, and cost-benefit 
calculations.  
This means more agency is given to frame-articulators and resurgence of organised and 
hierarchical activism after a period of leaderless and network-like jihad in response to the 
unwelcoming structural reality brought by the global war on terrorism and the loss of 





The concept of marjiʿiyya: Salafi-Jihadist referential authority  
Within the Salafi-Jihadist community there are varying scopes of authority in what looks like 
a division of labour, or more accurately: a division of leadership. The legitimising authorities 
of those who outline the ideological frame and devise the strategies of a jihadi organisation 
overlap only partially with the command of military leaders who decide the short-term tactics 
and give operational orders. Key Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists form together an 
epistemic leadership whose rulings are seen by their followers as sources of normativity. As 
such, the role of the group’s epistemic leaders (Ar. marajiʿ) is decisive for highly ideological 
organisations such as al-Nusra Front. However, epistemic leadership in jihadist activism is 
itself a contested terrain. Ideologues and jihadists are engaged in a continuous but not very 
conspicuous competition over authority in their groups.  
In the world of Islamist activism, marjiʿiyya is used to describe the ideological inclination and 
doctrinal background of a group or an individual, as in saying: “an Islamist organisation” or “a 
Salafi Sheikh”. It is noteworthy that the term marjiʿiyya is used by the Islamists themselves to 
refer to their main epistemic references. As to Salafi-Jihadist activism, the issue of marjiʿiyya 
is essential to members of groups such as al-Nusra. Members of jihadi groups do not plan and 
act upon their own reasoning and self-interests; rather, they usually follow certain marajiʿ, 
especially in relation to strategic choices. Jihadi marajiʿ are the “content creators” in the world 
of jihadist activism who provide their followers with rulings and instructions along with 
religious and strategic justifications that shape their perceptions. Their functions seem to 
resemble those of social movement entrepreneurs who define grievances, accentuate 
specific traditions and precedents, and translate the generic ideological principles into 
fathomable plans for action  (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Noakes & Johnston, 2005).  
Marjiʿ (plural: marājiʿ) literally means “reference” and the related word marjiʿiyya means 
“source of reference”. In modern Arabic lexicology, a person who is an authority in a field of 
knowledge is sometimes called marjiʿiyya. In the context of Islamic traditions, a marjiʿ can be 
a text, a specific figure, or a school of thought that lay Muslims refer to as a source of 
authoritative religious knowledge. However, the level of the authority vested in those marajiʿ, 
as well as the foundations of their authority, varies considerably.  
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Marjiʿiyya is often associated with the Shiʿi traditions where it refers to the highest positions 
in the hierarchy of the Shiʿi religious authority. In Shiʿi Islam, the title marjiʿ, and sometimes 
marjiʿ taqlid (lit., source to emulate), describes a cleric who has substantial religious 
knowledge and is authorised to issue fatwas and practice ijtihad (legal reasoning) (Walbridge, 
2001). The epistemic authority of the Shiʿi marjiʿ is legitimated based on old Islamic traditions 
that revolve around the idea that “the scholars are heirs of the prophets” (Takim, 2006). In 
this sense, the orthodox Shiʿi conception of marjiʿiyya seems to fit into Weber’s category of 
‘traditional leadership’ which rests mainly on “the sanctity of age-old rules and powers” 
(Weber, 1978, p. 226). But it must be noted that, practically, the authority of a Shiʿi marjiʿ is 
not limited to religious affairs; it also extends to the realms of politics and social life which has 
been the case particularly after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the 
subsequent embodiment of Khomeini’s theory of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the 
Jurist). While the Guardianship of the Jurist is inscribed as the key-principle of the Iranian 
Republic, other centres of religious marjiʿiyya keep existing, at points even in direct 
competition with the claim to Iranian religious and political leadership of the Shiʿa community. 
For example, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is of an Iranian origin and based in Najaf, Iraq, 
is a leading Shiʿi marjiʿ who plays a prominent role in religion and politics alike.  
However, the concept of marjiʿiyya exists and plays an important role in Sunni Islam as well. 
In most countries around the world, the Sunni community has a single official marjiʿiyya which 
is often represented by the office of the Grand Mufti. In practice, the issue of religious 
marjiʿiyya is highly decentralised with each Sunni community or organisation following its 
own religious sources.  
In most cases, the sources of religious and strategic guidance for members of Salafi-Jihadist 
groups are limited in number which reinforces the ideological coherence and distinctiveness 
of the group. What we call Salafi-Jihadism is the work of specific ideologues and strategists. 
Together, these marajiʿ form a ‘community of discourse’ that intentionally utilises discourse 
to extend its knowledge and to achieve agreed-on goals in the world (Martín-Martín, 2005, p. 
41). Historically, under the circumstances of the “war on terrorism” and the decline of al-
Qaeda Central as a cohesive organisation with a centralised chain of command, the 
importance of having a unified frame of reference has become salient for al-Qaeda so its 
members and sympathisers can remain attached to one shared ideological source. The works 
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of Abu Musʿab al-Suri, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and other widely 
known Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ enabled al-Qaeda to transform into a global network of 
ideologically connected cells and individuals and thus contributed to its survival in the wake 
of the global war on terror.  
In this sense, the scope of marjiʿiyya in Salafi-Jihadism exceeds what the traditional notion of 
religious authority entails.96 The authority of Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ is not limited to theological 
and exegetical matters but also includes providing followers with normative dictates and 
strategic directions. Moreover, Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ often assume nodal positions in the 
chain of command in their groups.  
These insights concerning the epistemic and normative authority in Salafi-Jihadism have 
direct counter-terrorism implications. Recognising the uneven distribution of agency in 
making strategic decisions in militant Islamist organisations entails that it is more meaningful 
and fruitful to focus on draining sources of ideological and strategic planning instead of 
limiting counter-terrorism strategies to trying to defeat the constantly mushrooming Islamist 




96 Krämer and Schmidtke (2006) consider that religious authority “assume a number of forms and functions: 
the ability (chance, power, or right) to define correct belief and practice, or orthodoxy and orthopraxy, 
respectively; to shape and influence the views and conduct of others accordingly; to identify, marginalize, 
punish or exclude deviance, heresy and apostasy and their agents and advocates.” 
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Salafism and the problem of authority 
The issue of religious and strategic authority has caused controversies and even rifts in the 
world of jihadist activism. The two main positions in this regard have been to either support 
independent individual reasoning or be in favour of preserving the authority of established 
scholars and specific leaders of jihad. The former position is known to have formed one of the 
defining principles of the Salafi doctrine in modern times (Wagemakers J. , 2016). In the past 
few decades, however, Salafi-Jihadists have started to call for abandoning the traditional 
Salafi position and establishing a hierarchy of authority especially in terms of matters relating 
to strategic planning and organised jihadist activism.  
Al-Suri has dedicated a sizable portion of his writings to the issue of referential authority in 
Islamist activism and presented a rereading of the history of the Middle East focusing on the 
changing role and impact of Islamic referential figures (marajiʿ). Starting from the Colonial 
era, al-Suri explains the quick and relatively easy dominance of the colonials, culturally and 
politically, as a result of their ability to destroy the authoritative role played by the traditional 
body of Islamic marjiʿiyya in three sectors: politics, religion, and society (al-Suri, p. 551). 
Politically, al-Suri considers that when the Ottoman Caliphate collapsed a new secular elite 
allied with the colonial powers ascended to power and implemented man-made laws that are 
fashioned according to Western political traditions. This, according to al-Suri, marginalised 
most Islamic scholars and influencers especially in the domains of governance and policy-
making  (al-Suri, p. 551). Religiously, al-Suri attributes the decline of marjiʿiyya to the fading 
importance of traditional religious institutions, such as madrasas and mosques and the spread 
of Sufism and quietist Salafism. Additionally, he underlines the impact of the spread of “the 
sultan’s jurists” and the increasing authority delegated to new formal institutions such as the 
ministries of endowments and religious affairs that are attached to and overseen by the ruling 
governments  (al-Suri, p. 551). Socially, al-Suri believes that urbanisation, economic and 
educational modernisations, and internal migration from rural areas to major cities, all of that 
led to undermining traditional forms of social marjiʿiyya while simultaneously weakening 
tribal, familial, and other traditional bonds (al-Suri, p. 552). 
Considering these changes, al-Suri sees that the traditional Islamic marjiʿiyya was unable to 
regain its influence in the post-colonial era and attributes that to additional subjective factors 
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that encourage passivity in politics and worldly affairs. He adds that the factors that limited 
the resurgence of traditional marjiʿiyya include “the spread of bidʿa and extreme Sufism that 
is inauthentic and calls for capitulation” (al-Suri, p. 552). Besides, he states that the Islamic 
marjiʿiyya suffered from “departing the scientific sharʿi methods and getting backwards in the 
fields of creativity and ijtihad” (al-Suri, p. 552). Such subjective elements are theorised as 
factors that enabled the colonisers and their local followers to isolate and restructure the 
traditional Islamic marjiʿiyya. Al-Suri considers that it has become clear that “the Islamic 
marjiʿiyya itself needs a revolution that brings it back to its correct origins and restores its 
vitality and competence” (al-Suri, p. 552).  
In modern jihadist activism, several jihadist ideologues and strategists have directed much of 
their criticisms towards the doctrine of Salafism because of the way contemporary Salafis deal 
with the issue of marjiʿiyya. Al-Suri is among those influential jihadist figures who blame 
traditional Salafism for undermining the authority of the ulama who rely on the heritage of 
the four mdhhabs while it was unable to provide an alternative form of recognised authority. 
Al-Suri sees that the problem became particularly serious for Salafi-Jihadists who migrated to 
join the fighting on other fronts. He explains that the problem is more serious because the 
mujahideen found themselves without marjiʿiyya in their new places, whether in Afghanistan, 
Algeria, or Chechnya, while having to deal with unprecedented political, social, and economic 
issues. 
Al-Suri sees that the spread of extremism and intransigence in the nineties diminished the 
wall between jihadist thought and takfiri thought and, for him, Salafism is to blame for that. 
pp.803-804 For him, the mujahideen’s blind adherence to the mainstream understanding of 
Salafism led to allowing anyone to deal with fatwas and matters of religion under the pretext 
of anti-madhhabism (al-Suri, p. 1068).  
Al-Suri believes that the interest of jihad necessitates accepting the diversity of madhahib 
(singular madhhab: a school of religious reasoning) among the mujahideen. As such, he 
criticises the dominance of a Salafi tendency to abandon the vast heritage of the main four 
Sunni madhahib (Shafiʿi, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali). His criticism of the Salafis’ inflexibility 
and eschewing of politics is apparent in his statement: “Have a look at the heritage and fatwas 
of contemporary Imams of Salafism. You will not find anything regarding novel issues in 
politics, governance, facing aggression, political economy, science, etc (al-Suri, p. 1069). 
195 
 
Instead, he calls for accepting doctrinal plurality among the mujahideen and benefitting from 
the four madhahib; an approach that he calls “moderate mdhhabism”: “I call the ummah to 
follow the doctrine of Salaf [ancestors] and excuse and consider Sunnis those who follow the 
doctrine of khalaf [descendants] … and I advocate following one of the four madhahib and I 
am with a moderate madhhabism” (al-Suri, p. 1070). Following his criticism of Salafism’s 
stagnation and inadaptability, al-Suri states that:  “Yes, we need a contemporary ijtihad, and 
we do need to open the gates of ijtihad”. He, however, calls for limiting ijtihad to highly 
qualified scholars who possess up-to-date knowledge of contemporary matters and are well 
versed in political reasoning and strategic planning (al-Suri, p. 1069).  
Practically, al-Suri observes the emergence and spread of novice muftis who do not limit their 
activities to normal religious matters such as worships, transactions, inheritance and others, 
but also practice independent religious reasoning and do not hesitate before issuing fatwas 
in the field of jihad. Al-Suri believes that the wrongdoings of these inexperienced religious 
figures created serious problems since they affect other people’s beliefs, lives, wealth, 
honour, etc (al-Suri, p. 1068). He blames the traditional and established ulama for the rise of 
unqualified muftis. By refusing to perform jihad and proactively enjoin good and forbid evil, 
the ulama left the young mujahideen alone in the field having to deal with what is supposed 
to be determined by “knowledgeable wise men”. Al-Suri additionally criticises “the ugly role 
played by hypocritic and corrupt Sultan’s jurists in blocking the way of Allah” and allowing for 
the novices to fill the gap and do the work of qualified ulama (al-Suri, p. 1068). 
To alleviate the drawbacks of such depicted reality, al-Suri calls for the restoration of the 
respectable position of the marajiʿ after reforming the nature of their referential authority 
towards incorporating more strategic planning and political reasoning into their expertise. In 
defence of his position regarding the need for established and recognised marajiʿ, al-Suri 
considers that it is necessary for those who work in the field of jihad and resistance to have 
their ulama, thinkers, intellectuals, doctrinal machinery, and media tools (al-Suri, p. 39). These 
marajiʿ are believed to be able to “channel boiling emotions in the chests of believers and 
transform them through jihadist media and propaganda into a will to fight, and sharpen and 




The influence of al-Suri’s thought is strongly felt in the writings of al-Nusra’s contemporary 
marajiʿ. Regulating the practice of ijtihad is part and parcel of contemporary internal jihadist 
debates about issues of authority and distribution of power in organised jihadist activism. In 
this regard, Abdelhaleem espouses ideas similar to those developed and promoted by al-Suri. 
Abdelhaleem states that “the truth is not exclusive to a specific sheikh or group, but it is 
absurd and disastrous to say that the door of ijtihad is open to those who are unqualified, 
inexperienced and immature”.97 
Besides, leading figures from al-Nusra Front have borrowed from al-Suri and built on his 
thoughts to formulate a strategic discourse that resonates with the Syrian context and 
benefits al-Nusra. For instance, when expounding the doctrine of al-Nusra Front, the leading 
jihadist marjiʿ Abdul Rahim Attoun states that his group’s two main objectives revolve around 
following the Sunna methodically and eliminating innovation in thought and practice. He 
explains that, in order to achieve these two goals, the mujahideen must: 1- follow the ulama 
and the knowledgeable figures amongst the ummah, and 2- avoid the mistake that some 
contemporary followers of Salafism have committed when they prohibited taqlid (the 
doctrine of emulation) altogether (Attoun, p. 84). Al-Nusra-affiliated magazine, Al Risalah, 
refers to the same point and states that “Jihad includes a lot of violence, fighting and killing 
and therefore it requires people with great Sharʿi knowledge to lead it and keep it straight. 
This is missing in the leadership of (ISIS)”.98 
Similar to al-Suri’s reasoning, Attoun believes that destroying all sorts of authority in the early 
phases of Salafi-Jihadist activism led to a state of chaos in the field of activism. Such chaos is 
manifest through disorganised religious learning, the proliferation of ignorant figures, lack of 
unified marjiʿiyya, increase in disagreements, and disrespect of Islamic doctrines and their 
vast jurisprudential heritage. Attoun concludes that this dreadful situation has led to the rise 
of an ignorant group that disrespects the ulama and their expertise for they do not recognise 
their value (Attoun, p. 84). 
Following his unconventional remarks regarding the need for a recognised marjiʿiyya and 
hierarchy of authority, Attoun insists on respecting the leaders and marajiʿ among the 
 
97 Abdelhaleem, Tariq. A Talk on Doctrine and Doctrinairism (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s Website, 10 
February 2017. Available at: http://www.tariqabdelhaleem.net 
98Al Risalah magazine, issue 4, page 32 
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mujahideen in Syria, but not any marajiʿ, however. Instead, he argues that only those who are 
equipped with proven strategic knowledge and armed with a well-rounded understanding of 
fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality jurisprudence) are worthy of being followed.  
The experience of al-Nusra reveals a recent turn in Salafi-Jihadism towards advocating 
organisational discipline and strict adherence to the dictates of those who are higher in the 
pyramid of command. For instance, the Bayʿa Statement that a person utters to become a 
member of al-Nusra Front shows clearly the centrality of obedience for al-Nusra (Attoun, p. 
60). 
Al-Nusra Front’s Bayʿa Statement 
(Oath of Allegiance) 
 
“I give allegiance to Sheikh al-Fatih “Aba Muhammad al-Jolani may Allah protect him” 
the emir of Jabhat al-Nusra, branch of al-Qaeda of Jihad in the land of Sham; and in 
effect to Sheikh al-Hakim Doctor “Ayman al-Zawahiri may Allah protect him” the 
general emir of the al-Qaeda of Jihad group; this bayʿa entails full adherence and 
obedience in pleasure and displeasure, and in hardship and ease, primacy over myself, 
calling people to Islam and performing jihad to liberate the lands of Muslims and 
implement the rule of Almighty God’s shariʿa, fighting all types of kuffar and apostates 
as well as assaultive Kharijites, preserving the blood and wealth of Muslims, and 
enjoining good and forbidding evil, to the best of my ability, and as Allah is my witness.” 
 
This bayʿa Statement clearly shows a departure from the traditional Salafi position that calls 
for dismantling all forms of religious authority. With al-Nusra, one notices a return to the 
classical hierarchical order in socio-political activism. As clarified earlier, the political, 
organisational, and religious aspects of Salafi-Jihadist activism intersect greatly which means 
that for members of al-Nusra even religious matters have to be subjected to the same 




Strategists and ideologues: Jihadists’ division of labour 
In every collective social action, agents play an essential role in linking ideology and action. 
They are, however, more than neutral meso-level intermediaries. Their agency means that 
their functions exceed merely transmitting pre-prepared ideological frames and discursive 
elements into the ontological realm. Based on their subjective experiences and interests, 
agents are actively involved in determining strategy, articulating frames and choosing 
methods of activism. Reflecting on the case of the Salafi-Jihadist group of Jabhat al-Nusra, the 
Salafi-Jihadists decide whether to use excessive violence and embrace dogmatic convictions 
and rigid discourses. That said, this is more of a privilege than an evenly distributed power 
among all members of al-Nusra. Rather, there is a “core group” of frame-articulators who 
have an intersubjective experience and play pivotal roles in deciding the methods of action as 
well as their theological and strategic justifications. This demonstrates that the key to 
understanding the transformations of Salafi-Jihadist discourses and practices lies in 
unravelling the functions, interests, and authorities of Salafi-Jihadist decision-makers, 
strategists, and ideologues. Revealing the motives and interests of those individuals as well 
as their manner of making decisions and framing discourses is essential to deciphering the 
course of action that Salafi-Jihadist activism has taken and will probably take.  
The core group of Salafi-Jihadists has exclusive access to power based on their charisma, 
history, religious knowledge, and strategic thinking. This group performs strategic framing 
that benefits bridging the gap between ideology and action. They provide strategic guidance 
and religious justifications in the forms of written and visual materials that are published on 
Jihadi websites and then circulated among members and sympathisers of the Salafi-Jihadist 
formations. 
The research reveals that in al-Nusra’s early phases the work of ideologues who publicise and 
promote the organisation and formulate its identity and recommend it to people had been 
essential for the newly formed group. This helped the organisation grow and attract 
supporters and members, mobilise people ideologically and convince them of the significance 
of the organisation’s activism, and justify and legitimise its methods. In essence, mobilisation 
and recruitment are the guiding incentives in the formative period which explains the special 
importance of ideologues at this stage.  
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With the growth of al-Nusra, the group entered a phase of resource management. The 
importance of ideologues declined with the passages of time, the growth of the organisation, 
the expansion of its activities and area of control, and the accumulation of resources and the 
emergence of context-specific problems. These changes gave rise to the strategists who 
provide indispensable strategic planning and informed guidance. This strategic marjiʿiyya was 
especially needed at this stage as the strategists helped the organisation adapt and maintain 
its control and deal with practical matters such as the administration of urban areas, the 
management of economic resources, and sorting out its conflicts with other organisations and 
political actors, whether militarily or through striking deals with them. 
Additionally, the experience of al-Nusra proves that strategists-ideologues relations are 
conflictual. There is a constant internal competition over authority and control. The need for 
ideologues at the formative period enables them to gain primacy. Later changes necessitate 
the management of economic and political affairs thus giving rise to strategists.  This is not 
limited to the experience of al-Nusra; it reflects a century-old conflict in militant Islamist 
activism between ideology and pragmatism. While the contested subject matter remains 
unresolved, the experience of al-Nusra signifies the appropriation of the ideology-reality 
dialectic to maximise benefits and advance activism. In theory, it appears like a division of 
labour. In practice, it is an internal competition over authority, the result of which is 
determined by the timing and the present circumstances and needs.  
Practically, in later times, with the expansion of al-Nusra and the emerging complications 
regarding its military and political decisions, ideologues like Qunaibi and Abdelhaleem found 
themselves less valuable to al-Nusra and were becoming less welcomed over time especially 
given their distance from the field of activism. Their competitors gained more importance, 
and their opinions were becoming weightier within al-Nusra. Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, Abu 
Mariyya al-Qahtani, Abu Abdullah al-Shami, and Mazhar al-Wais have become the main 
representatives of al-Nusra and formulated a discourse that emphasises on the furtherance 
of maslaha (interest or common good) and ensuring the survival of al-Nusra in Syria in the 
long run. For example, the following statement by Attoun reveals the pragmatic use of the 
concept of maslaha to justify the decision to break from al-Qaeda: “Today, if the interest of 
jihad in al-Sham requires that we return to al-Qaeda we would be the first returnees … But 
this is our judgement−and ijtihad−of what serves the interest of jihad”. He adds: “if the 
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majority of ahl al-hal wal-aqd [people with power and influence] in al-Sham agreed that the 
interest of jihad is in using al-Qaeda’s name we would return”.99  





They practice ideological framing 
which entails framing a discourse 
that focuses on defining the 
ideological alignment of the 
organisation and prescribing 
what must be done following 
Islamic traditions. 
They practice strategic framing that 
involves framing a discourse that 
sustains the group through 
determining what must be done 
considering the present geopolitical 
considerations. 
Level of pragmatism 
Call for dogmatic adherence to 
religious principles and traditions. 
Leave ample room for manoeuvre 
based on maximising interests and 
cost-benefit calculations.  
Method  
Demand an immediate 
implementation of ideological 
visions. 
Call for a politically informed and 
strategically planned course of action. 
Conditions for 
authority 
Proven religious knowledge is 
essential to people of authority 
and influence. 
Vast geopolitical knowledge and deep 
understanding of the context are 
essential to people of authority. 
Takfeer  
More inclined towards takfeer 
and take seriously matters of 
religious commitment, 
authenticity, and conformity. 
Tend to avoid issues like takfeer and 
assessing people’s religiosity and are 
willing to tolerate religious 




#utopia #quran #hadith 
#commitment #hudood #applying 
sharia #tawheed #wala&bara  
#waqiʿ (reality) #maslaha (interest 
and welfare) #maqasid (purposes) 
#pragmatism #politics #strategy 
#administration  
 
Studying the case of al-Nusra Front reveals that being “Salafi-Jihadist” is not indicative 
of a fixed and extant characteristic regarding the degree of extremism and intransigence of a 
jihadist group. The group’s characteristics and behaviour are results of a continuous and 
dynamic intra-movement struggle over marjiʿiyya. The two main competitors can be classified 
into two categories: strategists and ideologues. It is an internal struggle between those who 
 
99 Attoun, Abdul Rahim. Testimony on the Breaking of Ties of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, Telegram,13 
October 2017. Retrieved from: www.Jihadology.net 
201 
 
give primacy to practical and strategic considerations and those who advocate a complete 
surrender to the ideological vision and call for an immediate and uncompromising application 
of the ideological precepts regardless of the present conditions. 
In the early stages of activism, ideological discourse plays an especially important mobilising 
and unifying role. Over time, practical matters such as governance, distribution of power, 
resource management and the human and economic costs of war begin to rise and occupy 
centre stage, which increases the importance of strategic planning and the role played by 
strategists at the expense of dogmatic mobilisation directed by ideologues. Those who do not 
demonstrate an ability to provide strategic planning and nuanced readings of the geostrategic 
situation lose their significance and influence within the organisation. They either defect and 
voluntarily distance themselves or are forcibly expelled or arrested.  
Researching the case of al-Nusra Front reveals that the jihadist group worked initially in small 
loosely connected units and that was possible through being held together ideologically 
thanks to the works of ideologues such as Qunaibi and Abdelhaleem. These figures provided 
the newly established al-Nusra with a much-needed religious legitimacy in a region that is by 
no means in shortage of militant Islamist groups. Moreover, the ideologues participated in 
justifying certain practices of al-Nusra and mobilising people when numbers were immensely 
needed, especially at the beginnings of al-Nusra’s activities. For example, when al-Nusra Front 
was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the American Foreign Office in December 
2012, Eyad al-Qunaibi and several popular Islamic preachers defended al-Nusra and 
encouraged Muslims to keep supporting the mujahideen. Qunaibi sees that “the designation 
is meant to tighten the grip on the mujahideen in Syria and anyone who supports them 
financially or morally”.100 Therefore, he responds by stating that “if we have reached a point 
where we fear to support our brothers financially or morally, then we deserve to be buried 
deep down in earth.” The focus on Muslim solidarity is coupled with continuous justification 
of al-Nusra’s practices and killing of civilians. To clarify, Qunaibi says that “it is not the time to 
talk about wrongdoings of any Jihadi group in Syria. Some of the Prophet’s Companions drank 
wine and some others committed adultery, but still they are our leaders because they 
 
100 "What are the consequences of adding the Mujahideen of Syria to the list of terrorism?" YouTube, uploaded 




supported the religion of Allah and performed Jihad alongside the Prophet.” At this early 
stage, such justifications benefitted al-Nusra greatly and maintained its good reputation 
among the armed opposition.  
However, this mode of activism and performance became more difficult with the growth of 
al-Nusra and when it clashed with the more powerful ISIS and became under local, regional 
and international pressures to distance itself from terrorism and terrorist organisations in 
2015 and 2016. These developments gave rise to strategic marajiʿ and lessened the 
importance of ideologues. Ideologues, such as Qunaibi and Abdelhaleem, demanded more 
strictness and immediacy in al-Nusra’s application of sharia law and implementation of 
mufasala ʿaqdiyyah (total doctrinal separation) with unbelievers, steps that al-Nusra was 
unable to undertake given the actual circumstances and immense pressures posed by the 
Syrian context.  
Importantly, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of al-Nusra Front, benefitted from 
that shift. He practically consolidated his power and rid his organisation of rebellious or 
competing members as well as most of its ideologically intransigent leaders. In short, al-Nusra 
has gradually become al-Jolani’s organisation.   
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Reasons for the rise of strategic referential authority  
To pinpoint the reasons for the increasing worth of strategic thinking in Salafi-Jihadism one 
needs to take into consideration several existential challenges that have encountered the 
jihadists in recent years particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
subsequent worldwide war on terror.  
Firstly, the war on terror weakened al-Qaeda, eliminated many of its top leaders, and 
destroyed numerous training camps and jihadist safe havens, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Secondly, the outbreak of predominantly nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Syria, and other Arab countries in 2011, provided a counterexample to Al-Qaeda's 
violent approach to political change in the Middle East (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011). The 
uprisings and mass protests threatened to strip al-Qaeda of any popular support left after it 
had been deprived of much of its capability and reach. Thirdly, the splinter of ISIS and its 
conversion into a fierce jihadist competitor, discursively and methodically, propelled al-Qaeda 
to reconsider its discourse, projected image, and mobilisation methods.  
Consequently, a transition took place in Salafi-Jihadism. It is fair to say that recently there has 
been a noticeable shift from dogma to politics in the discourse and actions of Salafi-Jihadists, 
particularly al-Qaeda’s line of jihadism. The shift happened in the aftermath of a change in 
the nature of marjiʿiyya (referential authority) in Salafi-Jihadism. More authority moved from 
the hands of dogmatic ideologues and traditional religious scholars to the hands of strategists 
and politically versed figures. The transition followed a phase of anti-madhhabism and 
rejection of any sort of authority under the influence of classical Salafism. It is noteworthy 
that Abdallah Azzam played a salient role in changing the nature of authority in jihadism. One 
of Azzam’s main contributions to the evolvement of jihadism in the 1980s was his successful 
attempt to popularise the idea that, under the present circumstances, jihad has become a 
mandatory personal duty upon all Muslims. Hegghammer explains how Azzam, who was 
directly present in Afghanistan and had a massive influence over the Arab-Mujahideen in 
particular, was able to spread a message that young Muslims should join the jihad even if they 
could not obtain permissions from their governments, sheikhs, or parents. Hegghammer 
contends that this produced an uncontrollable jihadist movement, that soon descended into 
radicalism (Hegghammer, 2020, p. 8). The writings of al-Suri and several other veteran jihadist 
204 
 
marajiʿ substantiate Hegghammer’s argument since they all display a sense of dissatisfaction 
with the state of chaos and impulsiveness that characterised Salafi-Jihadist activism in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
Reflecting on their experiences in Afghanistan, Algeria and other jihad fronts, Salafi-Jihadists 
realised the need for a “reformed” and more pertinent approach to authority and leadership. 
The purposes behind introducing changes to the nature of authority in Jihadism were to bring 
about harmony and coordination and devise well-informed and effective strategies that 
resonate with the available circumstances, play into the advancement of activism, and 
possibly lead to the establishment of some sort of stable and autonomous forms of 
governance, be it emirate, state, or other political formations. Furthering these objectives 
required a more organised form of activism and a suitable hierarchy of power and command.  
As a result, the vacuum of authority was filled with a practical form of leadership linked to 
efficacy, strategic planning, and management skills. This was coupled with the 
instrumentalization of Islamic traditions and heritage to formulate a discourse that 
accentuates and elevates the importance of political, pragmatic, and strategic reasonings. 
Hence, the increasing importance of strategic planning was reflected in the religious discourse 
itself. In other words, strategy and strategic framing are no longer separate from religion or 
in opposition to it. With the emergence and increasing employment of al-fiqh al-haraki 
(jurisprudence of activism), religion itself is being utilised to justify certain choices, 
concessions, and turns. 
In addition to the abovementioned qualitative changes, other structural changes have also 
augmented the importance of strategic planning in jihadist activism. The increasing size and 
impact of the jihadist phenomenon in general, and the growing complexity, multiplicity, and 
competition within it, have prompted the need for strategic planning for jihadist groups 
seeking to prove themselves militarily and politically and to assert their distinctiveness from 
other groups, rhetorically and operationally. The multifaceted confrontation between al-
Nusra Front and ISIS is a stark indication of the fierce intra-jihadism competition. 
In the case of al-Nusra Front, there have been contextual reasons that led al-Jolani’s 
leadership to lessen its dogmatic adherence to global Jihadism and embark on a process of 
localisation and pragmatisation. Firstly, the pressure of the battle, including al-Nusra’s 
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inability to achieve considerable gains in the wake of the Russian intervention in September 
2015, pushed it to focus on administering the social and economic affairs in its areas of 
control. Secondly, acting as a branch of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra had almost exhausted its limited 
pool of human resources given the local suspicions of al-Qaeda’s intents and ability to 
establish a stable form of governance in Syria in addition to the success of ISIS in winning the 
support of a large portion of foreign fighters in Syria. Thirdly, the decline in military activities 
after the regime recaptured Aleppo in December 2016 al-Nusra needed to secure the flow of 
material resources to cover the expenses of administration and service provision. This pushed 
al-Nusra to focus on fixing its relations with the local population and collaborating with 
militant factions that it can contain. These constraints propelled al-Nusra to reconsider its 
stance from the Syrian revolution, become closer to factions of the militant opposition, and 
seek to lead a merger in the north-west of Syria in late 2016. Finally, al-Jolani’s leadership 
found in theses structural constraints a window to introduce new organizational and 
discursive changes that effectively tighten its control over al-Nusra and eliminate all internal 







This chapter showed that members of jihadi groups do not plan and act upon their own 
reasoning and self-interests; rather, they usually follow certain marajiʿ, especially in relation 
to strategic choices. Jihadi marajiʿ are the “content creators” in the world of jihadist activism 
who provide their followers with rulings and instructions along with religious and strategic 
justifications that share their perceptions. These ideologues and strategists form together an 
epistemic leadership whose rulings are seen by their followers as a source of normativity and 
a frame of reference, i.e., marjiʿiyya. 
However, the realm of marjiʿiyya in jihadist activism is itself a contested terrain. Ideologues 
and jihadists are engaged in a continuous but not very conspicuous competition over 
authority in their groups. The issue of marjiʿiyya has gained substantial attention recently. 
Salafi-Jihadists have in the past two decades started to call for abandoning the traditional 
Salafi position that shuns politics, fights innovation, and views with suspicion all forms of 
authority, other than the authority of God as expressed in the teachings found in Islam’s 
foundational texts. Consequently, leading Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ, especially al-Suri, called 
openly for establishing a hierarchy of authority in terms of matters relating to strategic 
planning and the organisation of jihadist activism. 
Abdul Rahim Attoun and various leading figures from al-Nusra Front have borrowed from al-
Suri and built on his thoughts to formulate a strategic discourse that resonates with the Syrian 
context and benefits al-Nusra. Attoun observes the chaos engulfing jihadist activism, which is 
manifest through disorganised religious learning, the proliferation of ignorant figures, lack of 
unified marjiʿiyya, increase in disagreements, and disrespect of Islamic doctrines and their 
vast jurisprudential heritage. As a result, Attoun insists on respecting the leaders and marajiʿ 
among the mujahideen in Syria, but not any marajiʿ, however; only those who are equipped 
with proven strategic knowledge and armed with a well-rounded understanding of fiqh al-
waqiʿ (reality jurisprudence). 
The writings of al-Nusra’s marajiʿ reveal a recent turn in Salafi-Jihadism towards advocating 
organisational discipline and strict adherence to the dictates of those who are higher in the 
pyramid of command. Additionally, the experience of al-Nusra proves that strategists-
ideologues relations are conflictual. There is a constant internal competition over authority 
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and control. The evolvement of al-Nusra since late 2011 shows that the need for ideologues 
at the formative period enables them to gain primacy thanks to their cohesive and 
mobilizational role. Later changes necessitate the management of economic and political 
affairs thus giving rise to strategists. This means that those who do not demonstrate an ability 
to provide nuanced readings of the geostrategic situation lose their significance and influence 
within the organisation. They either defect and voluntarily distance themselves or are forcibly 
expelled or arrested. Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of al-Nusra Front, 
benefitted from that strategic shift. He practically consolidated his power and rid his 
organisation of rebellious or competing members as well as most of its ideologically 
intransigent leaders. In short, al-Nusra has gradually become al-Jolani’s organisation. 
Finally, the issue of epistemic leadership is essential to organisations such as al-Nusra Front 
mainly because Salafi-Jihadist ideologues represent a source of normativity for members of 
al-Nusra. This should demonstrate that the key to understanding the transformations of 
Salafi-Jihadist discourses and practices lies in unravelling the functions, interests, and 
authorities of the Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ—ideologues, strategists, and decision-makers, and 
the extent to which their processes of framing are adaptable. Researching the motives and 
interests of those individuals as well as their manner of making decisions and framing 
discourses is essential to deciphering the course of action that the Salafi-Jihadist activism has 
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In this chapter I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs) reflecting on the case of al-
Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between “moderation” and “radicalism” in the 
period between its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this chapter originates from revisiting 
Haines’ premise that RFEs happen “unintendedly”. Reflecting on the discourse and behaviour 
of al-Nusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective actors in ways that 
serve their strategic goals. In this sense, claims to moderation may serve as a strategic tool in 
the hands of collective actors, including militant Islamist organisations. In this regard, the 
research reveals that al-Nusra’s oscillation between moderation and radicalism was by and 
large purposeful, or at least carefully managed by the organisation’s ideologues and 
strategists. Given the presence of fierce competition over legitimacy and resources alongside 
the raging conflict in Syria as well as the constantly lurking danger of being targeted by 
international and regional coalitions against terrorist groups, al-Nusra sought to manage the 
issue of “moderation” to increase its power and influence and to ensure its survival in the 
long run. The research also reveals that al-Nusra managed its “moderation” variably in its 
relations with ISIS and the Free Syrian Army. While the initial swift expansion of ISIS in Syria 
pushed al-Nusra to utilise an exceedingly extremist discourse and start seriously planning to 
establish an Islamic emirate in northern Syria, it shifted its strategy towards distancing itself 
from ISIS discursively and organisationally when ISIS became under the strikes of the Global 
Coalition in September 2014. At the same time, al-Nusra attempted to appear more 
committed and less compromising than other competing Islamist groups and factions of the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA). Moreover, al-Nusra’s leadership frequently redefined its espoused 
notion of “moderation” to restructure the internal organisation of al-Nusra and expel any 
disobedient members or potentially rebellious subdivisions.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section examines al-Nusra’s 
responses to the rise of ISIS in a highly competitive “jihad market”. The second section focuses 
on the relations between al-Nusra and factions of the Free Syrian Army and analyses the 
changes to these relations over the period between 2012 and 2017. In the third section, I 
explore the different currents within al-Nusra and their competition over power and 
legitimacy and analyse the impact of that competition on the overall behaviour and strategic 
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choices of al-Nusra. I conclude this chapter with general notes about al-Nusra’s discursive 
management of “moderation” and “radicalism” in its competitions with other actors and in 
response to structural changes during the period between 2012 and 2017.  
What are the Radical Flank Effects? 
Haines was the first (1984) to highlight and theorise Radical Flank Effects (RFEs), which he 
defines as “interactive processes involving radical and moderate factions of social 
movements” (Haines, 2013). Haines focuses specifically on uncovering “the impacts of radical 
group actions upon the reputations and effectiveness of more moderate collective actors.” 
He points out that such impacts may take negative or positive forms (Haines, 2013). Negative 
effects happen when the actions, or merely the existence, of “extremists” hinders the ability 
of more moderate factions to pursue their strategic plans and to achieve their objectives. On 
the other hand, the RFEs may lead to positive outcomes for the more moderate actors by 
making them more acceptable or negotiable for example. Haines rightly notes that positive 
RFEs have garnered the greatest interest from scholars of social movements (Haines, 2013).  
Importantly, Haines postulates that “positive RFEs are almost always unintended results of 
movement fractionalization” and that normally moderate and radical factions do not 
collaborate intentionally to bring about positive effects because that is an extremely risky 
strategy that could backfire if uncovered (Haines, 2013). This is also believed to be the case 
because such a scenario requires radical actors to sacrifice all their own ambitions to advance 
those of other actors.  
Haines’ insights regarding positive and negative RFEs have been incorporated into the agenda 
of social movement research. However, his initial theory has been criticised by other scholars 
on the basis that the positive-negative dichotomy ignores other possible effects. Gupta 
(2002), in this regard, adds four possible RFEs: radicals benefit at the expense of moderates; 
moderates benefit at the expense of radicals; both radicals and moderates benefit; or both 
radicals and moderates lose.101 The following table illustrates Gupta’s four possible RFEs: 
 
 
101 Gupta’s remarks are further discussed in: Ellefsen, Rune. Deepening the Explanation of Radical Flank 






 Radical Flank Effects 
(RFEs) 
  
   → Positive RFE 
   → Overall movement strengthened 
   → Negative RFE  
   → Overall movement weakened 
Table 8 Radical Flank Effects 
In addition to his significant additions to Haines’ analytical approach, Gupta brings to light the 
possibility that, in order to circumvent becoming irrelevant, moderate factions may be 
compelled to alter their strategies and discourses to bring them closer to those of the radicals 
(Gupta, 2002). This is especially important when the radical flank rises quickly, makes 
significant advances, and/or manages to attract the attention of the media and the public. As 
a result, the effectiveness and empowerment of the radical factions may force their relatively 
moderate counterparts to respond and modify their strategies by repositioning themselves 
organisationally and ideologically to become either closer to or further apart from the radicals 
based on contextual considerations and cost-benefit calculations.  
It is essential in such academic research to begin with elucidating “moderation” and 
“radicalism” to be able to determine any possible effects. First of all, moderation is a relative 
concept. It always depends on the context and the angle from which one is perceiving 
behaviours, attitudes, and statements. Moderate actors are deemed “moderate” in 
comparison with others who are more radical. In the case of this research, both al-Nusra and 
ISIS are considered radical organisations that do not abide by national and international laws 
and use violence for ideological reasons thus making them widely designated “terrorist 
groups”.102 However, observing the situation in Syria since 2011 shows that the two militant 
 
102 Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as any “criminal acts, including against civilians, 
committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a 
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, 
which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.” 
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Islamist organisations have embarked on two different courses of action despite their shared 
ideological and organisational source. While ISIS emphasised its terrorist character and 
demonstrably remained committed to its extremely violent and chauvinistic approach since 
its inception, al-Nusra Front seemed to care more about its reputation and public image, 
refrained from directing or commissioning external operations, and displayed a more 
pragmatic behaviour. Taking these differences into consideration, it is plausible to say that al-
Nusra Front is less radical than ISIS. Yet, al-Nusra is more radical and extremist than most 
other opposition factions fighting the Syrian regime. Al-Nusra frequently showed hegemonic 
tendencies in its relations with factions of the Free Syrian Army and has been intolerant and 
aggressive in its application of sharia laws in the areas under its control.  
In the Syrian context, “moderation” is a factor that has played a vital role in determining the 
trajectory of al-Nusra’s activism and its strategic choices. Drawing on the case of al-Nusra, the 
RFEs vary across time and place. Besides, they differ from one standpoint to another because 
al-Nusra is concurrently a part of a transnational Salafi-Jihadist movement and a leading 
player within the anti-Assad opposition, and by itself is a distinct organisational framework 
that contains competing currents that vary in their extremism and intransigence. The RFEs 
are found in all three spheres, with each effect having its unique considerations and 
circumstances. Another point worth adding here is that the RFEs have not happened 
spontaneously or unintendedly but rather were managed and manipulated to serve certain 
strategic interests. In this respect, al-Nusra’s ideational framing has been strategically 
employed in the “management of moderation”.  
The disputes and confrontations between al-Nusra and ISIS are usually explained as a result 
of differing theological and doctrinal standpoints or conflicting geostrategic ambitions. That 
is true to a great extent, but there is more to add. At the macro level, both Salafi-Jihadist 
players constitute two flanks in one movement despite their differences and occasional 
clashes. The rise of ISIS as the more radical flank in a somehow amorphous Salafi-Jihadist 
movement has in some ways benefited al-Nusra which dealt with that pragmatically trying 
purposely to appear less radical and more flexible than ISIS. This was meant to serve al-
Nusra’s survival and advance its activities in Syria. On one hand, the discourse of moderation 
was used by al-Nusra’s ideologues and strategists to engender local support given the 
expansion and terrorising practices of ISIS. It did so also to avert being designated “terrorist” 
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and to challenge the designation when it happened. Employing the discourse of moderation 
was also meant to attract more recruits based on claims of authenticity, moderation, and 
centrism in between the more radical ISIS and the more compromising FSA factions. 
Additionally, claims to moderation enabled the leadership of al-Nusra to get rid of disobedient 
members accusing them of being kharijites (deviants) and ghulat (extremists). 
To simplify, the following is a hypothetical moderation-radicalism spectrum to help visualise 
the position of al-Nusra between the more radical ISIS and the more moderate factions of the 
FSA.  
 
It should be emphasised here that the above depiction is by no means final or fixed. Rather, I 
propose that al-Nusra deliberately kept moving between the two hypothetical poles in order 
to maximise its effectiveness and influence, as the following sections will further elucidate.   
 
Al-Nusra’s behavioural patterns and shifts 
Over the period between 2011 and 2017, there had been several developments and incidents 
that affected the way researchers and analysts perceived al-Nusra Front. While Al-Nusra’s 
clear doctrinal leaning towards Salafi-Jihadism has always been evident, its organisational 
affiliation changed over time. To clarify, in al-Nusra’s early statements and media releases 
there is no mention of any direct affiliation with al-Qaeda or any other Islamist organisation. 
Only when the threat of ISIS became imminent in April 2013 that Abu Mohamad al-Jolani 
declared his group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda Central (AQC).103 Since then, al-Nusra stayed an 
official branch of al-Qaeda until July 2016 when the leader of al-Nusra, al-Jolani, appeared in 
a video revealing his face for the first time and declaring that his group decided to change its 
name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for Liberation of the Levant) (JFS) which would have no 
 
103 The Conflict in Syria: al-Nusra Front Pledges Allegiance to Zawahiri, Leader of Al-Qaeda (in Arabic), BBC 
Arabic, 10 April 2013. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/04/130410_nusra_qaeda  
ISIS   Al-Nusra Front   FSA 
              
Extremely radical   Less radical   Moderate 
215 
 
links with foreign parties (Al-Jazeera, 2016). A few months after disbanding from the al-
Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift its strategy towards attempting to secure local acceptance 
and regional and international recognition of its de facto role in its areas of control, most of 
which are in the Idlib province. Henceforth, JFS, formerly al-Nusra, began to assert its local 
Syrian character while embarking on an aggressive and hegemonic approach in its relations 
with smaller opposition groups. Importantly, JFS led the formation of a new Islamist coalition 
under the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 responding to the initiation of political 
negotiations between the Syrian government and several opposition groups including 
representatives of militant Islamist factions.  
Al-Nusra changing names and flags since its inception 
January 2012 
– April 2013 
 












Figure 12 Al-Nusra Front's names and flags since January 2012 
In Spite of al-Nusra’s attempts to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global jihadist approach and 
appear organically entrenched in the Syrian context, only a small number of experts of 
Islamist activism believed that al-Nusra was going through a pivotal ideological adjustment. 
However, the group’s tactical moves led some analysts, such as Colin Clarke (2017), to 
describe al-Nusra as “the moderate face of al-Qaeda”. Moreover, other counter-terrorism 
scholars began to openly call for a policy shift towards “accepting al-Qaeda” and its less 
dangerous offshoots in order to halt the rapidly expanding ISIS104. Such voices were becoming 
more heard given al-Nusra’s refrainment from launching operations against Western targets 
and the group’s apparent care for its public image. Al-Nusra’s ostensible willingness to 
respond to international and local pressures was indeed unprecedented considering the 
experience of Salafi-Jihadist activism since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the 
subsequent emergence of al-Qaeda in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind 
that al-Nusra’s strategic goals seem to have remained firmly anchored in Salafi-Jihadism.  
The group’s understanding of jihad as an armed conflict and as an obligatory duty has not 
changed—rhetorically at least. Since the beginning of al-Nusra’s operations in Syria in late 
2011, its members have shown hostility towards democracy and the modern institution of 
 
104 See for example: Mendelsohn, Barak. Accepting Al Qaeda: The Enemy of the United States' Enemy. Foreign 
Affairs. 09 March 2015. Retrieved June 10, 2017, Available at: https://fam.ag/2PmsSCV  
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nation-state, adopted divisive sectarian rhetoric and operated under the slogan “we came to 
Syria for nothing but to support the religion of Islam”, and their proclamation of war against 
unbelief and apostasy has constantly been their declared drive. Also, their commitment to 
Salafism and its literal reading of Islam’s foundational texts as well as their insistence on the 
application of shariʿa law have remained unchanged. Thus, it is worth investigating whether 
the discourse of al-Nusra has changed in tandem with the group’s frequently changing 
behaviour during the Syrian civil war, and whether al-Nusra’s marajiʿ have utilised their 
referential authority to frame a discourse that serves al-Nusra’s strategic plans. In short, has 
al-Nusra gone through a process of moderation along with the conflict in Syria or the group 
used the discourse of “moderation” strategically to survive and secure its de facto role in 
northwest Syria? 
Al-Nusra’s strategic management of the “moderation” discourse 
Al-Nusra constantly used the pretence of moderation to maximise its benefits during the 
conflict in Syria. Qualitatively, however, it used “moderation” variably in relation to different 
competitors and challengers. Studying the variability in using the discourse of moderation 
provides a window to explore the Islamists’ strategic management of discourse.  
Studying the qualitative changes of the discourse of al-Nusra reveals that in the beginning it 
used the claim to moderation to become more acceptable locally and persuade more Syrians 
to support its operations and join its ranks. Al-Nusra kept its relations with ISI and AQC 
undeclared for more than a year after its official formation in early 2012. The designation of 
al-Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the American Foreign Office in 
December 2012 propelled al-Nusra to present itself a “moderate” and “authentic” 
organisation that is being treated unfairly. For al-Nusra, the possibility of being targeted 
militarily by American or international forces following the designation was a lurking 
existential threat given the newness and immaturity of al-Nusra’s experience and the 
continued confrontation with the Syrian regime. Additionally, starting to utilise a discourse of 
moderation extensively around the end of 2012 was particularly important given the 
unpopularity of al-Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadism more generally in Syria prior to the uprising and 
in its early stages. Appearing moderate was meant to resonate with the local form of 
religiosity that is traditionally closer to Sufism and quietist Salafism than Salafi-Jihadism.  
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Al-Nusra purposefully attempted to appear the moderate flank in a Salafi-Jihadist movement 
that also encompasses the more radical ISIS. The discourse of moderation was also used to 
challenge those who sympathise with ISIS, al-Nusra’s main Salafi-Jihadist competitor. This was 
important given the rapid expansion of ISIS and its extreme views and violent practices that 
engendered fear locally and internationally from 2013 onwards. 
Later, when al-Nusra became engrossed in demonstrating its local Syrian character and its 
involvement in the Syrian opposition, it began to present itself as the moderate and most 
effective part of the opposition. Moderation, at this stage, was claimed in comparison with 
“too lenient”, “unauthentic”, and “less committed” factions of the opposition, Islamists or 
otherwise. Besides, in its competition with factions of the opposition, al-Nusra presented 
itself as the most capable to practice politics in the opposition since it is supported popularly 
and powerful enough to represent the Syrian people and negotiate on their behalf without 
having to make substantial concessions. In these endeavours, al-Nusra used the religious 
discourse in pragmatic ways that legitimise its preferences and back its claims. Al-Nusra also 
used the discourse of moderation to challenge those who agreed to get involved in 
negotiations with the regime around the end of 2016. This was a propaganda message that 
was put forward to challenge the political process to find a solution to the conflict by stripping 
the participating factions of their popular support given the regime’s intransigence, brutality, 
and harsh crackdown on the uprising since its early peaceful phase.  
The leadership of al-Nusra instrumentalised the discourse of moderation to impose internal 
discipline and rid the organisation of any rebellious figures, such as the arrest of Abu Julaybib, 
Sami al-ʿUraydi, Abu Khadijah, and Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni in November 2017, accusing 
them of being intransigent and working against HTS’ plan to establish a Sunni entity.105 This 
approach led to the consolidation of al-Jolani’s power and freeing him to implement his 
strategic visions most of which revolve around breaking from global Jihadism and embedding 
into the Syrian context, on one hand, and maintaining his group’ de facto dominance in the 
Idlib province, on the other hand.   
 
105 Tahrir al-Sham Explains the Circumstances of Arresting “Abu Julaybib” and “al-ʿUraydi” (in Arabic), Enab 
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April 2013 
Al-Baghdadi announces the merger of ISI and al-Nusra and the formation of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) 
 
Al-Jolani refuses the merger and pledges allegiance to al-Zawahiri, leader of 
AQC 
 
Al-Nusra becomes officially the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda 
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 January 2014 Various rebel groups, including al-Nusra, attack ISIS in Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa 
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June 2014 
ISIS captures Mosul and demolishes parts of the Syrian-Iraqi borders 
 
Al-ʿAdnani, ISIS spokesman, announces the establishment of “the Islamic 
State” and the designation of al-Baghdadi as the “caliph of Muslims” 
 
    
 
August 2014 
ISIS drives al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham out of large areas in northern and 
eastern Syria 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
May 2015  Led by al-Nusra, Jaysh al-Fateh takes over large parts of Idlib province 
    
    
    
 
September 2015 
Russia begins a military intervention following significant advances by al-Nusra 
and the militant opposition in northwest Syria 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
July 2016 
Al-Jolani renames al-Nusra to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and indicates that the 




Table 9 A timeline of the main events in jihadist activism in Syria since January 2012 
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Competitive “jihad market”: al-Nusra’s discursive reactions to the rise 
of ISIS 
The expansion of ISIS in Syria posed a grave threat to various rebel groups including al-Nusra 
Front. When in Syria, ISIS devised its signature slogan “remaining and expanding” and wanted 
to become the only dominant Salafi-Jihadist actor in Iraq and Syria. As such, ISIS  demanded 
full compliance and cooperation from al-Nusra considering the help and resources it provided 
the latter since its early days. ISIS leaders, especially the group’s spokesman al-ʿAdnani, 
intensified their authoritative commands to al-Nusra. Tensions increased and escalated 
quickly into militant confrontations between the two jihadist groups in the eastern part of 
Syria. ISIS achieved a relatively easy victory and consequently powerful military commanders 
and entire units of al-Nusra joined ISIS. Fearing ISIS, al-Nusra’s leader Abu Muhammad al-
Jolani gave allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda Central, and al-Nusra began 
to assert its Salafi-Jihadist character trying to appear firmly anti-democratic, anti-secular, and 
committed to the ideas of abolishing man-made laws, establishing an Islamic state, and 
applying the rules of sharia. Militarily, al-Nusra’s leadership turned towards solidifying its 
influence and presence in the countryside of Idlib and Aleppo, Damascus’ Ghouta, and the 
southern governorate of Daraa. 
Discursively, ideologues from the two jihadist groups engaged in heated competitions over 
authenticity in two realms: the first one is the group’s adherence to the principles of the 
founding fathers of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism such as Abdallah Azzam, Osama b. Laden, 
Atyyatullah al-Libi, and Abu Musʿab al-Suri; and the second is the group’s commitment to 
following the literal understanding of the Quran and the Hadith especially in regard to matters 
that have political and strategic relevance. These competitions have taken the form of virtual 
debates, exchanges of tweets, and written commentaries among other mediums. Al-
mubahala, for instance,  was a doctrinal and strategic dialogue held over Skype in March 2014 
wherein Abdul Rahim Attoun, representing al-Nusra Front, debated Abu Muhammad al-
ʿAdnani, ISIS’ spokesman.106  
 
106 Abul Ghait, Muhammad. ISIS has lost al-Mubahala (in Arabic), The New Arab, 10 September 2016. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/3ARZfze  
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While unable to outweigh ISIS militarily, al-Nusra managed to win the support of numerous 
jihadist ideologues inside and outside Syria. The support of these ideologues helped al-Nusra 
immensely and preserved its popularity in the jihadist circles through validating its doctrine 
and endorsing its strategic approach at a critical time. Tariq Abdelhaleem was among the 
Salafi-Jihadist ideologues who took the side of al-Nusra and defended its religious doctrine 
and approach to politics. Observing the jihadist scene in Syria in 2014, Abdelhaleem sees that 
the political Islamic movement has become divided into three camps.107 The first camp is 
represented by al-Nusra Front which is committed to the widely known doctrine of al-Qaeda. 
He sees that this is the only group that deserves the support of Sunnis in Syria as it is capable 
of providing them with an independent state that is ruled by the sharia. The second camp 
includes the Islamic State group which has become so extremist that he considers it now 
“more dangerous than the al-Assad’s Nusayri regime”.108 Additionally, he believes that the IS 
group is deviant because it follows fatwas fabricated by ignorant jurists “who know only how 
to copy and paste”. The third camp includes those who aspire to find a middle way between 
“the infidel secular and democratic regimes and the jihadist movement”, Abdelhaleem states. 
He mentions the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of the third category and regards this 
group as immature because it does not realise that its “compromising approach” will lead to 
another democratic state in Syria supported by the West and ruled by man-made laws.109 
The period between 2013 and 2015 was marked by jihadist infighting in addition to rising 
dogmatism and intransigence on all jihadist fronts. During this period, the rise of ISIS as a 
powerful and extremely radical flank in Salafi-Jihadism seems to have propelled al-Nusra to 
gravitate towards ISIS’ end of the spectrum, only discursively though. As a result, al-Nusra’s 
marajiʿ began to focus on demonstrating their dogmatic adherence to Salafi-Jihadism and 
their rejection of pragmatism and the recurring and expansive employment of the concept of 
maslaha (public interest). Veteran jihadists known to be close to al-Qaeda, such as Radwan 
Nammous (aka Abu Firas al-Suri), surrounded al-Jolani and became the main representatives 
of al-Nusra at this stage. Additionally, calls for the establishment of Islamic emirates near the 
Turkish borders started to emerge. For instance, in a voice recording leaked in July 2014, al-
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Jolani told members of his group that ”the time has come … for us to establish an Islamic 
emirate in the Levant, to implement the limits and punishments of God Almighty, and his laws 
in every sense of the word, without compromise, complacency, equivocation, or 
circumvention.”110 
Later when al-Nusra decided to break ties with al-Qaeda and shift towards attempting to 
embed in the Syrian opposition, several of the group’s ideologues have been relegated to a 
less significant role. Most of them, including Tariq Abdelhaleem, have voluntarily distanced 
themselves from al-Nusra’s new policies. Others who were closer to the field were 
marginalised or forced to leave al-Nusra. Accusations of being ghulat (extremist) have 
become more heard. Accusations of being ISIS sympathisers were also used, as will be further 
elaborated in later sections.  
ISIS posed a serious international threat as well. ISIS’ brutality and ruthless executions of 
foreign journalists and aid workers in addition to its responsibility for numerous local and 
external terrorist attacks triggered an international military response that began its 
operations in September 2014. ISIS retreated and became weaker gradually under the Global 
Coalition’s continuous airstrikes and the ground offensives of the predominantly Kurdish 
“Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF). The weakening of ISIS eased its pressure on al-Nusra 
allowing the latter to concentrate on projecting its power over other militant Islamist groups 
and factions of the Free Syrian Army. As such, although itself was sporadically being targeted 
by Russian and American airstrikes, al-Nusra benefited indirectly from the international 
military campaign against ISIS and became ready to shift its strategy towards asserting its local 
character and de facto dominance in northwest Syria. The shift was accompanied by a 
finetuning of al-Nusra’s jihadist discourse which began to feature signs of willingness to deal 
pragmatically with a more visible Turkish influence in the north and readiness to adhere to 
localised and temporary ceasefire initiatives.  
Al-Nusra and IS: the rival brothers  
The relationships between al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and ISI had never been stable. Strategic 
and theological disputes between the two parties arose frequently since the time of Zarqawi. 
 
110 Joscelyn, Thomas. Leaked audio features Al Nusrah Front emir discussing creation of an Islamic emirate, 




ISI’s leaders criticised al-Qaeda’s pragmatism particularly with respect to its relationships with 
Iran, lenience with whom they call Rafidah (rejectionists)111, and abstention from 
excommunicating former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi and leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood for their acceptance of democracy (Choucair, 2014). From its early stages, it was 
clear that ISI is more inclined to assert its Sunni identity and engage in an open confrontation 
with Shiʿa and non-Muslims in the region. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, concentrated its 
propaganda messages and military efforts on fighting the USA and its regional allies. In 
addition, the Abbottabad Documents revealed that AQC was dissatisfied with extreme 
violence and anti-Shiʿism becoming defining features of its affiliates in Iraq.112 Thus, Al-
Qaeda’s central leadership expressed concerns regarding Zarqawi’s approach of brute force 
and spreading terror through frequently uploading videos of executions and beheadings onto 
the Internet (Baken & Mantzikos, 2015, p. 136). Another bone of contention revolves around 
ISI’s prioritisation of founding and governing a state with a full and immediate 
implementation of shariʿa. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, seemed to prefer unsettled warfare 
with its near and far enemies, and its approach to governance is more “incremental” while it 
remains committed to the goal of reinstating “the caliphate”.  
Despite their disagreements, al-Qaeda supported ISI and praised its activities in Iraq. This 
should be seen in the light of the fact that al-Qaeda was losing in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(Morgan, 2018). The successes and popularity of ISI served to revive al-Qaeda and remind 
people of its presence and far-reaching influence. ISI remained officially loyal to al-Qaeda until 
it expanded into Syria and clashed with al-Nusra Front. ISIS’s unanimous announcement of 
the Khilafah in mid-2014 and the momentous confrontation with al-Nusra and other factions 
in Syria marked a point of divergence within the world of Salafi-Jihadist activism and the 
beginning of a phase of jihadi hostilities, infightings and takfir (pronouncing others to be 
unbelievers).  
Significantly, IS’ expansion and hegemonic tendencies brought al-Nusra closer to al-Qaeda 
Central (AQC) and fostered the consolidation of two separate trends in global Jihadism. On 
 
111 Rafidah, or Rawafid, means “rejectionists” and is a derogatory term that is used by some Sunnis, 
particularly Salafis, to refer to the Shiʿa especially those living in Iran and Iraq to highlight their rejection of the 
legitimacy and authority of the first three Rashidun Caliphs Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman as successors of 
prophet Muhammad.  
112 Abu Rumman, Mohammed. Reading into the Zawahiri-Baghdadi Dispute (in Arabic), Aljazeera.net, 22 May 
2014. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Dvi42s  
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one hand, IS’ “achievements” made it more intransigent and committed to its excessively 
violent and authoritative approach. The group’s fast geographical expansion and ever-
growing popularity that overshadowed all other Jihadist organisations in 2013 and 2014 made 
IS confrontational and aggressive in its relationships with competing militant Islamist groups 
in the marketplace of jihadism. On the other hand, AQC and its affiliates chose to present 
themselves as more discursively “moderate” and practically “flexible” than their rival IS 
especially in terms of their relationships with other Islamist groups and schools of thought. 
On the ground, being under constant pressure from IS, al-Nusra became officially al-Qaeda 
affiliate in Syria in April 2013. Shortly after that, al-Nusra embarked on a strategy to dissociate 
itself from IS, promote its own version of jihadist activism, and reposition itself on the map of 
the conflict in Syria.  
Al-Nusra’s leading marjiʿ Attoun justified his group’s refusal of the authority of ISI by accusing 
the latter of neglecting the differences between the Iraqi and Syrian contexts.113 Attoun 
argues that the Iraqi jihad started in the aftermath of a foreign invasion while the Syrian jihad 
began after the outbreak of a popular uprising. He adds that the tribes in Iraq are much more 
powerful than their counterparts in Syria, and that the Muslim Brotherhood is considerably 
more influential in Iraq than in Syria. Attoun also justifies al-Nusra’s less aggressive sectarian 
rhetoric by stating that, unlike the Shia of Iraq, the Nusayris (Alawites) in Syria are an isolated 
minority that does not practice proselytization and therefore dealing with them must be 
different from ISI’s strategy against the Shia.114 Attoun highlights these differences to support 
al-Nusra’s independence from ISI and demonstrate his group’s understanding of the Syrian 
context. 
The year 2013 witnessed a war of statements between ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as calls for 
reconciliation. However, all attempts to bring the rival brothers together failed. In early 
January 2014, Jaysh al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Army), which is a military coalition that 
includes several militant Islamist groups in addition to factions from the FSA, launched swift 
attacks on various ISIS posts in northern and north-western Syria. Soon after that, al-Nusra 
Front joined Jaysh al-Mujahideen in attacking ISIS. By engaging in a serious military 
 




confrontation with ISIS, al-Nusra sought to achieve three things: firstly, to show commitment 
to its claims of religious authenticity, secondly, to look like a moderate faction facing an 
extremist one, and thirdly, to get closer to factions of the opposition that were already 
engaged in military conflicts with ISIS.  
The orchestrated military operation of Jaysh al-Mujahideen and al-Nusra Front managed to 
push ISIS away from Aleppo towards the eastern countryside of the city and resulted in the 
death of ISIS’s top commander and mastermind Sameer Abd Muhammad Khleifawi, known 
as Hajji Bakr. However, large numbers of al-Nusra’s local and foreign fighters, including 
powerful leaders such as Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (known as Abu Omar al-
Shishani),  joined  ISIS. Fearing more defections, especially from the ranks of al-Nusra’s foreign 
fighters, al-Jolani warned from “drifting into a jahili conflict between muhajireen (migrants) 
and ansar (local supporters)”, and stated that “there is an essential need for the presence of 
migrant elements in the field of jihad in order to demonstrate the unity of Islam in such an 
historic conflict”.115 Al-Jolani also directed members of al-Nusra, especially the Syrians, “to 
take upon themselves protecting those who resorted to them and defending them with blood 
and money for this is a religious duty …”.116 However, in the conflict between al-Nusra and 
ISIS, the latter seems to have managed to win the battle over foreign fighters which 
inadvertently fostered the “Syrianisation” of al-Nusra.  
ISIS accused al-Nusra of apostasy and in February 2014 began attacking the latter’s positions 
in Deir Ezzor and other parts in the east of Syria. By August 2014, ISIS defeated al-Nusra and 
other Islamist factions decisively in Deir Ezzor and captured the city of Raqqa which was later 
declared the capital of Khilafah. Meanwhile, entire units of al-Nusra pledged allegiance to ISIS 
and some al-Nusra leaders, such as Abu Malik al-Talli in al-Qalamoon, refused to fight ISIS 
revealing serious internal divisions within al-Nusra. Although Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, leader 
of al-Nusra in the eastern part of Syria, remained loyal to al-Jolani and decided to move with 
the remaining members of al-Nusra to the southern governorate of Daraa, he was soon 
replaced by a more hard-line jihadi, Jordanian Sami al-ʿUraydi. The growing influence of al-
ʿUraydi and his countrymen Iyad al-Tubasi (aka, Abu Julaybib), Bilal Khreisat (Abu Khadija), 
 
115 Voice message by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani entitled Allah Allah fi Sahat al-Sham (Fear Allah in the Avenue 
of Sham) (in Arabic), al-Manarah al-Bayda’, 7 January 2014.  
116 Ibid  
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Khalid al-Arouri (Abu al-Qassam), and Abu Anas al-Sahaba (aka, Abu Samir al-Urduni), all of 
whom are close to al-Zawahiri’s line of global jihad, reflected al-Nusra’s desire to assert its 
Salafi-Jihadist character and alignment with AQC in response to the ISIS grave threat.  
Claiming “religious authenticity” in the face of ISIS 
Mazhar al-Wais is among the top marajiʿ for al-Nusra Front since an early stage. He is a Syrian 
Salafi-Jihadist Sheikh and known to belong to al-Jolani’s small circle of trusted figures. He has 
criticised ISIS sharply and written books and commentaries trying to expose ISIS’ misconducts, 
invalidate its approach to religion, and defend the jihadist doctrine of al-Nusra Front and 
other al-Qaeda affiliates.  
As elaborated in the previous chapter, al-Suri’s remarks have influenced the jihadist doctrine 
of al-Nusra in Syria considerably. His influence is found in the writings of al-Wais who shares 
with al-Suri the notion that the interest of jihad justifies everything and must be the 
fundamental reason behind any strategic decision (Al-Wais, 2015). In this sense, the interest 
of the ummah is partly dependant on the continuation of jihad; and the very pursuit of jihad 
is understood to be both a religious principle and a strategic necessity. Following that, ISIS is 
accused of giving primacy to the interest of the group over any other religious or political 
considerations (Al-Wais, p. 189). Al-Wais considers ISIS’ fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) to be 
deformed because it is built around the absolute interest of the group and hence ISIS 
members allow themselves to do whatever they desire and deny their adversaries the right 
to do the exact same things  (Al-Wais, p. 189).  
Al-Wais states that it is a mistake to think that ISIS is intransigent. He argues that ISIS members 
are superficially firm and that they are strict only on matters pertaining to Muslims. For him, 
members of ISIS excommunicate entire Islamic formations and legal schools accusing them of 
ceasing the application of hudood, while they only apply the hudood that are useful to their 
propaganda. He criticises ISIS’ repeatedly used justifications that are often built on claims of 
capability, attaining benefits and preventing harms, and pursuing sharʿi politics (Al-Wais, p. 
190).  
Al-Wais highlights ISIS’ “disloyalty” to the legacy of the architects and marjiʿiyya of 
contemporary jihadism. He gives an example ISIS members’ disloyalty to the approach of 
Osama b. Laden (Al-Wais, p. 191). He states that ISIS’ marajiʿ rebuke al-Qaeda for its support 
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of the revolutions of Muslim peoples and keenness to mobilise a broad popular base. Al-Wais 
finds it strange that they claim to be followers of the doctrine of Sheikh Osama, even though 
everything they accuse al-Qaeda of doing today was approved by Bin Laden before his 
assassination. He believes that they have repeatedly discredited Bin Laden when they claimed 
to praise his name while in fact they just exploited it in their propaganda, when they 
discredited his companion Ayman al-Zawahiri who remained committed to the doctrine and 
message of Bin Laden, and especially when they caused a schism in the Jihadi current. He 
states that all these practices formed an introduction to putting an end to the jihadi project 
“for which the ummah has spent so much blood and sacrifices, serving by that the kuffar 
greatly, wittingly or unwittingly.” Considering that, he concludes that members of ISIS are:  
“truly the dogs of the people in Hell, because a dog serves its master, and they served the 
people of Hell by their ignorance and deviance, and through them the kuffar were able to 
achieve what they could not do for tens of years despite their media and military wars.” (Al-
Wais, p. 192) 
Moreover, he draws historical analogy comparing the doctrine of ISIS with that of the khawarij 
(Kharijites) and considers that what has allowed them to reappear is the increasing disunity 
and fragmentation among the people of Sunnah (Al-Wais, p. 200). He explains that “like their 
ancestors who had attractive slogans, IS group deceives the public by their discourse, whereas 
the truth is that their actions are far from sharia and they are pretentious, utilitarian, 
opportunistic, and people of pleasure and greed” (Al-Wais, p. 209). In addition to that, al-Wais 
highlights another commonality between ISIS and the Kharijites which is the adoption and 
application of the rule: “who does not excommunicate a kafir, or doubts that, is kafir” (Al-
Wais, p. 246). Al-Wais explains that such inauthentic traditional rules have been used by ISIS 
to excommunicate those who disagree with their doctrine or practices. Following the 
historical analogy with the Kharijites, al-Wais promotes al-Nusra Front on grounds that, by 
fighting ISIS and remaining loyal to the doctrine of al-Qaeda, it is worthy of support and praise. 
In his defence of al-Nusra’s fighting against ISIS, he states that the closest people to truth in 
the time of disunity are those who face the Kharijites therefore people must unite under their 
banner for only there “they will find the rescue ship for the people of Sham, and it is the 
beginning of a Sunni project that will return the glory of the ummah” (Al-Wais, p. 209). 
Importantly, al-Wais criticises ISIS’ notion of “interest killing” which refers to killing any 
person if that would benefit the group regardless of any religious or ethical considerations. 
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He adds that practising “interest killing” is another common feature with the Kharijites (Al-
Wais, p. 81).  
Analysing the discourse of al-Nusra reveals that “interest killing” exists in the group’s jihadist 
ideology. However, al-Nusra’s criticism of ISIS focuses on the latter’s over-employment of 
“interest killing” quantitively. For example, al-Nusra’ magazine Al Risalah conducted an 
interview with Hamza Australi, from Queensland, Australia, who fought in Afghanistan and 
later came to Syria in 2014 “to aid Jabhat al-Nusra and help the Muslims in Syria”. Defending 
al-Nusra’s approach, Hamza states the following117:  
“I truly believe that Al-Qaeda’s methodology is the right way, the way of mercy, the way of 
forgiveness, the way of da’wah, the way of strength…and strength is not just in killing. Of 
course we have enemies who are fighting us and they must be dealt with, but at the same 
time we are also merciful and just. Everything that we do in Al-Qaeda must be for the benefit 
of the Muslim Ummah. If the killing of the enemy of Allah is in the interest of the Ummah then 
so be it, at the same time if the help, support and guidance of members of the Muslim Ummah 
that have gone astray is in our best interest, then so be it. Of course it is pretty obvious that if 
we kill half of the Muslim Ummah as Baghdadi’s group attempts, then this is not in the best 
interest of the Muslim Ummah.”  
 
117 Al Risalah magazine, Issue2, October 2015, p.18 
Figure 13 Anti-ISIS propaganda message used in al-Nusra Front's affiliated publications. Source: Al Risalah magazine, 
issue 3, mid-2016. 
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The magazine also quotes the Salafi-jihadist sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who criticised 
ISIS’ members for “they painted the religion and the jihadi movement with red blood until all 
people began to think that Jihad only consists of slaughter and killing”.118  
Attoun mentions similar criticisms of ISIS regarding the unregulated application of the 
concept of “interest”. Besides, Attoun argues that ISIS leadership resorted to manipulating a 
set of traditional Islamic rules  (Attoun, p. 194). The first rule is called Fatwa al-zafar (winning 
fatwa) which was used by ISIS to justify considering all al-Nusra properties as spoils of war 
that are permissible for anyone to obtain by any means including aggression, looting, and 
stealing. The second rule is qatl al-maslaha (interest killing) which was justified by ISIS marjiʿ 
Abu Ali al-Anbari “without understanding the correct conditions for the application of this 
principle or comprehending what people of knowledge have said about that”; therefore, ISIS’s 
marajiʿ quoted the ulama who said: “he whose evil cannot be avoided without killing should 
be killed” and applied that to all those opposing ISIS, particularly al-Nusra Front  (Attoun, p. 
194). The third point revolves around the idea that ISIS has unleashed the ghulat (extremists) 
to achieve their temporary interests without consideration of the devastating long-term 
consequences of that. In this regard he states that: “The Devil has corrupted that group, so 
they became exceedingly extremist so they almost everyone else and justified killing them, 
causing immeasurable damage and immensely hindering jihad  (Attoun, p. 194). Attoun 
concludes that the greatest wrongdoing ISIS members have committed was the declaration 
of a “fake caliphate” which is “among the biggest delusions that Satan imparted on them” 
(Attoun, p. 194). 
ISIS’ Caliphate proclamation represented a major point of disagreement in the Salafi-Jihadist 
camp. Numerous Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ around the world invalidated the legitimacy of the 
newly announced caliphate which was used by al-Nusra in its counterpropaganda campaigns. 
As an example, sizeable sections in al-Nusra-affiliated magazine “Al Risalah” are dedicated for 
renouncing the newly announced Khilafah and highlighting the ulama’s statements and 
opinions that disprove the religious legitimacy of ISIS’ solitary move. The jihadist magazine 
states that despite the ulama’s clear disproval of ISIS’ behaviours, ISIS continued rejecting and 
slandering the respected ulama labelling them as “old, senile men” who were “imprisoned”, 
 
118 Al Risalah magazine, Issue2, October 2015, p.24 
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“oppressed by the tawaghit” and “had no evidence for their claims” against ISIS’ caliphate.119 
Al Risalah mentions that some ISIS figures went as far as saying “we don’t need scholars, we 
have Qur’an and Sunnah” which the magazine describes as “ill-advised statement” given that 
the Quran tells Muslims: “So ask people who know the Scripture, if you do not know” [21:7], 
and that the Prophet said: “The scholars are the heirs of the Prophets”(Abu Dawud, 3641). 
The magazine criticises ISIS’ stance from the ulama and their disapproval of the self-
proclaimed caliph and his hastily declared caliphate.120 The magazine’s main criticism is on 
how ISIS considers the ulama as “just common men who are prone to make mistakes”; a 
criticism that reflects the turn towards re-establishing the authority of a class of epistemic 
leaders in al-Qaeda’s version of Salafi-Jihadism.121  
  
 





Fatwa against IS group 
“As a response to the request of a number of Mujahideen in the Levant from the scholars to 
issue a Fatwa (Islamic verdict) regarding the advancing of the Baghdadists (IS group) against 
the Mujahideen in Sawran and surrounding areas [and to] respond to the verse in which Allah 
mentions “And when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the scriptures [saying]; 
You must make it clear to the people and not conceal it” (Aal Imraan 187) 
 
We-those that have signed-issue the following Fatwa: 
Praise is to Allah and Salutations be upon the Prophet, his family and all his companions. 
Thereafter… It is not hidden from anyone with some understanding that the field of Sham 
has experienced its greatest victories and conquests in recent times which made clear signs 
of panic on the tyrant Bashar and his allies. The Islamic Nation waited for further victories 
when suddenly the Baghdadists stabbed the Mujahideen in their backs in Sawran to stop 
the advancements made against the Regime and to lengthen the lifespan of this tyrant. 
Based upon this we issue the verdict that it is compulsory (waajib) to repel their aggression 
and defend the lands of the Muslims and it is impermissible to hand over the land of Shaam 
to them for it has become clear the corrupted beliefs they hold. Their aggression, 
oppression and aggressiveness has become clear to whoever has some insight. 
Allah says “And whoever avenges himself after having been wronged – those have not upon 
them any cause [to blame]. The cause is only against the ones who wrong the people and 
tyrannize upon the earth without right. Those will have a painful punishment.” (41-42 Ash 
Shura) 
And from what has been reported from our scholars (May Allah have mercy upon them) 
regarding the necessity of repelling the attacking aggressor is the statement of Ibn 
Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him): “It is known that a person when he is attacked, 
it is permissible to defend according to the Sunnah (way of the Prophet) and Ijmaa 
(consensus of the scholars)” [Fatawa al Kubra]. Many other scholars also ruled on the 
necessity of defending one’s self & others against an attacker. No differentiation was made 
between whether the attacker is a disbeliever or a Muslim, whether the attacker is sane 
minded or insane, mature or immature, a person who’s blood is innocent or guilty or 
whether the attacker is a human or not. 
The situation is no different in this case (the case of the IS attack). If the base of a Mujahid 
is out of danger or in a village far away (from the IS attack) then as long as those close by 
are not sufficient to repel their attack then it is compulsory for everyone in the land of 
Shaam to repel this aggression. 
We ask Allah (swt) to cause their plots to return against them and to assist the Mujahideen 
in Allah’s cause and keep their feet firm. 
 
Signatories of this verdict: 
Sheikh Abu Qatada al Filistini Sheikh Abu Sulayman al Ustrali 
Sheikh Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi  Sheikh Abu Azzam al Jazrawi 
Sheikh Dr Sami al Uraydi  Sheikh Al Mu’tasim Billah al Madani 
Sheikh Sadiq al Hashimi  Sheikh Dr Abdullah al Muhaysini.” 
Sheikh Muslih al Alyani 
Table 10 Fatwa against IS group. Source: Al Risalah magazine, Issue 1, July 2015. 
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It is noteworthy that al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation draws on the experiences of other 
Islamist groups, militant and non-militant. Al-Nusra presented its adaptations and changing 
discourse and behaviour as a corrective movement within militant Islamism. It tried to 
maintain a Salafi-Jihadist discourse in tandem with its attempts to become more localised and 
closer to factions of the opposition. In this regard, Abdallah b. Muhammad refers to that the 
problem with earlier jihadist attempts was not their lack of bravery or religious commitment 
but their misreading of the political and geostrategic situations around them therefore they 
made wrong decisions and were particularly “naïve” when they ignored the danger of secular 
elites.122 
Attoun states that numerous Islamist groups appeared during the last century driven by a 
shared desire to return the rule of Islam but employed different methods. He considers that 
one of the most significant experiences was that of the Muslim Brotherhood who view that 
participating in parliamentary life is a way to achieve the Islamic rule considering that Muslims 
are majority in the region and will choose the rule of Islam in the ballots if they had the chance 
(Attoun, p. 169). Attoun argues that “regardless of the fallacies in this heretical method (the 
parliament), the Muslim Brothers never applied Islamic rules in any of their government 
experiences”. He mentions the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an example of the Brotherhood’s political behaviour. 
He criticises the AKP “even though it has developed the Turkish economy and public services” 
because “it has not ruled by Islam” (Attoun, p. 169). Attoun adds that the AKP abides by the 
rules of the International community, its army is still part of the NATO, and is relentlessly 
trying to enter the European Union (Attoun, p. 169). For him, like other experiences of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan’s AKP is focusing too much on politics and ignoring jihad and 
da’wa activities. 
On the other hand, Attoun adds that there are also the “people of extremism who follow the 
doctrine of Kharijites and wage jihad against the ummah instead of fighting tyrants” (Attoun, 
p. 172). For him, this extremist school encompasses the Takfir and Hijrah group, the GIA in 
Algeria, and the Islamic State group, and, wittingly or unwittingly, these groups “serve the 
 
122 Bin Muhammad, Abdallah. Al-Muthakkirah al-Istratijiyah (Strategic Memorandum). 
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interest of the enemies of God since they distract the mujahideen and prevent them from 
achieving their goals”, Attoun contends (Attoun, p. 172). 
Attoun considers that neither “lenience and democracy” nor “extremism and backstabbing 
the mujahideen” will eliminate the currently prevalent state of jahiliyya. Therefore, he praises 
the activism of Salafi-Jihadists describing them as the most committed and the closest to the 
essence of Islam and placing then between the compromising Brotherhood and the extremist 
Kharijites (IS group). However, he holds that Salafi-Jihadists also have their own problems as 
well. He explains that most jihadist factions have been preoccupied with performing jihad but 
developed very little knowledge of political reasoning and paid little attention to daʿwa and 
Islamic jurisprudence (Attoun, p. 171). For him, the mujahideen in Syria, represented by al-
Nusra Front, stand out among the mujahideen because they reflect on the experiences of 
other Islamist groups and are aware of the need to formulate a comprehensive and balanced 
strategy that includes jihadist activities, sophisticated political reasoning, and commitment to 
the core tenets of Islam.  
Portraying al-Nusra as a committed Salafi-jihadist organisation with a mature understanding 
of the socio-political situation in the Middle East is a cornerstone of the group’s propaganda. 
Such claims have been used to persuade bystanders to participate and to attract members 




Al-Nusra’s calculated moderation and conditional cooperation 
Al-Nusra remained AQC’s official branch until July 2016 when it started operating as an 
independent militant group by the name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). The phase of JFS 
represents a purposeful strategic turn marked by what I call “calculated moderation”, that is 
the carefully managed transition from global Jihadism to local activism, and “conditional 
cooperation” in reference to al-Nusra’s attempts to embed in the Syrian opposition but on its 
own terms.  
Breaking ties with al-Qaeda  
Al-Nusra’s decision to disband from al-Qaeda and rebrand itself in mid-2016 followed 
mounting local and international pressures to change its discourse and behaviour and rid itself 
of any extremist influences.  
Locally, there had been important developments that drove al-Nusra to make behavioural 
changes. Firstly, al-Nusra’s relationships with locals in opposition-held areas had deteriorated 
in consequence to al-Nusra’s recurrent attempts to purge small factions of the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) and harass and detain tens of civil society activists123. From late 2014 onwards, al-
Nusra started attacking externally backed factions justifying its action using religious terms. 
For example, the marajiʿ of al-Nusra accused several FSA factions of receiving money and 
weaponry from the United States and Britain and thus breaching the Islamic principle of 
“loyalty and disavowal”. In this regard, Attoun stated that “some leaders were compromised 
and began to alter their agendas and transform into extensions of the American project” 
(Attoun, 2016, p. 195). He said that following al-Nusra’s attacks on Haqq al-Muqatilah Front, 
Hazm Movement, and Division-13. Attoun added: “nevertheless the mujahideen were able to 
uproot them and partly defeated America with the help of God, there are similar projects in 
the south, and others in the east and north” (Attoun, p. 195). In this way, al-Nusra appeared 
ready to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global Jihadism and focus on arrogating to itself the 
role of a mover and shaker within the militant opposition in Syria.  
Secondly, the Russian military intervention in September 2015 tipped the balance of power 
in favour of the regime and put an end to months full of strategic territorial advances made 
 




by the rebels124 in the countryside of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, and Daraa. Backed by Russian air 
operations and numerous Shiʿa militias on the ground, including Lebanese Hezbollah, the 
regime regained territories swiftly.  
Besides, the increasing power and influence of al-Nusra were putting regional and 
international supporters of the Syrian opposition in a difficult and embarrassing position. 
Therefore, calls on the Syrian opposition to isolate al-Nusra were on the rise. In this regard, 
in December 2015 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254 initiating 
talks between the regime and opposition members and calling upon all parties to combat 
terrorism and repudiate extremists125. Militarily, the strategy of the US-led international 
coalition to defeat ISIS, that was formed in September 2014126, involved stemming the flow 
of all foreign fighters into and out of Syria including those who are fighting with al-Qaeda’s 
main affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra Front. As a result, al-Nusra suffered heavy losses as the Russian 
and American airstrikes continued to target its top-ranking fighters in addition to senior 
members of its allied groups127.  
These factors deprived al-Nusra of two sources of power and influence. On one hand, rising 
hostilities with factions of the opposition and local people weakened al-Nusra’s claim of being 
accepted and supported in the areas that had been captured from the Syrian regime. On the 
other hand, the Russian intervention and the increasing local ceasefires reduced the military 
effectiveness of al-Nusra considerably. Under these circumstances, al-Nusra’s leadership took 
a decision to cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016 and turn towards solidifying its position in the 
armed opposition against the Syrian regime. 
 
124 A multitude of rebel forces cooperated under the umbrella of Jaysh al-Fatah. Al-Nusra Front participated in 
Jaysh al-Fatah, and although its members were not a majority, it played a leading role in the military alliance 
and eventually benefitted most from its victories. For more on Jaysh al-Fatah see: Ghanem, Mohammed Alaa. 
Syria: An Opportunity in Idlib, Atlantic Council, 3 April 2015. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gqaTr1; and, Hubbard, 
Ben. A Look at the Army of Conquest, a Prominent Rebel Alliance in Syria, The New York Times, 1 October 
2015. Available at: https://nyti.ms/2Xn2tco  
125 Resolution 2254 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7588th meeting, on 18 December 2015. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3goevKb  
126 Cohen, Tom. Obama Outlines ISIS Strategy: Airstrikes in Syria, More U.S. Forces, CNN, 11 September 2014. 
Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/isis-obama-speech/index.html  
127 DeYoung, Karen; Sly, Liz; Ryan, Missy. U.S. Airstrikes Target al-Qaeda Faction in Syria, The Washington Post, 
6 November 2014. Available at: https://wapo.st/39YR9Is. For more information on the US targeting of al-Nusra 
see, for example: US Targeted 'Legacy' al Qaeda Leader Abu Firas al-Suri in Syria Airstrike, DW, 4 April 2016. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2EKnozx; and: Entous, Adam. Obama Directs Pentagon to Target al-Qaeda Affiliate 
in Syria, One of the Most Formidable Forces Fighting Assad, The Washington Post, 10 November 2016. 
Available at: https://wapo.st/2EQNAIR 
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Blending into the Syrian opposition  
A few months after disbanding from the al-Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift its strategy 
towards attempting to secure local acceptance and regional and international recognition of 
its de facto role in its areas of control, most of which are in the Idlib province. It appears that 
al-Nusra built its new strategy on claims of being 1) able to contain other factions, 2) capable 
of establishing governing bodies that provide services and mobilise people128, 3) willing to 
acquiesce in more visible diplomatic and military roles by regional powers such as Turkey, and 
4) disinterested in launching international attacks.  
Aiming to blend into the Syrian context, JFS, formerly al-Nusra Front, pursued a strategy of 
“calculated moderation” which was translated practically through undertaking several steps. 
Firstly, JFS started to pay more attention to local politics and show a willingness to take part 
in coalitions and coordinate with other factions, on its own terms, however. JFS’ discourse at 
this stage indicates that al-Jolani’s leadership was preoccupied with trying to form a broad 
coalition or merger aiming to justify its strategic turn away from al-Qaeda and global Jihadism. 
Secondly, JFS began to assert its local presence and dominance over all aspects of governance 
in Idlib. This included launching propaganda campaigns that focus on showing the group’s 
new outlook that revolves around cooperating with other factions to ensure accountability, 
fighting corruption, and providing public services. In this regard, Heller (2016) rightly notes 
that in opposition-held areas “gaps and failures in service provision have been an opening for 
armed groups to meet civilian needs and earn popular support”, and JFS was no exception to 
this rule.129  
Thirdly, JFS embarked on a process of rearranging its internal power distribution which began 
with arresting or expelling leaders who were known to be loyal to AQC and those who 
opposed or expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of disbanding from al-Qaeda. JFS also 
launched attacks against groups that were suspected of being sympathetic to or affiliated 
with IS. In addition to that, JFS became clearly interested in asserting its “Syrianness” and 
embeddedness in the local context and social fabric. Previously, non-Syrians formed a 
 
128 Abbas, Yasir. How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria, War on the Rocks, 10 May 2016. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/31gEIUD  
129 For more about al-Nusra’s, and later JFS’, approach to administration and service provision refer to: Heller, 




majority in al-Nusra’s top-tier leadership (see Table 10). However, after the transition to JFS 
in mid-2016 and the subsequent formation of HTS at the beginning of 2017, Syrians began to 
assume the most significant positions while many non-Syrian leaders and foreign fighters 
defected and joined other groups, especially the hard-line jihadist group Hurras al-Din.   
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Table 11 Syrians and non-Syrians in al-Nusra’s top-tier leadership and ideological marjiʿiyya 
  Abd al-Muhsin al-Sharrakh  
  Abdullah al-Muhaisini 
  Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir 
  Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (Abo al-Afghan al-Masri) 
  Abu Ahmad Akhlaq 
  Yehya b. Tahir (Abu al-Fateh al-Farghali) 
  Abu al-Harith al-Masri 
  Abu al-Khayr al-Masri  
  Abu Anas al-Sahaba (Abu Samir al-Urduni) 
  Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani 
  Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi (al-Hijazi) 
  Abu Musab al-Filistini 
  Abu Salman al-Maghribi 
  Abu Shuʿaib al-Masri 
  Abu Talha al-Urduni 
  Abu Yehya al-Tunisi 
  Abul Qassam al-Urduni 
  Ahmad Salama Mabrouk (Abu al-Faraj al-Masri) 
  Ali al-ʿArjani (Abu Hasan al-Kuwaiti) 
  Bilal Khreisat (Abu Khadija al-Urduni) 
  Dheeb Hdeijan al-Utaibi (Abu Ammar al-Jazrawi) 
  Eyad al-Toubasi (Abu Julaybib al-Urduni) 
  Fawzan al-Harbi (Abu Anas al-Jazrawi) 
  Hani Haykal (Abu Hani al-Masri) 
Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi  Ibrahim Salih al-Banna (Abu Ayman al-Masri) 
Abdul Rahim Attoun (Abu Abdullah al-Shami)  Muhammad Naji (Abu al-Yaqzan al-Masri) 
Abul Bara' al-Ansari  Muhammad Yousef Osman al-Asamneh  
Abu Omar al-Kurdi  Muslih al-Alyani 
Abu Saleh Tahhan  Nawaf al-Mutayri (Abu al-Walid al-Kuwaiti) 
Abu Yousef al-Hamwi (Abu Yousef Hilfaya)  Refa'i Ahmed Taha (Abu Yasir al-Masri) 
Ahmad Husein al-Sharʿ (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani)  Sami al-ʿUraydi 
Hasan Bakkour (Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Hamwi)  Sharif Muhammad Fouad Hazza'  
Jamal Hussein Zainiyyeh (Abu Malik al-Talli)  Suraqa al-Makki 
Mazhar al-Wais (Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Shami)  Eyad al-Qunaibi 
Mustafa Zuhri  Tariq Abdelhaleem 
Radwan Mahmoud Nammous (Abu Firas al-Suri)  Hani al-Siba'i 
Saleh Hama (Uss al-Siraʿ)  Abdullah b. Muhammad 
Samir Hijazi (Abu Humam al-Shami)  Essam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (al-Maqdisi) 
Yaqoub al-Omar  Omar Mahmoud Othman (Abu Qatadah) 
   
Syrians in al-Nusra’s 
top-tier leadership and 
ideological marjiʿiyya 
  
Non-Syrians in al-Nusra’s 






The discourse of al-Nusra has noticeably changed reflecting the group’s new strategic 
repositioning. At this stage, al-Nusra’s discourse signalled a departure from al-Qaeda’s old 
strategy of fighting the “far enemy”. This is the case in the writings of al-Nusra’s marjiʿ Attoun 
who reminded members of al-Nusra that the strategy of targeting the West is not eternal or 
untouchable; rather it was adopted in response to specific circumstances (Attoun, 2016, p. 
177). Thus, he adds that if that reality has changed then the strategy must change accordingly. 
Attoun argues that the Arab Spring, especially after the Syrian revolution, and “the military 
retreat of the United States in consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq”, created a 
new situation that requires a different response from the mujahideen (Attoun, p. 177). 
Defending al-Nusra’s turn towards focusing on the context in Syria and blending into the 
opposition, Attoun says: “Another September [attack] is not possible given the extraordinary 
security measures put in place currently and the fact that the raid of September 2001 has 
achieved its goals anyways” (Attoun, p. 178). Following that, Attoun states that al-Nusra has 
not changed its stance from the United States as an enemy but “the most useful way to fight 
the USA today is through thwarting its plans by cutting its hands ... because America uses 
proxies such as the PKK and Peshmerga”  (Attoun, p. 178). This reasoning was used to justify 
al-Nusra’s military campaigns against several factions of the FSA who were in control of parts 
of the Idlib and Aleppo provinces and were challenging al-Nusra’s military and administrative 
dominance in the northwest.  
From Jabhat Fateh al-Sham to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham  
Towards the end of 2016, al-Nusra worked on reaching a merger of all rebel groups under its 
umbrella, calling its attempt a “uniting of the ranks”.130 Al-Nusra’s efforts resulted in the 
formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organisation for the Liberation of al-Sham) (HTS) in 
January 2017. However, in the way towards forming HTS, JFS sought to become the sole 
powerbroker in the armed opposition. Therefore, it used its military capabilities and exerted 
tremendous pressures on all the factions present in the northwest. In the few weeks prior to 
the formation of HTS, JFS eliminated several armed groups including Jaysh al-Mujahideen in 
spite of the objections expressed by Ahrar al-Sham and Falylaq al-Sham.131  
 
130 Lister, Charles. Al Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition, Foreign Policy, 15 March 2017. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3gr3ZSo  
131 “Fatah al-Sham” Eliminates Jaysh al-Mujahideen and Takes Over Arms Depots (in Arabic), Sham Network, 25 
January 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/2TNgA8G  
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Threatened by JFS, other groups decided to come together and form smaller coalitions to 
survive which eventually resulted in the creation of two militant Islamist camps, the JFS-led 
HTS on one side and the powerful Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham and its allies on the other side.132 
It is worth noting that although Ahrar al-Sham was angered by JFS’ escalating aggression it 
did not intervene militarily to protect the groups under attack which was enough to pave the 
way for the newly formed HTS to attain and maintain dominance over most of the “liberated” 
areas and eventually drive other rebel groups, including Ahrar al-Sham itself133, out of their 
strongholds in the Idlib province.  
Initially, HTS included powerful Islamist groups such as al-Zinki Movement and Ansar al-Din 
Front, received the support of influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi, 
Abdullah al-Muhaysini, and Muslih al-Alyani, and attracted military commanders such as 
Hashim al-Sheikh (Abu Jabir) who left Ahrar al-Sham and was appointed the general 
commander of HTS.134 Later, however, several groups defected from HTS including al-Zinki 
Movement135 and Ansar al-Din both of which soon realised the fact that HTS is managed and 
led by al-Jolani and the rest of the leadership of JFS, formerly al-Nusra Front. Additionally, al-
Muhaysini, al-Alyani, and other Islamic scholars left HTS at the beginning of September 2017 
in consequence of leaked recordings containing conversations between military commanders 
close to al-Jolani wherein they harshly criticise the mashayekh (religious figures) in HTS and 
disparage them as being “mere justifiers”.136 In a sense, it soon became clear that HTC was 
another attempt to modify and rebrand al-Nusra Front and strengthen al-Jolani’s control, 
after the short-lived experiment of JFS. 
 
132 For more details about the circumstances surrounding the formation of HTS refer to: Al-Tamimi, Aymenn 
Jawad. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, Policy Notes 75, February 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/35WwP93  
133 Al-Khatib, Khalid. The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over. Will Ahrar al-Sham Disintegrate? (in Arabic), 
al-Modon Online, 27 July 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/2K5rpBv 
134 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: Its Formation, Leadership, and Joining Factions (in Arabic), Sham Network, 28 
January 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/38GPFEn  
135 “Al-Zinki” Announces Its Disbanding from “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, 20 July 2017. 
Available at: https://enabbaladi.net/archives/162465  




The JFS-led merger was as a strategic move aimed at countering intensified international 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict and reach a political settlement in Syria. Such 
initiatives were mainly organised by Russia after it provided vital assistance to the Syrian 
regime enabling the latter to decisively defeat the armed opposition in Aleppo and regain 
most parts of the strategic city in December 2016.137 Specifically, as Russia, Iran, and Turkey 
arranged and oversaw indirect talks between representatives of the Syrian government and 
representatives from several armed opposition factions in January 2017 in Astana, the capital 
of Kazakhstan, JFS lobbied factions that oppose negotiating with the regime and count on 
 
137 Landay, Jonathan; Mohammed, Arshad. Aleppo's Fall Would Be Win for Russia, Defeat for U.S. in Mideast, 
Reuters, 5 December 2016. Available at: https://reut.rs/2XCXMLv  
Figure 14 A translation of the announcement of the establishment of Hay'at 
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 
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winning militarily. On the ground, soon after its formation, the JFS-led HTS launched a broad 
attack against factions that agreed to attend the peace talks in Astana.  
 
Figure 15 Militant Islamist groups that merged in January 2017 to form HTS 
 
Through that, JFS wanted to prove to regional and international players that opposition 
parties and armed factions that agreed to engage in political negotiations with the 
government do not represent the will of the people living in “liberated” areas and that they 
do not have influence in the field. Discursively, JFS dedicated much of its propaganda at this 
stage to challenge the legitimacy and utility of the ongoing negotiations. Attoun, for example, 
rejected the active diplomatic efforts questioning their underlying objectives. He states:  
“The West cannot engage in a direct fight against the people of jihad who defend the people 
of Sham and adopt their revolution because it will drive more Muslims to support the 
mujahideen leading to the spread of the doctrine of jihad. Therefore, [the West] resorts to a 
cunning method that is to employ a sympathetic discourse … while it actually kidnaps the 
















West’s objective is to isolate the mujahideen from their people so it can easily fight and defeat 
them without provoking Muslims.” P.196 
In May 2017, Astana peace talks reached a plan to implement four "de-escalation zones" in 
Eastern Ghouta, Daraa, Homs, and Idlib; with each zone being surrounded with monitoring 
posts jointly staffed by soldiers from the guarantors: Russia, Turkey, and Iran138. The plan did 
not prevent the Syrian regime from escalating its military offensives in the months that 
followed. Consequently, the regime retook control of all de-escalation zones, apart from the 
north-western province of Idlib, making it the last stronghold of the opposition with a very 
high demographic density after it became the destination for several mass internal 
displacements and evacuations following the regime’s sieges and vicious military campaigns 
especially around Damascus and Homs139. Although Idlib hosts numerous militant opposition 
groups, HTS gradually consolidated its control over the area by eliminating or integrating 
other groups (Balanche, 2018) and through expanding the work and authorities of its newly 
founded “modernised” administrative bodies. Significantly, in November 2017 HTS 
established a civilian-led government called “Salvation Government” to replace al-Nusra’s 




138 Syria: The Astana Peace Process, France 24, 5 September 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/33Cydhu  
139 Rollins, Tom. Syrian evacuations break the will to resist, The New Humanitarian, 20 September 2016. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2C5UpVW  




Competing flanks inside al-Nusra 
As discussed above, acting as the official branch of al-Qaeda in Syria started to impede al-
Nusra’s attempts to blend into the Syrian opposition and engender local popular support. The 
bad reputation of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation made international and regional 
backers of the opposition reluctant to increase their financial and military support. Moreover, 
influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi issued fatwas against joining al-Nusra 
Front because the presence of al-Qaeda began to tarnish the reputation of the rebels and 
delay their victory.141 Under these pressures, al-Jolani’s leadership decided to cut ties with al-
Qaeda in July 2016; a decision that has proven to be a bone of contention between different 
currents within al-Nusra.  
Fearing internal divisions, leaders of al-Nusra presented their decision to lay members as a 
step coordinated with AQC and accepted by influential jihadi figures around the world.142 In 
reality, al-Nusra’s leadership made that decision without getting AQC’s approval. 
Consequently, serious internal divisions became apparent especially when the leadership of 
al-Qaeda Central, represented by its general leader al-Zawahiri, publicly censured al-Nusra’s 
decision to break from al-Qaeda and change its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.143 Al-Zawahiri 
issued several letters wherein he seemed furious with the leadership of al-Nusra accusing the 
latter of acting autonomously and breaking its oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda.  
Al-Nusra’s leadership responded to al-Zawahiri’s reprehension by justifying its decisions 
based on considerations of maslaha and public good and blaming AQC for its slow and 
unresponsive bureaucracy and lack of knowledge of the context in Syria. Regarding maslaha, 
al-Nusra framed the project of HTS as the crystallization of a common idea developed and 
endorsed by most of the factions in Jaysh al-Fatah. In this regard, Attoun replied to the AQC’s 
criticisms by saying that al-Nusra Front understood from al-Zawahiri’s earlier statements that 
if the decision of disbanding will lead to a broad merger in al-Sham he would not object to 
that. Al-Zawahiri did not deny that but replied by saying that al-Jolani’s decisions have led to 
 
141 Attoun, Abdul Rahim. A Dialogue with Shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi, October 2015. Retrieved from: 
www.Justpaste.it   
142 Abazid, Ahmed. Jolani’s Final Plan: War in Search of Politics (in Arabic), Ala Basirah, 9 February 2017. 
Available at: https://alabasirah.com/node/523  
143 Al-Zawahiri Attacks al-Jolani: We Have not Approved the Breaking of Ties (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, 29 
November 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/354MaVU  
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further fragmentations and chaos. Besides, in its defence of breaking all external ties, al-
Nusra’s marajiʿ blamed al-Qaeda and its “old-fashioned” ways of handling serious matters 
such as the jihad in Syria. In this respect, Attoun states the following:  
We have not broken any oath or promise. We remained committed religiously and 
organisationally and what happened was a result of bureaucratic deficiencies in al-Qaeda, 
miscommunications and delayed responses, and the presence of a group of disruptors who 
intentionally misread our decisions. These individuals used disbanding from al-Qaeda as a 
pretext to accuse al-Nusra’s leadership of serving the infidels. Besides, the delayed delivery of 
messages causes serious damage in a constantly changing situation such as in al-Sham. This 
forced the local leaders and commanders to act and make decisions on their own.144  
Al-Jolani’s leadership directed much of its criticism to a group of leaders within al-Nusra who 
have direct links with the leadership of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the al-
Qaeda-affiliated jihadists inside al-Nusra belonged to a Jordanian current that included Iyad 
al-Tubasi (aka Abu Julaybib) who was a top military commander in HTS, Sami al-ʿUraydi who 
was the chief of religious affairs in al-Nusra Front, and Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni, among 
others. As an example, Attoun complained that in al-Nusra’s correspondences with AQC 
messengers were opening the letters and keeping copies and that the first letter from al-
Zawahiri to al-Jolani was delivered to Abu Julaybib days before it reached al-Jolani.145  
Attoun raises another point and blames AQC for turning its back on the newly formed HTS   
“even though it is the only remaining jihadi faction that is committed to performing jihad in 
al-Sham”.146 For Attoun, the mujahideen should have a vested interest in preserving and 
supporting HTS instead of getting fixated on its organisational affiliation, or lack thereof. It is 
apparent that, at this stage, al-Nusra’s propaganda focused on showing the need to prioritise 
uniting the ranks of the Islamists in Syria over any other doctrinal or organisational 
considerations which signifies incorporating pragmatism into the group’s official discourse. 
As such, the transition to HTS came to mark a complete departure from al-Qaeda and its line 
of global jihad. At the same time, the HTS merger marked a turn towards more politics and 
less ideology, discursively and practically. From 2017 onwards, al-Jolani and his affiliated 
cadre have demonstrated willingness to accept the presence of Turkish troops near their 
 
144 Attoun, Abdul Rahim. Testimony on the Breaking of Ties of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, Telegram,13 
October 2017. Retrieved from: www.Jihadology.net  




areas of influence and even cooperated with Turkey through the diplomatic activities of their 
affiliated civilian-led Salvation Government.147 Considering that the marajiʿ of al-Nusra have 
adopted different stances from Erdogan’s government and its policies and interventions in 
north Syria, HTS’ gradual rapprochement with Turkey did not pass without triggering a wave 
of decamping in 2017. 
Dissatisfied with the localisation of its jihadist activism and the decision to disengage from al-
Qaeda, numerous jihadists distanced themselves from HTS and founded or joined other 
jihadist groups. Significantly, a group of jihadists deserted HTS and in the second half of 2017 
established a new al-Qaeda-affiliated group that was officially declared in early 2018 by the 
name Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) (HaD) and led by Abu Humam al-Shami148. HaD, 
which encompasses a sizeable number of foreign fighters and attracted most of those who 
defected from al-Nusra after it left al-Qaeda, has soon become a strong military actor, but not 
strong enough to threaten the dominance of HTS in the northwest. Other jihadists joined 
already established groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Tawhid. However, these 
seemingly competing jihadist actors have in fact served HTS’ strategies by sustaining its claims 
of being moderate and centrist, especially with the declining influence and presence of ISIS 
as the most hard-line jihadist organisation.  
When its dispute with AQC went public and with the solidification of its control over most of 
the Idlib province including a monopoly over the strategic border crossing of Bab al-Hawa 
with Turkey149, HTS turned to reorganise its internal leadership structure using its pretence of 
moderation to rid itself of any disobedient or dissenting figures. On one hand, HTS launched 
offensives against groups that it accused of being ghulat (extremists) or affiliates of IS. For 
instance, in February 2017 the newly formed HTS launched a military operation in southern 
Idlib to uproot its previously close ally Liwa’ al-Aqsa (formerly Jund al-Aqsa) justifying the 
 
147 Alami, Mona. HTS Continues to Evolve, Atlantic Council, 1 December 2017. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3fOtxHR 
148 His name is Samir Hijazi, sometimes called Farouq al-Shami. He is a Syrian jihadist fought in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and is believed to have been close to Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musʿab al-Suri. He was al-Nusra's 
general military commander before the transition to JFS, and strongly opposed disbanding from al-Qaeda. In 
August 2016, a letter signed by Abu Humam al-Shami appeared whereby he resigns from al-Nusra. Later, Hijazi 
joined Sami al-ʿUraydi, Abu al-Qassam, and Abu Julaybib (all of whom are veteran Jordanian jihadists who have 
ideological and organisational ties with AQ) and founded a hard-line jihadist organisation called Hurras al-Din 
(HaD).  
149 Al-Khatib, Khalid. The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over. Will Ahrar al-Sham Disintegrate? (in Arabic), 
al-Modon Online, 27 July 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/2K5rpBv  
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move as a war on extremism and takfir.150 On the other hand, in conformity with its new 
strategy of asserting its “Syrianness”, HTC led frequent campaigns to rid itself of numerous 
non-Syrian figures (muhajiroun). For example, in November 2017 HTS arrested leading figures 
of the Jordanian jihadist current that was in favour of remaining officially affiliated with al-
Qaeda Central and its transnational jihadism. As such, HTS arrested Abu Julaybib, Sami al-
ʿUraydi, Abu Khadijah, and Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni, all of whom were accused of “working 
against HTS’ plan to establish a Sunni entity”.151 In effect, the absence of these figures meant 
that al-Jolani has gained more power, maintained his control of HTS, and become freer to 
implement his own visions supported by a small group of loyal marajiʿ and strategists.  
 
In his pursuit of international recognition, al-Jolani is instrumentalising the issues of 
refugees flooding into Europe through Turkey, people’s need for humanitarian aid, and 
fighting extremism and global jihadism. Certainly, in recent interviews Jolani has adopted a 
populist tone, and he has appeared in PR films walking casually through the streets of the city 
of Idlib and visiting local shops and businesses, as though he were an elected politician.152 
That cannot efface the fact that he is the leader of a jihadist militia that owes its stature mainly 
to victories on the battlefield. If HTS is no longer slaughtering quite so many local civilians, it 
does not mean that its power in Syria has become an acceptable situation or that yesterday’s 
jihadists have become “pragmatic” enough to be viewed as legitimate political actors. 
Additionally, al-Jolani who is leading this transformation pushed by certain considerations 
might abruptly decide to make another shift in a different direction. Any hasty cooperation 
with HTS will also give the group time to establish complete dominance over Idlib. Allowing 
al-Jolani and other warlords of the Syrian conflict to recycle themselves as tomorrow’s leaders 
is short-sighted “realism” that will only promote the instrumentalisation of Islamic discourse 
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as a means of reaching and consolidating power making the path towards democracy, 
stability, and prosperity harder to tread. 
Jolani recognizes that achieving his envisaged future role as a legitimized political 
powerbroker in the densely populated Idlib province will require first getting removed from 
Western lists of terrorist groups. He has embraced this as an agenda by emphasizing that HTS 
poses no threat to individuals outside of Syria. As indicated in a recent interview with PBS’s 
Frontline: “We here do not pose any threat to you, so there is no need for you to classify 
people as terrorists.” In this regard, although HTS is designated a terrorist group by many 
governments and international organizations, “delisting” such groups is not unprecedented. 
The Houthis in Yemen are a recent example.153 However, should HTS be removed from lists 
of terrorist organizations, this must come about at the end of a long and thorough scrutiny of 
the group’s promises to allow organic and meaningful civil activism and its claims of 
willingness to open prisons and detention centres up for inspection by human rights groups. 
The way is paved for HTS to cooperate with Turkey, whether directly through the HTS-
affiliated Salvation Government in Idlib or indirectly by collaborating militarily with the 
Turkey-backed factions in the north. There are actually signs of a rapprochement between 
HTS and some factions of the Syrian National Army. This must be read against a background 
of the following factors. 
First, HTS is under mounting pressure both from extremists dissatisfied with Jolani’s 
pragmatism and locals unhappy with the group’s management of social and economic 
affairs.154 This makes it likely that HTS will move closer to accepting Turkey as its regional 
patron and comply with, or at least not aggressively oppose, any international initiatives for 
peace and reconciliation in the future. Second, the most important source of legitimacy for 
HTS was its military achievements during the conflict therefore, under the current military 
stagnation, HTS' leadership has embarked on a campaign aiming to secure a new source of 
legitimacy that is an external recognition. HTS will capitalize on its de facto dominance in Idlib 
to try to secure recognition of its role and authority to compensate for its diminishing military 
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legitimacy. Third, all actors involved in the conflict in Syria are concerned about the possibility 
of a sudden American withdrawal, following what happened in Afghanistan recently. Such a 
scenario is unlikely given that the situation in Syria is considerably different and that the 
United States left Afghanistan after striking a deal with the Taliban. But, still, the mere 
possibility of an American withdrawal is propelling all actors, including HTS, to prepare for 
such a scenario, for if it happens it will alter the balance of power, most probably in favour of 







This chapter demonstrated al-Nusra’s purposeful utilisation of the discourse of moderation in 
variable ways that were meant to maximise the group’s benefits in each episode of the Syrian 
conflict. Al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation has accompanied its recurrent behavioural shifts 
that were prompted by three key factors which are: the rise of ISIS as a strong Salafi-Jihadist 
challenger, the overall downturn of the militant opposition, and managing the relationship 
with al-Qaeda and its local affiliates and sympathisers. 
Studying the discourse and behaviour of al-Nusra Front in light of the rise of the more radical 
and excessively violent IS group demonstrates the utility of Haines’ theory of RDFs (1984; 
2013). It also corroborates the idea that the emergence of a radical flank does not necessarily 
lead to a positive impact on the more moderate flank. However, the results challenge Haines’ 
premise that RDFs, whether positive or negative, happen unintendedly. Since 2013, al-Nusra 
has taken advantage of the rise and expansion of ISIS to portray itself as the moderate flank 
in Salafi-Jihadism that is adaptable, less violent, and more politically and strategically adept. 
The claim to moderation at that stage was employed to evade the consequences of being 
designated a “terrorist group” including the risk of being targeted internationally and not 
being able to integrate into the opposition and encourage locals to join and support al-Nusra’s 
activities. 
Moreover, al-Nusra has used the claim to moderation differently in relation to factions of the 
Free Syrian Army. In mid-2016, al-Nusra made a strategic shift when its leader, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jolani, announced breaking from al-Qaeda and cutting ties with all foreign 
parties. This decision signified a turn towards asserting al-Nusra’s “Syrian character”. 
Therefore, the Salafi-Jihadist group began to employ a discourse that accentuates “organicity” 
and representation of the will of local people. Aiming to expand, attract more members, and 
become a de facto dominant player in the northwest, al-Nusra resorted to challenging the 
effectiveness and cultural authenticity of the FSA by portraying the latter’s components as 
timid, dependent on external aid, and acting in compliance with foreign agendas. In this 
respect, al-Nusra’s moderation discourse was constructed around claims of commitment, 
effectiveness, autonomy, and cultural resonance.  
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The research reveals that al-Nusra used its internal radical flanks to appear centrist, 
pragmatic, negotiable, and separate from globally-oriented jihadism. Recurrent internal 
campaigns against extremism and intransigence have taken place since disengaging from al-
Qaeda and the subsequent formation of HTS. It appears that these campaigns happened to 
serve the interest of a specific group within al-Nusra. Al-Nusra’s central leadership, that 
encompasses al-Jolani and a small group of his close companions and associates, launched 
military operations and propaganda campaigns to rid their organisation of any “extremist” 
elements. This, in effect, led to the arrest, expulsion, or assassination of numerous members 
and leaders who in reality were potential challengers of al-Jolani’s authority and strategic 
plans. As such, the pretence of moderation served as a tool in the hand of al-Nusra’s 
leadership that enabled al-Jolani to tighten his grip on power and gain more freedom to 
implement his strategic plans most of which revolve around breaking from global Jihadism 
and embedding into the Syrian context, on one hand, and maintaining his group’ de facto 











The few years prior to the Arab Spring were indicative of a shift in al-Qaeda’s approach and 
structure. In 2008, Sageman published his important work Leaderless Jihad wherein he argued 
that al-Qaeda suffered heavy losses in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the 
subsequent decisive American response (Sageman, 2008). Sageman’s thesis centred around 
the idea that al-Qaeda transformed into a brand and an inspiration to many minimally linked 
and globally scattered cells. While Sageman rightly noted that al-Qaeda was unable to resurge 
and reorganise its ranks given the enormous structural constraints at the time, the 
unforeseen outbreak of popular uprisings in several Arab states in late 2010 and early 2011 
changed everything.  
The Arab Spring uprisings have changed the scene of Salafi-Jihadist activism profoundly. Al-
Qaeda, which was facing a serious possibility of becoming irrelevant, sought to take 
advantage of the new situation and found itself propelled to rethink its organisation, 
approach to change, and propaganda messages. ISI, al-Qaeda’s strongest representative in 
the Middle East at the time, was coloured by the Iraqi context focusing on demonstrating its 
anti-Shia propensity while being preoccupied with trying to survive the attacks of the Iraqi 
Ground Forces and the American air raids. The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria offered 
al-Qaeda Central and its affiliates an opportunity to mobilise support and enter into a new 
episode of activism. The new episode, however, was marked by jihadist divergences and 
infightings. Salafi-Jihadism has drastically changed under the Arab Spring; and is by no means 
irrelevant, nor by any ways leaderless.  
Reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front, which emerged in Syria within the context of the 
Arab Spring, reveals that jihadist groups are not extant and unchangeable. Such groups keep 
assessing the effectiveness of their strategies and mobilising discourse. Importantly, jihadist 
groups are not homogeneous. Rather, they host rivalries and constant competitions over 
authority between different currents. In these competitions, claims to religious authenticity 
and strategic expertise are utilised.   
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The recent increase in Salafi-Jihadist activism in various parts of the Middle East is not simply 
and directly a product of the newly consolidated political identity of “Sunni-Arabism”, or the 
lack of political openings and the dominance of authoritarianism in various parts of the Arab 
and Muslim world. However, these are contributing factors that are exploited and channelled 
towards boosting the jihadist propaganda and furthering the strategies of the mujahideen. 
Specific jihadist leaders play an essential ideational and interpretative role. These leaders 
deliberately and selectively magnify elements from the surrounding structural context and 
cultural climate that are thought to serve the objectives of jihad as framed by these figures. 
As such, accounting for the objective historical reality and its complexities remains insufficient 
to explain the behavioural and discursive differences among jihadist groups or the 
occasionally changing behaviour and discourse of the same group.  
Conclusions and final remarks 
In this research, I studied processes of ideological and strategic framings in al-Nusra Front 
between 2012 and 2017. The research reveals that the discourse of al-Nusra Front shows 
ideological continuity and strategic adaptability. Both change and continuity were intended 
to advance al-Nusra’s activism through garnering support and justifying the leadership’s 
strategic preferences. Such a purposive aspect of framing processes indicates the significance 
of human agency in Salafi-Jihadist activism. Furthermore, the findings of the research show 
that it is essential to recognise the imbalanced distribution of agency among Islamist activists. 
Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and strategists form a source of epistemic and normative reference 
(marjiʿiyya) for members of their groups. These figures play varying roles in activism at 
different times. In this respect, the research shows that the realm of referential authority in 
Salafi-Jihadism is itself a contested terrain. It is highly likely that, inside Salafi-Jihadist groups, 
one finds different currents competing over influence and control. Unravelling intra-jihadism 
vying for authority is key to understanding change and continuity in the thought and praxis of 
Salafi-Jihadism.  
Purposeful ideological continuity  
Researching the defining features and themes of the mobilising discourse of the ideologues 
of al-Nusra Front shows a purposive ideological continuity. The fourth chapter shows that 
Salafi-Jihadism is an extension of the modern phenomenon of Islamism which goes against 
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the mainstream idea that Salafi-Jihadists are exceptional and have in the past four decades 
fashioned an entirely different discursive and organisational identity. However, this continuity 
should not be taken at face value. The use of a familiar ideological discourse can itself be a 
strategy for mobilisation. In this research, Islamism (or political Islam) is perceived to be 
centred around the idea that Islam and politics are inseparable and hence all aspects of public 
life, including social and political affairs, must be arranged along Islamic lines. Analysing the 
discourses of three of al-Nusra’s ideologues demonstrates that Salafi-Jihadist organisations 
share with other Islamists the centrality of politics in their discourse, the long-term objectives 
of activism, and the vision of how an ideal society should be. Given that the language of 
Islamism has recently become widespread in various parts of the Middle East for various 
reasons155, the usage of the discourse of Islamism is strategically lucrative as it resonates with 
the current sentiments and consciousness of large segments of society making mobilisation 
easier and rendering “ideological fidelity” itself a strategy. This is significant as it contributes 
to our understanding of the reasons for the rapid rise in the popularity of al-Nusra Front in 
the year following its inception in January 2012. 
Salafi-Jihadism has been on the rise in Syria since 2011 on an unprecedented scale, especially 
with the emergence of al-Nusra Front in early 2012 and ISIS in 2013. Several interrelated 
historical factors have generated political opportunities and material and non-material 
resources that together offered a favourable atmosphere for the recent rise of Salafi-Jihadism 
in Syria. These historical factors include recent changes, such as a rapid increase in 
sectarianism in the Middle East after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and an unprecedented 
surge in Islamist activism after the Arab Spring, in addition to longstanding structural changes 
caused by processes of modernisation and state-building. These structural changes include 
the traditional ulama’s inability to mobilise people and develop a pertinent revolutionary 
discourse in the wake of the Arab Spring which created a gap of religious authority that was 
filled by Salafi-Jihadists in rebel-held areas. Additionally, the Syrian regime has long been 
using militant Islamists to further its foreign and domestic policies in what seems like an 
exchange of favours between two rivals.  
 
155 Notable among these reasons are the decline of Pan-Arab nationalism and the increasing American military 
presence in the Middle East after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. 
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The US-led invasion of Iraq has drastically changed the socio-political situation in Iraq and the 
rest of the Middle East including Syria. Importantly, the initial success of al-Nusra Front and 
other Islamist factions is inseparable from the existence of longstanding sectarian and ethnic 
grievances that have been surging since 2003. In this regard, the rise of “Sunni-Arabs” as a 
cross-border political identity is one of the most significant and least addressed outcomes of 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The awakening of this political identity resulted primarily from 
purposive mobilising efforts carried out by various Islamist groups and happened in a context 
of heightened sectarianism in the Middle East and under a post-Saddam political system 
marked by confessionalism. In this regard, militant Islamists in the region, including Salafi-
Jihadists, were the main beneficiaries of the deepening of sectarian divides and the 
consolidation and politicisation of ethnic and sectarian identities in the Middle East. AQI and 
later ISIS and al-Nusra Front have exploited and fuelled chaos partly by relentlessly fomenting 
anger among Sunnis and providing sectarian framings of the social and political crises in the 
Middle East. 
When demonstrations erupted in Syria in 2011, al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in the Middle East, 
that is ISI, was experiencing a near-defeat in Iraq. Therefore, a scenario of Syria plunging into 
chaos and civil war was a silver lining for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere. Practically, the 
general leadership of al-Qaeda started monitoring the situation and working on establishing 
a branch in Syria with the help of their war-hardened representatives in Iraq. The processes 
of setting up a branch in Syria proceeded sufficiently smoothly and resulted in the 
establishment of al-Nusra Front in January 2012. However, the rapid growth of al-Nusra Front 
over the course of 2012 and early 2013 and the expansionist tendency of ISI led to their 
unavoidable confrontation in 2014 and the subsequent divergence between al-Qaeda and IS 
that arguably constitutes the deepest organisational crack in the history of Jihadist activism. 
The research reveals that, in addition to the existence of permitting and sometimes 
favourable political conditions in Syria after the Arab Spring, members of al-Nusra Front were 
able to mobilise and utilise the available material and nonmaterial resources and channel 
them to advance al-Nusra’s operations and sustain its activism. Symbolically, al-Nusra Front 
used a mobilising discourse that frames the main problem in Muslim societies as being the 
dominance of jahiliyya which signifies the public ignorance of God’s laws and is linked to 
contemporary problems such as corruption, economic crises, and dictatorship. Al-Nusra’s 
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ideologues call on Muslims to give Islam a decisive and authoritative role in the management 
of social and political affairs. They also use a motivational discourse that urges Muslims to be 
active in the public sphere, join Islamist organisations, and seek to fully implement Shariʿa. In 
this regard, the use of a familiar ideological discourse can be seen as an attempt by Salafi-
Jihadist ideologues to increase the cultural resonance of their ideational frames and hence 
increase the probability of success of their mobilising efforts. 
The strategic management of resources enabled the jihadist organisation to carve a 
substantial space for itself in the Syrian civil war and increasingly play a key role in local and 
regional politics. Organisationally, al-Nusra worked initially in small loosely connected units 
which was possible through being held together ideologically thanks to the work of several 
jihadist ideologues. However, this mode of activism and performance became much more 
difficult when al-Nusra grew, clashed with ISIS, and became under immense local, regional, 
and international pressures.  
Strategic adaptability  
The research reveals a recent shift in Salafi-Jihadist activism. The shift revolves around giving 
primacy to strategy and strategic planning in the jihadist discourse. The necessity to bridge 
the gap between the discourse of Salafi-Jihadism and real-life considerations has given rise to 
new and modified branches in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). These aspects of religion that deal 
with reality are theorised, elaborated, and appropriated by an increasingly empowered class 
of jihadist strategists. 
The increasing significance of strategic framing has not led to a departure from religion per 
se; instead, it has led to changing the nature of religious discourse itself. This took the form 
of new and modified branches of Islamic jurisprudence. The emerging practical aspects of 
religious reasoning fall under the generic category of fiqh haraki (activism jurisprudence) and 
include various sub-branches most significant among them are fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality 
jurisprudence), fiqh al-jihad (jihad jurisprudence), and fiqh al-awlawiyyat (priorities 
jurisprudence). These aspects of Islamic jurisprudence enjoy unique importance in today’s 
Salafi-Jihadist activism and form the base for jihadist process of strategic framing. 
The re-emergence of these branches of jurisprudence and the increasing importance of 
strategic framing and political reasoning in jihadist activism provided al-Nusra Front with 
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desperately needed religious justifications of the group’s pragmatism and recurrent strategic 
adaptations, discursively and practically. In this regard, in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 
2011, al-Nusra’s marajiʿ formulated a discourse that justifies riding the wave of popular 
protests by utilising activism jurisprudence. The various branches of activism jurisprudence 
were used to promote pragmatism and theorise the transition from elitism to populism in 
response to the Arab Spring. 
The centrality of marjiʿiyya  
The research shows that members of jihadist groups do not plan and act upon their own 
reasoning and self-interests; rather, they usually follow certain marajiʿ, especially in relation 
to strategic choices. Jihadist marajiʿ are the “content creators” in the world of jihadist activism 
who provide their followers with rulings and instructions along with religious and strategic 
justifications that share their perceptions. These ideologues and strategists form together a 
source of reference, i.e., marjiʿiyya whose rulings are seen by followers as a source of 
normativity and strategic guidance. 
Yet, the research reveals that the realm of marjiʿiyya in jihadist activism is itself a contested 
terrain. Ideologues and jihadists are engaged in a continuous but not very conspicuous 
competition over authority in their groups. The issue of marjiʿiyya has gained substantial 
attention recently. Salafi-Jihadists in the past two decades have started to call for abandoning 
the traditional Salafi position that shuns politics, fights innovation, and views with suspicion 
all forms of authority, other than the authority of God as expressed in the teachings found in 
Islam’s foundational texts. Consequently, leading Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ, especially al-Suri, 
called openly for establishing a hierarchy of authority in terms of matters relating to strategic 
planning and the organisation of jihadist activism. Abdul Rahim Attoun and various leading 
figures from al-Nusra Front have borrowed from al-Suri and built on his thoughts to formulate 
a strategic discourse that resonates with the Syrian context and benefits al-Nusra. Attoun 
observes the chaos engulfing jihadist activism, which is manifest through disorganised 
religious learning, proliferation of ignorant figures, lack of unified marjiʿiyya, increase in 
disagreements, and disrespect of Islamic doctrines and their vast jurisprudential heritage. As 
a result, Attoun insists on respecting the leaders and marajiʿ among the mujahideen in Syria, 
but not any marajiʿ, however; only those who are equipped with proven strategic knowledge 
and armed with a well-rounded understanding of fiqh al-waqiʿ (reality jurisprudence). 
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The writings of al-Nusra’s marajiʿ reveal a recent turn in Salafi-Jihadism towards advocating 
organisational discipline and strict adherence to the dictates of those who are higher in the 
pyramid of command. Additionally, the experience of al-Nusra proves that strategists-
ideologues relations are conflictual. There is a constant internal competition over authority 
and control. The evolvement of al-Nusra since late 2011 shows that the need for ideologues 
at the formative period enables them to gain primacy thanks to their cohesive and 
mobilisational role. Later changes necessitate the management of economic and political 
affairs thus giving rise to strategists. This means that those who do not demonstrate an ability 
to provide nuanced readings of the geostrategic situation lose their significance and influence 
within the organisation. They either defect and voluntarily distance themselves or are forcibly 
expelled or arrested. Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of al-Nusra Front, 
benefitted from that strategic shift. He practically consolidated his power and rid his 
organisation of rebellious or competing members as well as most of its ideologically 
intransigent leaders. In short, al-Nusra has gradually become al-Jolani’s organisation. 
The strategic use of discourse 
The research reveals the adaptability of the Salafi-Jihadist discourse and its responsiveness to 
structural changes in the surrounding environment. The last chapter demonstrated al-Nusra’s 
purposeful utilisation of the discourse of moderation in variable ways that were meant to 
maximise the group’s benefits in each episode of the Syrian conflict. Al-Nusra’s discourse of 
moderation has accompanied its recurrent behavioural shifts that were prompted by three 
key factors which are: the rise of ISIS as a strong Salafi-Jihadist challenger, the overall 
downturn of the militant opposition, and managing the relationship with al-Qaeda and its 
local affiliates and sympathisers. 
Studying the discourse and behaviour of al-Nusra Front in light of the rise of the more radical 
and excessively violent IS group demonstrates the utility of Haines’ theory of RDFs (1984; 
2013). It also corroborates the idea that the emergence of a radical flank does not necessarily 
lead to a positive impact on the more moderate flank. However, the results challenge Haines’ 
premise that RDFs, whether positive or negative, happen unintendedly. Since 2013, al-Nusra 
has taken advantage of the rise and expansion of ISIS to portray itself as the moderate flank 
in Salafi-Jihadism that is adaptable, less violent, and more politically and strategically adept. 
The claim to moderation at that stage was employed to evade the consequences of being 
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designated a “terrorist group” including the risk of being targeted internationally and not 
being able to integrate into the opposition and encourage locals to join and support al-Nusra’s 
activities. 
Moreover, al-Nusra has used the claim to moderation differently in relation to factions of the 
Free Syrian Army. In mid-2016, al-Nusra made a strategic shift when its leader, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jolani, announced breaking from al-Qaeda and cutting ties with all foreign 
parties. This decision signified a turn towards asserting al-Nusra’s “Syrian character”. 
Therefore, the Salafi-Jihadist group began to employ a discourse that accentuates “organicity” 
and representation of the will of local people. Aiming to expand, attract more members, and 
become a de facto dominant player in the northwest, al-Nusra resorted to challenging the 
effectiveness and cultural authenticity of the FSA by portraying the latter’s components as 
timid, dependent on external aid, and acting in compliance with foreign agendas. In this 
respect, al-Nusra’s moderation discourse was constructed around claims of commitment, 
effectiveness, autonomy, and cultural resonance.  
The research reveals that al-Nusra pragmatically used its internal radical flanks to appear 
centrist, negotiable, and separate from global jihadism. Recurrent internal campaigns against 
extremism and intransigence have taken place since disengaging from al-Qaeda and the 
subsequent formation of HTS. It appears that these campaigns happened to serve the interest 
of a specific group within al-Nusra. Al-Nusra’s central leadership, that encompasses al-Jolani 
and a small group of his close companions and associates, launched military operations and 
propaganda campaigns to rid their organisation of any “extremist” elements. This, in effect, 
led to the arrest, expulsion, or assassination of numerous members and leaders who in reality 
were potential challengers of al-Jolani’s authority and strategic plans. As such, the pretence 
of moderation served as a tool in the hand of al-Nusra’s leadership that enabled al-Jolani to 
tighten his grip on power and gain more freedom to implement his strategic plans most of 
which revolve around breaking from global jihadism and embedding into the Syrian context, 
on one hand, and maintaining his group’ de facto dominance in the Idlib province, militarily 
and administratively, on the other hand.  
Based on the above, do these remarks mean that pressure leads to moderation in the case of 
Salafi-Jihadist organisations? While pressure seemed to lead al-Nusra to respond positively 
and move slowly towards ideological moderation and political cooperation, pressure also led 
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ISIS towards more defiance and extremism. The difference cannot be explained by referring 
to ideological divergences that separate the two jihadist groups. ISIS and al-Nusra emerged 
from the same ideological source but evolved differently. There is little to no predictability in 
that regard. What may alleviate uncertainty is to acquire more nuanced knowledge on the 
movement’s leaders and the power dynamics within jihadist organisations as this will bring 
to light volitionality and purposiveness in Salafi-Jihadist activism. In essence, more agency-
sensitive research would lead to a more accurate understanding of the Islamists’ dissimilar 
evolvements and divergent trajectories. Contrary to the claimed and supposed homogeneity 
in jihadist organisations, this research shows that these organisations host constant internal 
struggles and conflicts over authority, legitimacy, and influence, and that the organisation’s 
overall behaviour and strategic choices are strongly influenced by such internal competitions. 
Religious discourse and traditions are used by different conflicting currents and groups to 
back their respective positions hence reducing the explanatory power of a sole religio-cultural 
approach to Islamist activism. 
I conclude this research by stating that al-Nusra Front, as an example of Salafi-Jihadist 
organisations, is not purely and constantly ideologically and dogmatically driven. At the same 
time, al-Nusra Front is not purely and constantly pragmatic. What determines the extent of 
pragmatism and dogmatism is a set of framing processes performed by specific referential 
leaders. In this respect, militant Islamist organisations are not homogeneous bodies that 
blindly follow scripts or collectively agreed-on strategic visions. They are more than reactors 
who impulsively respond to changes in their environments. The inside of a militant Islamist 
organisation is an ecosystem that hosts fierce competitions over influence and control. Using 
the terminology of Islamic studies, different currents within such organisations compete over 
marjiʿiyya (epistemic and normative authority). The research reveals that ideologues and 
religious figures play a particularly significant mobilising role in the early stages of activism as 
they define the enemy and the unifying cause for members and supporters. But the 
significance of ideologues begins to fade with the rise of questions regarding the management 
of resources and running administrative bodies in the areas under control. With the rise of 
such pressing practical matters, referential authority moves into the hands of strategic 
leaders who, in addition to possessing adequate religious knowledge, are close to the field, 
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